



ISS

European
Union
Institute for
Security Studies

What ambitions for European defence in 2020?

Edited by
Álvaro de Vasconcelos

*Preface by
Javier Solana*

In January 2002 the **Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)** became an autonomous Paris-based agency of the European Union. Following an EU Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001, modified by the Joint Action of 21 December 2006, it is now an integral part of the new structures that will support the further development of the CFSP/ESDP. The Institute's core mission is to provide analyses and recommendations that can be of use and relevance to the formulation of the European security and defence policy. In carrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface between European experts and decision-makers at all levels.

The European Union Institute for Security Studies . Paris

© EU Institute for Security Studies 2009. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the EU Institute for Security Studies.

Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur, Graphic design by Metropolis (Lisboa)



What ambitions for European defence in 2020?

Claude-France Arnould, Juha Auvinen, Henri Bentégeat,
Nicole Gnesotto, Jolyon Howorth, F. Stephen Larrabee, Tomas Ries,
Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Stefano Silvestri, Alexander Stubb,
Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Alexander Weis
and Richard Wright

Preface by Javier Solana

Edited by Álvaro de Vasconcelos



Institute for Security Studies

European Union

43 avenue du Président Wilson

75775 Paris cedex 16

tel.: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 30

fax: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 31

e-mail: info@iss.europa.eu

www.iss.europa.eu

Director: Álvaro de Vasconcelos

ISBN 978-92-9198-145-8

QN-80-09-755-EN-C



**‘For those who make wise decisions
are more formidable to their enemies
than those who rush madly into strong action’.**

Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*



Acknowledgements

My first debt is to the authors who contributed to this volume and to Javier Solana who graciously agreed to write the foreword. I would also like to acknowledge the input of Maria do Rosário de Moraes Vaz, including comments on earlier versions of my own chapters, and also that of Giovanni Grevi, Daniel Keohane and Burkard Schmitt. I would also like to thank Nicole Gnesotto for her comments on the Survey questions. Last but not least, many thanks to EUISS publications editor Gearóid Cronin, for his skilful revision and editing of all the chapters, and thanks also to Hanno Ranck and to Metropolis in Lisbon for the graphic design. Of course I assume full responsibility for the conclusions and recommendations drawn from the authors' papers.

Álvaro de Vasconcelos

Paris, July 2009

Contents

Preface

Javier Solana	7
---------------	---

Introduction – 2020: defence beyond the transatlantic paradigm

Álvaro de Vasconcelos	11
-----------------------	----

Part I – Experts’ perspectives 23

Nicole Gnesotto <i>The need for a more strategic EU</i>	25
---	----

Jolyon Howorth <i>Implementing a ‘grand strategy’</i>	35
---	----

F. Stephen Larrabee <i>The United States and the evolution of ESDP</i>	45
--	----

Tomas Ries <i>The globalising security environment and the EU</i>	55
---	----

Stefano Silvestri <i>The gradual path to a European defence identity</i>	69
--	----

Part II – Practitioners’ perspectives 79

Claude-France Arnould <i>A noble ambition</i>	81
---	----

Henri Bentégeat <i>What aspirations for European defence?</i>	91
---	----

Alexander Weis <i>Improving capabilities for ESDP’s future needs</i>	101
--	-----

Richard Wright and Juha Auvinen <i>What ambitions for the civilian ESDP?</i>	111
--	-----

Part III – Politicians’ Perspectives 123

Alexander Stubb <i>In search of smart power</i>	125
---	-----

Nuno Severiano Teixeira <i>European defence: a future challenge</i>	137
---	-----

Jacek Saryusz-Wolski <i>Security and defence in the enlarged Europe</i>	145
---	-----

Conclusions – Ten priorities for the next ten years

Álvaro de Vasconcelos	153
-----------------------	-----

Annexes 163

<i>The authors</i>	163
--------------------	-----

<i>Survey: What ambitions for European Defence in 2020?</i>	167
---	-----

<i>Abbreviations</i>	169
----------------------	-----



Preface

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has reached an important milestone in its development. This year marks its tenth anniversary. This book is therefore an important contribution to the strategic debate, looking ahead to where ESDP could and should be ten years from now. It covers the range of key issues that we need to consider in taking ESDP forward into its second decade – policy, analysis of challenges, strategy, partnerships, structures and capabilities.

The EU today plays a crucial role in bringing stability to different parts of the world. Over the past ten years ESDP has contributed to this through 22 missions in four of the world's continents. The EU has proved the credibility of its military capability on the ground in Africa, in Congo and Chad; it has proved its unique civil-military capability in the Balkans; and it further demonstrated its relevance, as well as the EU's capacity for immediate action when the political will is there, when we deployed over 200 unarmed monitors to Georgia as part of the EU-brokered peace agreement following the war between Russia and Georgia last year. Development of ESDP's crisis management capacity is crucial to the objective of strengthening the EU as a global actor and contributing effectively to international peace and security.

Therefore ESDP has an important role in the management of global challenges. That the world looks to us for this is evidenced by the fact that we are increasingly in demand. The strength of ESDP derives from its consensual basis, which lends it moral and legal legitimacy. Missions undertaken in the framework of ESDP are not based on a single state's interests, but on a collective and consensual ethos motivated by concern for the common good, whether this be for example improving the situation in Congo for victims of sexual violence, or bringing stability to the people of Somalia and ensuring they can better manage their territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

The logic underpinning ESDP – its unique and distinctive civil-military approach to crisis management – was ahead of its time when conceived. That logic has proved its validity and has been adopted widely by others. It provides a sound basis on which to approach the coming ten years.

We must strengthen our comprehensive nature and cohesion beyond the level of rhetoric, and ensure that our ESDP actions are firmly anchored in political strategies. Our Member States each have a different history and geography. We must improve our ability to channel the richness of this diversity in support of our political engagement in other parts of the world. The strengths of one Member State must become a source of strength for the others and for EU action. Member States, our strategic partners and partner organisations acknowledge the value of having a strong EU able to engage in crisis management and contribute to the promotion of security and stability in the world. ‘Civ-mil’ synergies must be further developed, as must our ‘civ-civ’ synergies – as these are part of the added value of the EU. Our institutions, decision-making processes and command structures must be flexible, able to respond quickly and fit for the purpose of our future challenges and our comprehensive method of engagement. The Lisbon Treaty will give us new momentum in this direction and the potential to do more, and to act more cohesively and with greater flexibility. But this will not come easily. How it unfolds in terms of implementation will depend on the political will of Member States and solidarity between them – the will of the larger Member States to remain committed in a way that is commensurate with their size, and the will of the smaller Member States to continue to contribute to the diversity and global perspective of the EU.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) will provide our strategic framework well into the next decade. The world as envisaged in the ESS necessitates that we are much better able to anticipate events and adopt a more sophisticated approach to conflict prevention. In due course, our analysis and developments will enable us to see with more clarity what is required of us in meeting the challenges foreseen. The future is already upon us. We are already familiar with issues of ‘ecological protection’ and ‘flow security’ described in this book e.g. in relation to the piracy activities off the coast of Somalia, which originate from Somali fishermen protecting their fishing stocks. The EU launched its counter-piracy operation, EU NAVFOR Atalanta, last year to tackle the immediate effects of this and we are also looking at what it can do to address the root causes.

We must have the personnel and capabilities – both civilian and military – to back up these political ambitions. The current gap between ambitions and reality must be addressed. For our future credibility, in a world where we must be ready to engage in more complex and risky endeavours, it is imperative that we become more efficient at procuring and deploying equipment and personnel. Striving for greater European defence integration and cooperation is a corollary of this. Mem-

ber States should continue to support the European Defence Agency (EDA) in its efforts to lead this process. I am convinced that in an uncertain world of fast-changing dynamics and threats, the more we do together the more efficient we are and the stronger and safer Europe will be.

The EU has several strategic partnerships to foster and balance. ESDP is an important element of this – Canada, Norway, Russia, Turkey and the US are all contributors to our missions. This has the value of broadening the consensus for our action. Furthermore, our interaction with partner organisations – the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the AU – is vitally important. We must find ways to strengthen these relationships to ensure that interaction in ESDP is as efficient as it needs to be. The ‘either/or’ EU-NATO debate is outdated. The EU is not a military alliance and the added value of the broader EU/ESDP approach to security has been amply demonstrated. The key issue now is to develop a more flexible framework for working together.

The world will remain constantly in flux. We must therefore remain adaptable in terms of our engagement – what is now possible between the EU and US was not possible until recently. But we must also remain consistent in terms of the pursuit and application of our principles: liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law – these core values will remain as fundamental in 2020 as they are today.

We have come a long way in developing ESDP as a tool enabling Europe to project itself through action in response to crises. ESDP is no longer an aspiration; it is a reality. The process of moving forward, of evolving and growing stronger has not been as fast as some would have hoped, but it is nevertheless an ever-advancing process. This book makes a significant contribution to the debate on the future of ESDP and the implications of what the Lisbon Treaty could and should bring to it, identifying the obstacles to progress and solutions for addressing them. I am grateful to the EUISS for this important initiative and to the contributors for their valuable input.

Javier Solana

Brussels, June 2009



Introduction – 2020: defence beyond the transatlantic paradigm

Álvaro de Vasconcelos

January 2003 saw the deployment of the first ESDP police mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first-ever ESDP military mission, in Africa, was soon to follow, in June, as some fifteen hundred mainly French soldiers led by General Bruno Neveux were dispatched in record time to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to break the siege laid to the city of Bunia. ESDP was thus adding flesh to the bones of the policy laid out some ten years ago, at the 4-5 June 1999 European Council meeting in Cologne. Bringing ESDP into existence was meant by European leaders to convey a message of ‘never again’, and to mark a departure from past dramatic failures to check even the ugliest manifestations of resurgent extreme nationalism, epitomised by the inability to stop genocide in Srebrenica in 1995.

It was the Bosnia ‘trauma’ and its bitter lessons that led France and Britain to join forces and sign the St. Malo Declaration towards the end of 1998, resolving to put aside their differences and set European defence in motion, in a move designed to give the EU ‘autonomy’ and ‘credibility’, and to add muscle to European military cooperation. The fact that ESDP did indeed see the light of day signifies that Europeans were finally ready to overcome the taboo surrounding defence that had existed since the failure in 1954 of the European Defence Community.

The aim of the present volume is to examine what Europe’s own ambition in security and defence matters could be in the next ten years, or more appropriately perhaps to seek to define what that ambition should be, and how it should translate into politics and policies. We go to press, however, without foreknowledge of whether the Lisbon Treaty will ever come into being, without a full appreciation of how defence options and budgets will be affected by the world economic crisis, whether this is in full swing or already receding, and more importantly without knowing how global and indeed European power sharing will be re-shaped as a result. No more than we can foretell whether Paris and London will ever be able to find in tandem the inspiration and commonality of vision

that would give a second life to the spirit of St. Malo. Just as decisive for the future of the EU as a world player, the success or failure of the 'Obama experiment' in the United States is equally unpredictable. Will the multilateral vision be turned into political reality, will it be up to the task of 'multilateralising multipolarity' and thus bringing about a world governed by norms and rules somewhere in the future, creating the most favourable – perhaps the only – environment allowing for the European 'model' to entirely fulfil its promise? Or are we moving anti-clockwise, slipping back, in spite of our best joint efforts, into a truly 'multipolar' world shaped by the strains and inherent dangers of big power competition?

There can of course be no definite answers to questions whose outcomes lie in the future, even if they are being determined in the present. And yet these are the relatively simple ones, in that we know already that they need to be formulated, and require some form of answer in order to tackle the issues addressed in the following pages. There are the more complex ones arising from sheer unknowns, the entirely unforeseeable developments that may yet come to shape the international system perhaps even more decisively, and the EU and its future with it. And we do not know exactly what might be the trigger of such unknowns because the present complexities and intricacies of international relations, or rather their determining factors, are difficult to grasp and there is a high level of unpredictability.

What will their implications be for the great-power dreams, including those still entertained by certain EU Member States? Not only are such ambitions contrary to the essence of a commitment to the EU ideal, but they are also totally unrealistic since in a world of great powers come true the most powerful European states, without the backing of the Union, would at best count as medium-sized players.¹ Nicolas Sarkozy was made acutely aware of this during his term at the helm of the EU Presidency, when the prominence of France on the world stage, notably during the war in Georgia, was contingent on the ability to mobilise the EU's soft power, bringing the weight of economic relations to bear on Russia, and fielding an ESDP monitoring mission to Georgia at the height of the crisis.

A noble ambition

We have neither the wish nor the power to predict the future. Looking into the future is first and foremost, almost without exception, an exercise reflecting what one would like to happen. Based on what we know now, we set out to outline what should be a realistic ambition for meaningful EU defence cooperation, that is to say, for ESDP. Claude-France

1. See Álvaro de Vasconcelos, 'L'Union européenne parmi les grandes puissances', *Commentaire*, no. 104, hiver 2008-9.

Arnould reminds us of Montesquieu's words: 'when properly directed, a noble ambition is a sentiment useful to society.' In the case of the EU, 'noble ambition' constitutes the essence of the European process itself. When, after the dreams of political union and European defence were shattered in 1954, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman proceeded with small steps along a path of gradualism, the ambition was the same and just as enormous: to bring peace to Europe, to do away with the then established belief that war was a natural and legitimate 'continuation of politics by other means.' Ambition, in fact far-reaching 'noble ambition', was from the beginning an essential ingredient of the European project, and concomitantly its driving force.

The European Union is not, however, about the past. It is clearly a construction 'against the past,' looking to the future and in perpetual *devenir*: that is why the ultimate goal, the so-called *finalité*, tied to its intrinsic open-endedness, is left undefined. In attempting to set forth what should be the ambition of Europeans in the field of security and defence, we have asked leading experts and 'practitioners' of ESDP, some serving in the Council, the Commission and Parliament, as well as a number of academics and politicians, to address a set of ten specific questions. The topics include the nature of ESDP missions and their geographical scope; intra-European solidarity and relations with NATO; ESDP goals and capacities; the creation of a European defence market; the question of from where ESDP derives its legitimacy; the issues of values and autonomy; coherence and flexibility.

The limits of the exercise are those of the European Union itself and of its international identity. Knowing what the EU is not is just as essential as knowing what it is, where it is headed and what it might become. This is the reason why we should briefly ponder – before surveying the different chapters in this volume and the conclusions to be drawn from the different perspectives they present – on the likely, and hopefully positive, evolution of European power in the years to come and on the challenges of the emerging multipolar order..

No normative power without 'real power'

The European Union's international identity will reflect its internal identity, no more and no less. And this duality will shape both the European vision for the international system – the grand strategy – and its foreign policy orientations, and of course also ESDP. The present and future ability of the EU to project military force cannot be analysed or designed and shaped as if the European Union was exactly the same as the United States – or China for that matter. As Jolyon Howorth suggests, the distinctiveness of the EU lies in 'norms-based effective multilateralism and the promotion of a world in which hu-

man rights, human security, international institutions and international law will replace the law of the jungle. The EU is already demonstrating, empirically, that it can *conduct international relations differently*.² This has led some to define the European Union as an ‘international public good.’² It also explains why expectations placed in the EU by close and not so close neighbours remain high, the ‘Obama revolution’ notwithstanding. They will only tend to increase in the years ahead, especially if the Lisbon Treaty finally sees the light of day.

The Union must develop a clear and common understanding of the present international system and of the security challenges that it entails. The European Security Strategy of 2003 and the Implementation Report of 2008 are a good basis for this, as in both documents effective multilateralism is defined as the linking thread of EU external action. But the EU needs to define a larger strategic concept able to bring together all the dimensions of its external action and to find the right balance between security and other global governance issues. One of the characteristics of today’s world is the improbability of a military confrontation among the major global players. This is an enormous opportunity to foster an international agenda not dominated by security concerns but by human development ones, including the protection of the individual against violence of any kind. This is a very favourable climate for the EU to exercise its soft power.

To maintain its soft power, to protect its power of attraction from inevitable erosion otherwise, the EU will need to avoid any form of ‘securitisation’ of its policies, in discourse as well as in real terms. Looking to 2020, however, some will be tempted to say that since challenges are arguably shifting away, as Tomas Ries points out in his chapter, from the comparatively clear confines of state security into predominantly economic, social and ecological spheres, this should then imply that security options and concerns be equally as expansively defined, broadening the scope for justified, legitimate use of EU military instruments as a consequence. Let it be stressed again that the distinctiveness of the European Union greatly depends on its sustained preference for soft power instruments, for persuasion rather than force. Deviation from this rule, in particular when confronting non-military, non-security challenges of a ‘societal’ nature, be they social, economic, energy or environment-related, would kill European distinctiveness altogether. Reliance on hard power to meet ‘soft’ challenges – a rough equivalent of ‘disproportionate response’ – would not only be inconsistent with the lessons learnt from the European experience, but a sure recipe for alienating partners and pushing the goal of global governance well out of reach.

2. Celso Lafer, ‘The European Union – an international public good’, *Issues*, EUISS Newsletter no. 24, November 2007.

The refusal to pursue a ‘security first’-driven international policy does not mean that the normative power of the EU – in other words, achieving its ‘noble ambition’ – does not crucially depend on its status as an international actor, however non-traditional, in possession of a full range of policy instruments, including a significant measure of hard power. The need for a balanced combination of both soft and hard power was an important conclusion of the debates held around the Convention on the Future of Europe, that ultimately defined the Union as being based on the equilibrium between diversity and unity; the balance, on the other hand, is to be struck by subsidiarity, which can simply be described as doing together what is best done together, and leaving to the capitals what they do best on their own. The European Union is a community of states that have come together to shape and share a common destiny: it is based on deep association among individual states that have raised commonality and interdependence to a stage where fragmentation or conflict become unthinkable. Nothing in the past or the current debate on the future of Europe points to the Union becoming over the next decade some superstate or superpower with an army modelled on the United States of America. Conversely, there is no indication that its ambition goes no further than just being a giant, tightly regulated marketplace (though shrinking in relative terms). The ‘global trader-only’ design, if it ever really existed, was swept away by the post-Cold War debate, the war in the Balkans and the drive to move forward to a political union of national states.

There is another reason why Europe’s ambition is different from that of most or even all current great powers: the primary *raison d’être* of the European project, that of building a space where peace and democracy reign supreme. The defeat of extreme nationalism, which led to the brutality and horror of World War II, has delegitimised nationalism, as Raymond Aron noted many years ago, and as a consequence adherence to the European ideal means renouncing power politics. But consistency demands that once power politics are abandoned ‘domestically’ they be abandoned for good. This obviously has enormous consequences for the European defence endeavour. Building a European army to pursue European interests ‘by other means’ is not on the cards.

The European Union will remain a civilian power, but hopefully one with a commensurate military capability. An easy prediction is that ESDP will not transform itself into some kind of new NATO, a military alliance predicated on collective defence, at least as long as the United States will remain committed to the existential defence of European states. There is no reason to think it likely that the US commitment will vanish in the next decade. It is true that a strong expression of EU solidarity clearly alluding to defence is to be found in the Lisbon Treaty, where article 42.7 states that should one of its member countries be ‘the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their

power.’ This is in a sense an overstatement of a basic principle of EU integration or, as Alexander Stubb emphasises, ‘this confirms the obvious’, for it is inconceivable that in the improbable event of an armed attack against any EU Member State the others would remain passive and fail in their duty to extend solidarity. But it does not mean that ESDP is going to turn into a military alliance, since it is in no way implied that assistance must be restricted solely to military means, and military assistance in such a remotely probable event would hardly need ESDP to materialise. Membership of the European Union, collective or joint military capabilities notwithstanding, is in a sense an ‘existential’ deterrent of greater magnitude than ESDP could ever be expected to provide.

The reality is that the European Union is building ESDP into a security tool indispensable to the conduct of foreign policy: an instrument designed to promote EU international standards that adds a vital element to its ability to promote peace, democracy and also, it should be noted, development. In the years to come, ESDP will be expanding its missions to include disarmament and post-conflict stabilisation.

The EU’s ability to play a major role in crisis-management is indeed instrumental in achieving many of its major goals. ESDP has been, the recognised foreign policy deficit notwithstanding, an instrument of the broader strategic objectives of the Union. These are unlikely to change dramatically in the years ahead, and may be outlined as follows.

First, to bolster European integration itself as it widens and simultaneously deepens; which means today, in keeping with the decisions taken by the European Council, expanding the Union into the Balkans and Turkey. Setting the Balkans on the ‘road to Europe’ and consolidating democratisation there would not have been possible without the stabilisation and rule-of-law missions of ESDP, and this is certainly today the case for Kosovo and Bosnia. Turkey needs to become strongly involved in ESDP and in European agencies like the EDA.

Second, to bring about peace and support democratically-minded political reform in its neighbourhood; this obviously extends to the Middle East, and requires the ability to stop crises from degenerating into grave humanitarian disasters. The Union is already strongly engaged in Africa in the framework of UN peace missions and in cooperation with the African Union. Africa will certainly remain at the centre-stage of the EU’s contribution to international peace in the years to come.

Will EU ambitions remain predominantly regional and focused in particular on Africa (perceived as ‘an extended southern neighbourhood’)? Or is the EU on the course to becoming a global international (and therefore security) actor able to act wherever chal-

allenges to international peace – increasingly coincidental with internal peace – will arise? The answer remains unclear. Some will contend that the most important contribution to international peace consists of continental-wide integration, and that if in the coming decade the Union is able to extend peace and democracy by inclusion to its neighbouring areas this would count as a formidable achievement. But others will argue, as does General Henri Bentégeat, that there is inevitably a global dimension to the challenges the Union must face, and that it is unimaginable to reduce the ‘diplomatic action which it is gradually re-inventing by speaking with a single voice on countless issues and by acting on behalf of 27 Member States in more than 130 countries around the world’ to ‘purely regional aspirations.’

Perhaps a stronger reason that makes it inevitable for the Union to take on a global outreach is a consequence of the ties with the vast Euro-Mediterranean space in its immediate vicinity, and, more broadly, the stakes in the global governance agenda. Suffice to mention that the countries of the Middle East, including Iran, are among the EU’s neighbours; that Turkey is a membership candidate and Cyprus a full member, and there is little need for further proof that the challenges the EU faces are indeed global challenges that have a bearing on the world order. The Union needs the full engagement of the United States and other major powers to satisfactorily deal with its international agenda. And if the Union wants to influence the world order then it also needs to strengthen ties with other global players. This in turn requires a global role that must necessarily include that of a security provider. This is crucial to a ‘relationship of equals’ with the United States, who in particular expects Europe to play a major part in rebuilding Afghanistan, and indeed it is just as crucial for strategic partnership-building with current and aspiring world powers. If the Union remains excessively region-focused when it comes to international security, it will hardly be able to persuade others to live up to the international responsibilities world-power status implies. In other words, a truly global status will inevitably require a commensurate global security dimension.

In all probability, the European Union will remain faithful to its security doctrine which is generally considered to place ‘human security’ at its heart, since it is predicated on protecting civilians and on the responsibility to protect. Like all members of the international community, who in President Obama’s words must always be mindful that they share ‘a common humanity’, it must be ready to do all in its power to prevent crimes against humanity from being committed and to use force to stop mass atrocities. As is stressed by Richard Wright and Juha Auvinen in their contribution, one of the implications of this is the deployment of ‘ESDP operations in areas risk-prone to mass atrocity crimes’; it is interesting to note in this regard that ‘the Council Joint Action on EULEX Kosovo is the first example of such a direct reference to the responsibility to protect.’

The implication of this is that ESDP is not just focused on peacekeeping operations but also, increasingly, on making peace. In looking into the future and planning for it, we should be aware that such a definition of ESDP does not mean risks will diminish or indeed that only low-intensity conflicts will need to be resolved. Nor does it provide an indication as to the number of troops that might be needed, no more than as to the scale and duration of military operations that the future may hold in store: Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur, Congo or Afghanistan, all fit into the parameters of implementing a human security concept and rising up to the responsibility to protect. Bosnia in the 1990s provides an illustration of the kinds of challenges that result from the EU taking up fully, albeit belatedly, the responsibility to protect as part of its international duties. Both keeping and making peace requires, on the other hand, a strong civilian component. This is an aspect of ESDP that has grown significantly in the past ten years.

Multilateralising multipolarity

The world is unquestionably ‘multipolar’ although in an unprecedented way. Enormous interdependence creates a common interest in regulated, sound multilateral governance but at the same time gives rise to tension and possibly conflict: energy interdependence between Russia and the EU is a good illustration of this. The only way to avoid a great world power game, where the EU would soon be irrelevant, is to build a system of universally accepted rules and norms forming the basis for common efforts and sharing the burden of resolving global and regional issues. This is what can be termed ‘multilateralising multipolarity’, i.e. engaging global and major regional players in strategic cooperation frameworks in order to act together.³ There is no other option for the EU to fulfil its ambition of playing a major role in international politics to bring about peace and security. The alliance with the US is as indispensable as it is insufficient to deal with the most pressing issues for the EU. If there is one predominant idea in all the essays in this volume, it is that the world has changed dramatically and will change even more in the next ten years. As a result, the ‘West’ needs the ‘Rest’, a foregone conclusion that already constituted one of the drivers of the 2003 European Security Strategy. NATO will not be the only option or even a decisive one when it comes to dealing with international security issues. The EU’s main partner outside NATO may sometimes be the US, but at other times it may be India or China, the African Union or Latin America, or even a large coalition of states legitimised by the UN. In the years to come, the EU will need to learn how to develop ESDP missions with the cooperation of other international actors. This is already the case to a certain extent with Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway,

3. See Álvaro de Vasconcelos, ‘“Multilateralising” multipolarity’, in Giovanni Grevi and Álvaro de Vasconcelos (eds.), ‘Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism’, *Chaillot Paper* no. 109 (Paris: EUISS, May 2008).

and Turkey. In all circumstances, the ability of the Union to speak with a single voice in all international institutions will be a precondition of its ability to come to terms with the extraordinary changes that multipolarity entails.

The advent of the 'Obama era' in the United States has opened a window of opportunity for the European vision of effective multilateralism to come true. The first four years of the next decade will in this sense have a decisive impact on the shape of the international order by 2020. A common understanding with the United States on how to deal with today's multipolarity, so as to avert concert-of-power trends and check emerging balance-of-power impulses, is doubtless a first priority. This obviously implies that NATO must never become or indeed be seen as an alliance of the West against the Rest. There is a major inconsistency in demanding that China and Russia take on their international responsibilities and proposing in the same stroke a 'global NATO' that looks suspiciously like a military alliance of democracies against authoritarian states. The revision of NATO's strategic concept in 2010 will be an opportunity to define NATO's role and to take stock of the specific civilian/military role of ESDP. The United States is moving towards a strategic concept much closer to that of the European Union, where pre-emptive wars will disappear, and resorting to military force will increasingly be envisaged in terms of last-resort necessity. This is bound to have major implications for NATO's strategy.

Europe needs to agree on a common understanding regarding NATO's strategic concept. The full integration of France into NATO's military command structure should not mean that ESDP is made irrelevant, but that complementarities and division of labour between the two can now be defined in a more consensual way. Technical relations between ESDP and NATO should be enhanced, but it should be borne in mind that the EU's primary strategic partner will remain the United States, with whom we have a bilateral agenda that is much broader than NATO or even security issues. NATO should remain a military alliance and not a crisis-management organisation. The EU with its unique civilian component will need to build a strategic partnership with the United States that goes well beyond NATO. Its content and the scope for cooperation is bound to have a strong crisis-management dimension, with the US comeback as a soft power provider; the EU would be ill-advised to think that it can continue to claim uniqueness in this field. A significant upgrade of EU-US security relations is made easier by the recognition by the US that a strong, up-and-running ESDP is in America's interest, and that the EU will increasingly act autonomously from NATO. For that, as almost all the authors in this book point out, the EU will need to establish a fully-fledged European command to plan and conduct military operations. There are many indications that the US understands this today : as F. Stephen Larrabee points out, 'France's return to the military wing of NATO ... should reduce the sense of suspicion and mistrust on both sides and make the establishment of

an EU planning capacity less contentious and easier to manage.’ This in no way implies that NATO-ESDP cooperation should suffer as a result.

In ten years time we will know if Europe, and indeed also the United States, will have proved able to overcome the old transatlantic paradigm and build a comprehensive strategic partnership, capable of fostering effective multilateralism, or if old habits will have triumphed – habits that have caused as Nicole Gnesotto points out, the EU-NATO relationship to be ‘a major factor in the ESDP’s stagnation, and ultimately a pretext for collective paralysis, both in the Union and in NATO’.

No credibility without legitimacy and effectiveness

The main conclusion from the following chapters is that the EU must address three basic deficits as a matter of priority (and remain vigilant so as not to create a fourth) in order to realise its ‘noble ambition’ in a way that will be beneficial to its own Member States and to international society.

(1) The CFSP deficit. ESDP is a display of the EU’s foreign policy strengths as well as, paradoxically, of its weakness. The fact is that it has proven easier for the European Union to deploy troops and field policemen than to define common positions and act on them, as exemplified in Kosovo. Nicole Gnesotto points out that the ‘ yawning gap between ESDP’s progress and the *status quo* in common foreign policy’ constitutes a major handicap: ‘Progress on defence has been much faster and higher-profile than progress on foreign policy.’ This is amply demonstrated by, for example, the EU intervention in Kosovo.

(2) The coherence and common knowledge deficit. If the strongest point of the Union is the ability to combine a wide variety of instruments, there is a recognised deficit on the implementation side either between different EU institutions, or also at times between EU-defined and Member States’ policies. Nuno Severiano Teixeira points out the twin lack of ‘common knowledge’ about security affairs and ‘integrated strategies to frame the foreign action of the European Union.’ This can be addressed at two levels: first, by promoting shared and ‘integrated’ knowledge about security and by working jointly on development-related issues; and second, by establishing multi-disciplinary teams which pool expertise on *inter alia* defence, foreign affairs, development, justice and home affairs.

(3) The joint capabilities deficit. The lack of joint capabilities, in direct contradiction of the ESDP mission statement, has a negative impact on both the EU’s credibility and ESDP effectiveness. The 60,000-strong force, intended to be readily deployable in 60

days, under the terms of the Headline Goal adopted by the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, which was to be operational by 2003, failed to fully materialise, and the need for it has only recently been restated by the French EU Presidency. As noted by Alexander Weis, equipment shortfalls identified from the outset remain critical in some areas. There are 1,700 helicopters in military inventories, for instance, yet ‘many of these are not available for crisis-management operations’ either due to lack of training or because technical requirements are not met. This goes to show that what Europe needs most is not to spend more on defence, but rather to spend better and in a more coordinated manner.

Legitimacy at the heart of ESDP. Legitimacy is central where defence is concerned. This not an issue for ESDP at present, but one must remain mindful that it does not arise in the future. Today, ESDP enjoys high levels of support and is strongly backed by all national parliaments and by 76 % percent of European public opinion, with a majority support in all 27 Member States;⁴ moreover, it is based on sound multilateral legitimacy, including increasingly stronger cooperation with the UN. Future developments may affect the legitimacy equation. Indeed, one of the most interesting developments for ESDP envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty is the permanent structured cooperation open to a limited number of ‘able and willing’ Member States. As Stefano Silvestri argues, ‘while the intergovernmental nature of the decision making would not change, ESDP will become a permanent feature of the EU political and institutional landscape’ – whereas today the model is inclusive and open to all Member States and this is crucial to ensuring European legitimacy (a particularly important element in former African colonies). The Chad mission under Irish command is a good example of the critical importance of a system that is inclusive to match EU soft power with hard power – what Joseph Nye has called ‘smart power’.⁵ The European construction project is a difficult compromise between legitimacy and efficiency... sometimes, apparently at least, to the detriment of the latter; it is very difficult to think that this will not be the case in developing a EU defence policy.

In the years to come the European Parliament will be called upon to play a more important role, working in tandem with the national parliaments, and it will be critical to find the right interaction between both. As Jacek Saryusz-Wolski says, ‘strengthening Parliament’s power in ESDP would ... contribute to the stronger legitimacy of Petersberg missions both at the European and national levels.’ But this will not be enough; we will still need to find a way fostering a stronger European commitment in the national parlia-

4. See Eurobarometer Standard, ‘The European Union Today and Tomorrow,’ field work May 2008, publication November 2008. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm.

5. Joseph Nye, ‘Smart Power: In Search of the Balance between Hard and Soft Power’, (book review), in *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, issue no. 2, fall 2006.

mentary defence committees, which play a major role in defining the defence policies of their countries and in giving national legitimacy to the ESDP missions, a crucial aspect due to the intergovernmental nature of European defence.

The future will look brighter perhaps if the Lisbon Treaty comes into in force and a more favourable and balanced institutional environment is set in place. Much will continue to depend however on the ability of the EU, its multi-faceted mechanisms and first and foremost its capitals, to act consistently and coherently with the founding principles and universally-held values that oblige the European Union to act *differently* – and persuade others, ideally all others – to act just as *differently* in the conduct of international relations. Ideally, ESDP should be in lesser demand in 2020 than it is today. There could be no better measure of its success.



Part I

Experts' perspectives



The need for a more strategic EU

Nicole Gnesotto

Ten years after its inception, the European Security and Defence Policy has delivered very mixed results. While the success of this new Union policy is unquestionable, its omissions and failures are equally evident. Since 2003, which saw the first Union operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Union has conducted 22 external military and/or civilian operations in four of the five continents, mobilising a total of 10,000 European troops and 4,000 European police officers. At the same time, the Union continues to be perceived as a marginal, little-known security player, most often absent when it comes to settling the major strategic issues of the planet. The progress that has been made is a source of undeniable satisfaction, but there is nonetheless keen frustration at the overall performance achieved. On the basis of what past record and with a view to what new ambitions can a future for the Union as a major international security player reasonably be built?

Brief overview of the first decade of ESDP

No ambitions for the future of the ESDP can be identified without first taking stock of its strengths and weaknesses over the past ten years. The ESDP's added value lies firstly in the political legitimacy of operations undertaken by Europe. When the Union acts on the world stage, it does so by consensus. Its action is therefore indirectly sanctioned by nearly 500 million people. No single Member State can lay claim to such legitimacy. The fact that the Union acts always under the aegis of the United Nations also makes what it does more acceptable to the people of a region in crisis than action undertaken in other frameworks (individual nations, *ad hoc* coalitions, the Atlantic Alliance). In the Middle East and when it comes to stabilising crises in Africa, such added value is considerable. As for European public opinion, no other Union policies enjoy such massive and constant support. On average, 70 % of Europe's citizens are in favour of the Union playing a greater role on the international stage; this includes the countries whose governments are least enthusiastic about the ESDP, such as the United Kingdom and Poland.

The second advantage is the comprehensive nature of the Union's competences, for it is far more than just an alliance of military resources. Operations within the Union frame-

work come with the assurance of the availability of all possible non-military crisis management resources – reconstruction aid, humanitarian aid, development aid, legal advice on reform of local governance, etc. – in parallel with the purely military phase. The Union is in fact the world's largest donor of development aid. No other organisation, starting with NATO, can offer such a range of supplementary resources. As for the Member States, none has the means to mobilise such extensive financial resources within a purely national framework. So the complexity of modern-day crises, the fact that military intervention is less and less effective in resolving conflicts, and the importance of the phases of stabilisation and reconstruction of regions or entire countries, make the European Union a key player, ever more in demand to help preserve international stability.

On the other hand, the sense of frustration regarding European defence stems from three handicaps that are no less evident than its strengths. Firstly, there is an increasingly untenable mismatch between increasing demand from outside and the stagnation, even shrinkage, of the resources which Member States make available to the Union. While the UN, the African Union, the OSCE and NATO are constantly calling on the Union's crisis management capabilities, the ESDP has not even managed – in ten years – to establish any permanent pool of military or civilian forces worthy of the name. The aim of a 60,000 strong force proclaimed back in 2001 had fallen into oblivion to such an extent that under the French Presidency it had to be dusted off and presented as a major innovation. It sometimes takes months of domestic negotiations before a country agrees to make available a police officer or two for an ESDP operation. And this shortage of resources is compounded by Member States' inability to agree on a minimum of permanence: the ESDP remains in many ways a virtual policy. Very few structures are permanent, visible or embodied in a building or a lasting institution: there is still no European Command, no joint manoeuvres on the ground, no standing units, and the European College is a nomadic institution, with no budget or statutes of its own.

The yawning gap between the ESDP's progress and the *status quo* in common foreign policy is a second handicap. And it is a big one. Progress on defence has been much faster and higher-profile than progress on foreign policy. The ESDP has even acquired a kind of autonomy, as if it were some kind of European mini-NATO, unrelated to the Union's common policies. That explains why there is sometimes a feeling that the ESDP is just marking time: what is the point of deploying forces outside the Union if it does not give the Union greater political influence in resolving crises? Does the Union have a common foreign policy on Afghanistan? Did the missions to Rafah and Palestine allow the Union any influence over the peace process? With the notable exception of the conflict in Georgia in the summer of 2008, the ESDP has all too often been used not as the instrument of a common European policy objective, but as a substitute for policy itself.

Thirdly, an overwhelming sense of going nowhere and of *déjà vu* persists. The United Kingdom, for all that it instigated the Saint Malo Agreement ten years ago, has championed the ESDP *status quo* in Europe, refusing to increase the budgets of the European Defence Agency, to establish a European Command for the conduct of operations or to accept anything that might allow the ESDP to emerge from its virtual world. With remarkable consistency, it has upheld an almost ideological opposition to any quantitative or qualitative development of the ESDP that might begin to tread, however lightly, on NATO's toes, or inject even a hint of strategic autonomy into the European Union. It does not matter whether the world changes from one day to the next, whether America opts for one strategic direction or another, whether globalisation profoundly alters the conditions of European security – the same political, or ideological, constraints will keep on hampering the ESDP's development. The EU-NATO relationship has thus become a major factor in the ESDP's stagnation, and ultimately a pretext for collective paralysis, both in the Union and in NATO.

Why a fresh ambition?

It is a comfortable paralysis, of course, and no doubt not all Member States will necessarily feel a need to relaunch European defence. Personal conviction aside, on what grounds can the need for a new phase in the Union's quest for a strategic identity be justified? Is there, internationally or within the Union itself, a groundswell for such fresh ambition?

At first sight, the reply must be less than positive. Of all the arguments in favour of the status quo, or even of the gradual breaking up of the ESDP, there are two that honesty demands be addressed. The first argument is a major one, for it relates to the new Obama Presidency's change of direction in US foreign and defence policy. After a decade of decline into unilateralism and militarism, combined with authoritarian handling of relations with allies and a disastrous track record in terms of the perception and reality of US power in the world, Barak Obama is without a doubt good news for the whole world. Against a background of transatlantic reconciliation and of rapprochement of the strategic outlooks of the United States and Europe, the whole process consecrated by France's return to NATO's integrated military structure, does common sense not dictate that our prime concern should henceforth be for the efficiency and vitality of this Atlantic framework? Why duplicate in the Union something that already exists, and works, in NATO?: if our security is indivisible, if France is once again on the same wavelength as the United States within what the French President has begun to call 'the Western family', why persist in trying to give the Union the means to exert its strategic autonomy? Many would claim to have neither the means nor, above all, the need to do

so. France's return to the NATO fold does not, therefore, augur well for the maintenance of Europe's defence ambitions. And it is hard to see how a more NATO-minded France could induce the United Kingdom to be more European. A bilateral partnership could of course be developed between the United States and the Union for all the non-military aspects of management of international security. But in terms of defence and military intervention as such, the temptation to 'leave it all to NATO' could well be overwhelming. All the more so since Obama's victory ushers in the possibility of a new American leadership that is intelligent, likeable, even admirable, making it even more difficult for the European Union to sustain its own strategic ambitions. European defence could certainly progress, but in an Atlantic framework, as the European pillar of NATO, not necessarily as an instrument essential to the political strengthening of the Union itself.

The second argument in favour of the *status quo* lies in the severity of the economic crisis and recession that has befallen the entire world, developed or not. At a time of belt-tightening, when the EU's basic premise – shared prosperity – is being shattered, more urgency must be attached to restoring the Union's internal cohesion and power than to stepping up external action and creating a European strategic power. We cannot, of course, remain totally indifferent to the insecurity of others, if only in the Union's immediate vicinity: a minimum of external operations and stabilisation of crises on the periphery will continue to be necessary, and the ESDP will still have its merits. But there is no compelling need to move on to a new phase – because resolving the crisis inside must take precedence over managing crises outside, and it would make sound economic sense for the Union to delegate even more responsibility for managing international security to NATO. Public opinion would not understand it if the Union were to waste its available resources on trying to secure an external power that now looks like a luxury. Paradoxically, then, the scale of the economic crisis, combined with the clear signs of reconciliation in the Atlantic Alliance, could revive the Cold War division of tasks, with the Union taking care of prosperity and NATO of security.

This dual trend is undeniable and must be factored into any consideration of the future of the ESDP, a policy which appears neither irreversible nor automatically destined for a glorious future. However, the prevailing gloom and doom does not nullify certain trends which, conversely, favour the emergence of a new strategic ambition for the Union. The first relates to changes affecting security in a globalised world: the non-military aspects of crises – in terms of both the form they take and the way they are resolved – have gained considerable importance over the past two decades. Is there still anyone who believes that the conflict in Lebanon or the Iranian issue will be resolved by military confrontation? Where Afghanistan is concerned, how can

anyone fail to recognise the inadequacy of strategies based solely on calculating the size of the opposing forces? Compounded by the emergence of global threats (climate, health, crime, terrorist networks, etc.), the inadequacy and relative impact of the military option in crisis management have made the strategic modernity of the European framework clear to see. With its various institutions, the Union has at its disposal all the resources required for overall management of a crisis and for post-conflict reconstruction – the ESDP being one link in this chain of resources. NATO's added value in terms of the military aspects of security is of course incomparable, but it has no reconstruction budget, no civilian resources and no commercial or legal competences vis-à-vis third countries: it is in the Union that these components, vital to the success of operations, are to be found. Whether they like it or not, Europeans are more and more in demand for crisis management: whether they perform it in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, on behalf of an EU-US partnership, or under their own foreign policy, will be the subject of a major political debate. But, whatever the outcome, Europe will need a genuine professional civil/military capability. This is all more the case given that nothing in the current state-of-play in international affairs suggests that any improvement can be expected in the EU's security environment over the next ten years.

The second trend conducive to a renewal of the Union's strategic ambitions is to be found in America. Whatever the merits of Barak Obama, the strategic crisis in which the United States finds itself is profound and is doubtless destined to continue for a long time. For many reasons, from its heavy level of indebtedness which will inevitably put a strain on defence budgets, to its priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan which will mobilise the bulk of its troops and resources, the United States will no longer be able to take responsibility for every regional crisis, any more than it can, on its own, instil a consensual dynamism into the international system. This relativity of American power will mean that Europeans will increasingly be required to manage crises for which the United States cannot or will not take responsibility, to support and supplement US external action, and to take responsibility for whole sections of the civilian/military management of this or that region in crisis. The Atlantic Alliance, for its part, has found Afghanistan its absolute priority, as well, perhaps, as the limits of what can be done by an organisation that has changed hardly at all since the end of the Cold War. The priority NATO gives to Afghanistan leaves little room or resources for intervening elsewhere. Indeed, NATO has more and more need of the global power of the Union to carry out its missions successfully. For how long will Europeans be able to avoid having to take greater responsibility for the management of external crises?

Three prerequisites for strengthening the Union's strategic action

In theory, these various developments could give rise to two types of scenario for the future of the ESDP. The low-profile scenario would see the ESDP gradually lose its military component to NATO, which would become the sole military intervention body, with the possibility of development of a European defence pillar being integrated within it. In the Union, the ESDP would continue to develop solely in the civilian sphere. Occasionally it would intervene in support of NATO military interventions, in the framework of an EU-NATO partnership. In the high-profile scenario, the Union would continue to develop its military and civilian crisis management resources in the light of its own foreign policy objectives. There could be technical cooperation with NATO in the light of the requirements of any given crisis, but the overall political and strategic partnership would be between the United States and the Union.

It is of course the second hypothesis that this writer prefers. It is no doubt the most exacting, and hence the most improbable scenario, but it is certainly not beyond reach if Europeans still have a minimum of ambition to succeed in the European enterprise first undertaken 60 years ago.

Three conditions must be fulfilled if Europe's role as a security player is to be enhanced:

- Restoration of the ESDP to its proper place, i.e. as an instrument at the service of the Union's international role. The ESDP is not a separate fourth pillar. Nor is it a neutral military instrument, some kind of toolbox for the use of either the Union or NATO. It is not, either, the only criterion for measuring the Union's international political role, for the ESDP is just a part of what the Union does as a global security player. It is therefore the Union's political role on the international stage which must remain the aim and the priority: the ESDP is just one possible road to go down, certainly not the primary or only one. Developments in international security make non-military crisis management resources increasingly important, and the Union is the only organisation to possess the entire range of resources required – economic, legal, humanitarian, financial, civil and military. This throws its strategic modernity, and hence its added value as a global security institution, into sharp relief.
- Definition of the Union's role and ambition in the international system born of globalisation. If defence is an element of a foreign policy, the aims and collective aspirations of that policy must be clear. Apart from stabilisation of specific crises, apart from the processes of enlargement and stabilisation of its periphery, what else characterises the kind of international order the Union wants? What system of secu-

rity best serves Europeans' values and interests? Should defence and consolidation of the interests and leadership of the democratic West be the prime aim? Should Europe's strategic interests be modelled on those of America, throwing European specificity to the winds? Or, conversely, should we accept that the tide of history has turned, with the result that the power of the West is no longer what it was, and strive for global governance, with the different hubs of power, including our own, coming together within a set of collective rules and institutions? In other words, should the aim of European foreign policies be to shore up an ailing Western supremacy and enhance Europe's position within this system or, on the contrary, to share the elements of economic and political power with others? Until such time as the Union clarifies its global strategic objectives, until it sets itself priorities and stops responding piecemeal to requests from outside, the ESDP will almost certainly remain a motley collection of military and civilian operations, with no real influence on the outcome of crises.

- Definition of the terms of a new partnership between the United States and the European Union is the third priority. Neither the ESDP nor NATO is an autonomous political player. The ESDP must be first and foremost the civil/military instrument of the Union's foreign policy, and NATO must remain the instrument of military solidarity between the United States and Europe. A distinction therefore has to be made between, on the one hand, a tactical and technical NATO-EU partnership – necessary for certain crises, but always ad hoc and temporary – and, on the other, a strategic partnership between the United States and the Union, built on a more permanent political basis, on a range of subjects of common interest, including military operations requiring NATO involvement. In other words, if a crisis requires military intervention and the United States decides to take part in the operation, NATO is the legitimate arm of intervention, while Union resources may be used to supplement the NATO mission, in the framework of an ad hoc NATO-Union partnership and on the basis of a joint EU-US strategy. In all other cases, i.e. where the military element is marginal or inoperative (terrorism, Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, for example) or where the crisis is military but the United States decides not to intervene (crises in Africa in particular) NATO has no role to play. Here, responsibility lies either with a strategic partnership to be established between the US and the Union, or with the Union alone, in the framework of its security policy.

The right way forward

Based on these political prerequisites, the way forward could be as follows.

Commit fully to consistency in the Union's external action: in the short term, this would presuppose that the Lisbon Treaty CFSP *acquis* be saved. The provisions on the role and competences of the High Representative, the post of President of the European Council and the creation of an integrated diplomatic service must without fail be implemented. If the Treaty is not ratified, the European Council should decide to act as a matter of urgency on the best legal means of implementing these three *acquis*. Looking ahead to 2020, however, pure logic would demand that, to ensure an efficient and consistent integrated foreign and security policy, the posts of President of the Commission and President of the European Council be merged.

Switch from the virtual to the permanent, from cooperation to integration: discontinuity is not the right recipe for ensuring that the Union is efficient and professional in security matters. Twenty years after its inception, the ESDP must have a foundation of permanent structures: a formal Council of Defence Ministers, chaired by the (new) High Representative; a European Defence College, with its own premises and budget, to train all personnel in a common strategic culture of the Union, a European Command to plan and conduct the Union's military operations, alongside a civilian command and an integrated civil/military command capability; joint manoeuvres on the ground for European forces. A number of permanent units should be set up, a sort of European armed rapid-reaction mini-force: one or more battlegroups, the European corps, a civilian intervention force for natural crises and disasters, a European humanitarian intervention corps, a pool of civilian ESDP officers, European logistical stocks, particularly medical equipment. Lastly, the speed of Union action will also depend on having a substantial European budget for ESDP operations, for use by the High Representative.

Acquire the means to have a certain strategic autonomy: if the Union wants to be able to prevent crises, to make a difference in a given operation, to have credibility *vis-à-vis* its American partner, it must have the means to carry out its own threat analysis. The ESDP must therefore have military monitoring capabilities in space and be equipped with more powerful forecasting and strategic analysis resources (situation centre, forecasting directorate with a budget comparable to that of an American centre, rationalisation of the gathering and processing of information from EU diplomatic posts worldwide: in this respect, the creation of a common European diplomatic service is an absolute necessity here).

Legitimise Europe as protector: In every EU country the bulk of the population is increasingly concerned about internal security issues: protecting the environment and combating terrorism and organised crime, in particular. But the Union's effectiveness as regards internal security suffers from compartmentalisation of the EU's institutional pillars and tight political constraints. Failing to meet the expectations of European citizens, i.e. being able to help if a natural disaster occurs in Baku, but not if it happens in The Hague or Rome, is an aberration: it must be possible to use ESDP military and civil resources in response to terrorism or natural disasters in the Union. Whatever the future of the Lisbon Treaty, the clause on solidarity in the event of terrorism or a natural disaster must be implemented.

Avoid getting sidetracked by the wrong issues: There are two developments that appear politically impossible over the next ten years and hence should be ruled out. The first would be for the ESDP to take charge of the Union's collective territorial defence: that, in the view of the vast majority of Europeans, is and must remain the prime function of NATO. So long as the US continues to play the role of existential protector of the countries of Europe, the debate on the Union's responsibility for its own defence is not worth starting, and there is little prospect of the US reneging on that basic tenet of NATO by 2020. Were it to happen, however – were doubt to creep in and cracks appear in Europe's security as a result of developments in America's policy (and in particular its attitude to NATO), the Union would then have no choice but to take full responsibility for its defence.

The second fallacious idea relates to flexibility in the ESDP. It could admittedly be useful in an ever more diverse Union to create coalitions of States more ready than others to carry out a particular consensual mission or take the initiative for some type of advance in terms of armaments and military capabilities. But the Union's force lies in its collective decision-making and the solidarity of all once commitments are given. This principle of collective responsibility is vital to the use of Community resources and is at the root of the Union's added value in crisis management. To violate that principle for the sake of a European 'mini-defence' (which by definition would be non-consensual) would be to condemn it to real powerlessness.

Conclusion

With the continuous ‘acceleration of history’ over the past century, it is almost impossible to conceive what 2020 will bring. The first decade of the twenty-first century has done much to change the world (the September 11 attacks; America’s unilateralist folly; the excesses of financial capitalism; the extraordinary rise of the Asian countries; large-scale enlargement, but creeping crisis in the European institutions; the resurgence of Russian nationalism, etc.). There is no reason to believe that the next decade will be any less productive of strategic revolutions and surprises. Staying alert to international developments is of course a must for any political player. Deciding to play an active role and to shape rather than submit to globalisation trends is quite a different undertaking. If the European Union refuses to confront this challenge, if it abandons any attempt at collective influence on the course of events, *inter alia* via an effective ESDP, questions will inevitably be asked about what purpose it actually serves.

Implementing a 'grand strategy'

Jolyon Howorth

Since the end of the Cold War academics and policy analysts have incessantly debated the issue of what sort of new world order is emerging. The *unipolar* thesis – according to which the US still reigns supreme in world affairs (and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future) – has been most persuasively defended by Dartmouth political scientists Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth.¹ The January 2009 issue of the journal *World Politics* features a lively debate about the characteristics and implications of unipolarity. One conclusion is that the enduring 'uni-pole' (the US), far from being a *status quo* power (as dominant powers in most world systems have tended to be), is more likely to emerge as a *revisionist* power. We had a foretaste of this under George W. Bush. For those who believe that the system dictates policy, more revisionism is likely to come – no matter who is US president. The *bipolar* option has been expounded by the leading international economist C. Fred Bergsten who argued in 2008 that the US should 'give true priority to China as its main partner in managing the world economy', even if this means displacing Europe.² The non-polarity thesis has been put forward by the President of the US Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haass, who foresees growing international chaos as US preponderance is replaced by an unstructured congeries of influences exerted by a confusion of players: states, regional regimes, NGOs, multinational corporations (MNCs), institutions, militias, individuals, large cities, media outlets, criminal gangs, to name but a few. Such an order, he argues 'will have mostly negative consequences for the US – and for much of the rest of the world as well.'³ So far, from a European perspective, the picture looks bleak.

If we turn to those who detect multipolarity as the system of the future, things do not get much better. Neo-realists have always argued that unbalanced multipolarity is the most dangerous and war-prone international system.⁴ Robert Kagan, in *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, proclaims that 'the world has become normal again' with the

1. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

2. C. Fred Bergsten, 'A Partnership of Equals. How Washington Should Respond to China's Economic Challenge', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2008. For a rebuttal of the G-2 theses, see Elizabeth C. Economy and Adam Segal, 'The G-2 Mirage', *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2009.

3. Richard N. Haass, 'The Age of Non-Polarity: What Will Follow US Dominance?', *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008.

4. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 161-63.

return of traditional nation-state naked ambitions, the emergence of seven major powers all vying for status and influence, a rivalry overlaid by new forms of ‘the old competition between liberalism and autocracy’ and by ‘an even older struggle’ between radical Islam and modern secularism, all ushering in ‘an age of divergence.’⁵ Another vision of the multipolar world is provided by the quinquennial survey of the US National Intelligence Council⁶ which predicts a world of ‘major discontinuities, shocks and surprises’ and offers four illustrative scenarios featuring: (i) a ‘World Without the West’ in which rising powers supplant the West as global leaders; (ii) a ‘BRICS bust-up’ in which a dispute over vital resources sparks a new World War pitting China against India; (iii) an ‘October surprise’ in which the world pays a terrible price for not dealing soon enough with climate change; and (iv) ‘Politics is not always local’ in which global networks eclipse governments in setting the international agenda. Most of this is particularly disturbing for Europeans, who were warned in 2006 by their own Institute for Security Studies that the world of 2025 will be smaller, more volatile and more dangerous than that of today and that, in that world, the EU’s current strengths and assets will have been significantly diminished.⁷

The only relatively bright spot on the horizon in this brainstorming around the nature of the global system in the twenty-first century comes from Giovanni Grevi, who has coined the notion of ‘inter-polarity’ as the synthesis of multipolarity and interdependence. He argues that every existing and rising power (not to mention the rest of the world) will be mightily constrained in the coming decades by the interconnectedness of all main policy areas (the economy, energy, security, environment) and that the “existential interdependence” of all these issues argues inexorably in favour of cooperation. Multipolarity must join hands with multilateralism to capitalise on positive issue-linkages and drive the move towards a more harmonious world order.⁸

What of the transatlantic relationship, that twentieth century life-jacket for Europeans in distress? Should one attach significance, as many journalists did, to the fact that President Obama began his global diplomatic Odyssey in Europe? How much does Europe *matter* for America? Where does the old continent stand with respect to its main ally as we enter the second decade of this – to date – extremely turbulent century?⁹ There can be no return to the past. The Cold War relationship was aberrant, but so were both

5. Robert Kagan, *The End of History and the Return of Dreams* (New York: Knopf, 2008), pp.3-4.

6. National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, Washington DC, November 2008.

7. Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi (eds.), *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?* (Paris: EUISS, 2006).

8. Giovanni Grevi, ‘The inter-polar world: A new scenario’, *Occasional Paper* no. 79 (Paris: EUISS, June 2009).

9. For the current status of US policy towards Europe, see Philip H Gordon’s Statement of 16 June 2009, accessed at <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2009/124870.htm>.

the Clinton years (when the EU struggled to find an international role) and the Bush years (when Europeans allowed themselves to become victims of 'divide and rule'). With Barack Obama, the US and the EU can make warm declarations about shared values and can assert that, together, they can help solve most global problems. But, as Obama made clear in Strasbourg on 3 April 2009, this can only happen if the EU emerges as a serious *strategic* partner for the US.¹⁰ The US has many strategic partnerships to foster around the world, and the prospect of a US-China condominium is not entirely fanciful. It is by no means certain that President Obama sees the EU relationship as the main priority for the US. What he does want is an EU which can – collectively – bring something significantly useful to the table. That 'something' need not necessarily be channelled via NATO. Indeed, it is more likely to be channelled via ESDP. These two entities arose and evolved in quite different ways in response to quite different historical stimuli. Their two stories, often conflated by politicians or analysts keen to subordinate the latter to the former, are both distinct and *sui generis*. It is relatively clear in 2009 what type of actor ESDP is likely to become (see below). NATO's precise future, post-Afghanistan, is more difficult to predict. But the EU Member States collectively will increasingly need to coordinate their views on the future profile of NATO. As the Alliance strives to agree a new 'Strategic Concept', the European input to the debate could prove decisive. In order to coordinate that input, an EU caucus inside NATO is to be encouraged.

CFSP and ESDP: values, legitimacy and influence

There are those who still argue that the EU's 'normative power' or 'civilian power' around the world is the surest guarantee of its global influence, and the true underpinning of its international legitimacy.¹¹ This is not how the issue is perceived by the other global players. Given the history of European colonialism and imperialism, most other parts of the world do not instinctively perceive the EU as a font of altruism or selflessness. Despite its relatively positive track record in providing overseas development aid, the EU's persistent refusal to phase out the Common Agricultural Policy and open up its agricultural markets effectively negates much of the benefit of that assistance to the Global South. The EU does (increasingly) enjoy legitimacy as an international actor, but this does not stem from its 'normative power.' It derives from the Union's ability

10. 'So I've come to Europe this week to renew our partnership, one in which America listens and learns from our friends and allies, but where our friends and allies bear their share of the burden. Together, we must forge common solutions to our common problems. So let me say this as clearly as I can: America is changing, but it cannot be America alone that changes.' Accessed at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-President-Obama-at-Strasbourg-Town-Hall/

11. Ian Manners, *Europe and the World* (London: Palgrave, 2009); Karen E. Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008); Mario Telo, *Europe: a Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order* (London: Palgrave, 2006); Zaki Laïdi, *EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World: Normative Power and Social Preferences* (London: Routledge, 2008); Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners (eds.), *Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 2006).

to deliver, constructively and efficiently, the instruments and capabilities of civilian and military crisis management, and particularly from the EU's capacity to deliver those global public goods where other international actors – the US, NATO, even the UN – are, for one reason or another, unable to intervene. The principles and values driving this process will be those most prized by the normative power school: norms-based effective multilateralism and the promotion of a world in which human rights, human security, international institutions and international law will replace the law of the jungle. The EU is already demonstrating, empirically, that it can *conduct international relations differently*. But if those normative objectives are actually to be achieved, the EU must possess the entire range of policy instruments, including a significant measure of hard power. For whatever reason – and the reasons vary considerably – the EU is now welcomed as a power combining civilian and military capabilities by, among others, the US,¹² China,¹³ India¹⁴, Brazil,¹⁵ the UN, ASEAN and the African Union.¹⁶ Legitimacy stems in large measure from credit earned in the eyes of third parties. The value-added of the EU, in the eyes of other international actors, is its unique ability to combine, in new and unprecedented ways, military and civilian resources in the delivery of global public goods.

If the Lisbon Treaty is ratified, this external international legitimacy will also be enhanced internally by the increasing role of the European Parliament in sanctioning CFSP and ESDP. The European Parliament will play a more visible and active role in promoting and achieving a better and more effective European foreign and security policy, thus conferring upon these policy areas enhanced popular legitimacy. Greater interaction between, on the one hand, the European Parliament and its foreign and security committees and, on the other hand, equivalent committee members from the EU's national parliaments will magnify this effect – gradually phasing out the WEU Assembly whose continued existence owes more to inertia and corporatism than to strategic need or institutional logic.

12. Victoria Nuland, speech at the Presse Club and AmCham, Paris, 22 February 2008; Joseph Biden, speech at the 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 2009.

13. Feng Zhongping, 'A Chinese perspective on China-European relations', in Giovanni Grevi and Álvaro de Vasconcelos, 'Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism', *Chaillot Paper* no. 109, (Paris: EUISS, 2008), pp. 77-86.

14. Ummu Salma Bava, 'The EU and India: challenges to a strategic partnership', in *ibid.*, pp.105-13.

15. Marco Aurélio Garcia, 'The strategic partnership between Brazil and the EU', in *ibid.*, pp. 49-57.

16. Mark Corner, 'Towards a Global Sharing of Sovereignty', *European Essay* 44, London, Federal Trust, 2008.

CFSP and ESDP: the need for a strategic approach

The world around the Union is changing very fast. The last two years alone have witnessed massive aftershocks from the recent movements of history's tectonic plates: the humiliation of the 'Western' model of market-driven capitalism and the major return of the state as an economic and financial actor; the rise to serious prominence of China (the lone 'strong man' of the G-20 summit in London in April 2009); the increasing centrality of India as a power broker in South Asia and beyond; the designation of the Indian Ocean as the principal theatre of future great power jostling – and piracy;¹⁷ the return to NATO of France after forty-three years' absence, but at the same time NATO's increasing discomfiture in its first ever 'out-of-area' mission in Afghanistan; a drive towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons (Obama's Prague speech) but also an acceleration towards nuclear weapon status by North Korea and Iran; the return to the strategic scene of Russia – with a vengeance – in Georgia; power politics played out via petrol pipelines; the birth of the Union for the Mediterranean; major developments in Africa where new global players are vying with one another for strategic resources in what used to be perceived as Europe's 'backyard'. The world is being redefined in terms of relative power assets. One recent Polish calculation of relative power, based on a combination of GDP-PPP and demography, sought to identify the ten major powers of the twenty-first century. If the EU stands together, then it qualifies easily for a seat as one of the top four (China, the EU, the US, India – in that order). If it fails to stick together, then not a single European state makes it into the top five, Germany comes in as number six and France and the UK scrape in (behind Indonesia) at numbers nine and ten.¹⁸

As the twenty-first century unfolds in the turbulent context previously outlined, the absence of a clear strategic approach will increasingly condemn Europeans to marginality in international affairs. The time has come for the EU to begin devising and implementing a 'grand strategy', succinctly defined by Yale historians Paul Kennedy and John Gaddis as 'the calculated relationship between means and large ends'.¹⁹ Europe suffers from major handicaps in the emerging international pecking order: demographic decline, limited natural resources, geographical exiguity, energy dependency and military inadequacy. The European Coun-

17. James Rogers, 'From Suez to Shanghai: The European Union and Eurasian maritime security', *Occasional Paper* no. 77 (Paris: EUISS, March 2009); Robert Kaplan, 'Centre Stage for the 21st Century: Rivalry in the Indian Ocean', *Foreign Affairs* vol. 88, no. 2, March/April 2009.

18. Krzysztof Rybinski, 'A New World Order', *Open Democracy*, 31 March 2009.

19. See, on this, Sven Biscop, Jolyon Howorth & Bastian Giegerich, 'Europe: a Time for Strategy', *Egmont Paper* no. 27, Brussels 2009.

cil's December 2008 'Report on the Implementation of the ESS' recognises that, over the preceding five years, the threats facing the EU have become 'increasingly complex', that 'we must be ready to shape events' by 'becoming more strategic in our thinking', and that this will involve being 'more effective and visible around the world.'²⁰

The first major issue is threat assessment. The EU's geo-strategic reach should cover all those parts of the globe where its interests might come under physical threat. It goes without saying that multilateral bargaining within institutional frameworks – over trade, environmental or climate policy, agriculture or intellectual property rights – will not require any form of muscular role from the EU. But threats to the EU's commercial sea-lanes, acts of piracy on the high seas, civil conflict and violent destabilisation of areas affecting the Union in terms of migratory or refugee flows, disruption of resource supply lines or the encouragement of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other physical threats will require an ongoing and ever more professional EU military response capacity. This does not suggest that the EU should be preparing for major expeditionary or inter-state warfare. Such an eventuality remains a highly unlikely prospect in the twenty-first century. None of the major global powers – including Russia – has anything to gain from a traditional great power war with the EU (or indeed with any other global power). The structural interdependence of an increasingly globalised world, together with the lethal destructive power of modern arsenals, suggests that traditional scenarios of major interstate conflict are seriously on the decline.²¹ On the other hand, the world of the future will be awash with what Mary Kaldor calls 'new wars': asymmetric warfare and small-scale regional conflict of a variety of types – insurgency, civil war, banditry, piracy, criminality and terrorism.²² It is the response to such conflicts which has driven the development of ESDP from the outset. But it is the proactive anticipation of such events, together with an increasingly sophisticated approach to conflict prevention, which must drive ESDP over the coming decades.

The second issue is range. The key theatres for such an EU involvement are relatively clear-cut. The main priority has to be the EU's own 'near abroad': the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caucasus, the unstable borderland between the Union and Russia. Beyond that immediate frontier, developments in Africa and the

20. SG/HR Javier Solana, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World*, Brussels, 10 December 2008. Available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17104.en08.pdf>.

21. John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: the Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Michael Mandelbaum, 'Is Major War Obsolete?', *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 4, 1998-1999; Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Limits of Power: the End of American Exceptionalism* (New York: Holt, 2008); Christopher A. Preble, *The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous and Less Free* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

22. Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1992); Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force* (New York: Knopf, 2005); Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

Middle East (especially Israel, Palestine and Lebanon) require a focused EU stabilisation involvement. Beyond these areas, which must be seen strategically as the continuation of the 'near abroad', the EU will need to pay increasingly serious attention to the Eurasian coastal zone, that stretch of vital oceanic waters running from the Suez Canal to Shanghai, through which a huge proportion of EU commercial traffic passes and whose volume is set to increase between 2006 and 2016 by 121%.²³ In addition, to the extent to which regional destabilisation in South Asia – from the Iranian border with Afghanistan and Pakistan through India to Bangladesh and Burma/Myanmar – poses a threat to the non-proliferation regime and exacerbates terrorism and criminal trafficking activities, the EU cannot afford to be absent from this theatre.²⁴ Over time, the Union will find itself confronting challenges hardly anticipated at St. Malo. The current anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa is a foretaste of things to come, which, in the future, could well include counter-insurgency, counter-proliferation and counter-trafficking operations.

Thirdly, with what sort of forces can the Union play a constructive and stabilising role in these theatres? In terms of overall structure, there is not – nor has there ever been – a case for the constitution of a 'European army'. The framework – political, institutional or military – for such a body currently does not exist, nor is it necessary that it should. For the foreseeable future, European armed forces will be drawn from national contingents on a voluntary case-by-case basis. More important than the geo-political *label* attached to these forces is their competence, training and effectiveness in the missions they are likely to be assigned. Those operations will be broadly of the type envisaged in the European Council's *Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities* of 11 December 2008.²⁵ The EU should develop the capability to mount a number of missions simultaneously: two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations, two rapid response operations of limited duration, an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals, a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission, a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to ninety days, about a dozen ESDP civilian missions of varying formats. This is an ambitious programme and developments to date, from the *Helsinki Headline Goal* of 1999 to the *Headline Goal 2010* (2004) and the *Civilian Headline Goal 2010* (2007), do not augur well for success if the process continues to be bottom-up and reactive rather than top-down and proactive. Above all, since the *reality* of troop deployment and capabilities (as opposed to the *declaratory* aspect) currently depends

23. Rogers, op.cit. in note 17, p.22.

24. EUISS Report on the panel discussion 'Indian and EU Approaches to Security', New Delhi, 23 February 2009. Available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/fileadmin/fichiers/pdf/seminars/2009/Indian_EU_approaches_to_security.pdf.

25. Council of the European Union, *Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities*, 11 December 2008. See: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st16/st16840.en08.pdf>.

entirely on national levels of ambition, which are inevitably tied to local political culture and conditions, little is likely to change until and unless the EU attempts to break through that impasse via some means of collective small-group agenda setting and even decision-shaping.²⁶ The expanded *Petersberg Tasks* which are defined in the *Lisbon Treaty* under Article 28B, do refer explicitly to ‘tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis management, including peacemaking’ (Eurospeak for ‘separation by force’).²⁷ The EU should therefore set itself for 2020 a strategic target of having at the ready a very sizeable force – of the order of 60,000 troops (i.e. 180,000 allowing for rotation) – in order to face up to the full range of operational challenges likely to present themselves in an increasingly complex world. This will require major changes in training, funding and procurement over the next decade.

The Treaty of Lisbon already contains many security commitments – a solidarity clause, a mutual assistance clause, as well as the expanded Petersberg tasks – which cannot be met without a robust and ever more integrated EU military capacity. One aspect of this will be permanent structured cooperation, whose dynamic must be as *inclusive* as possible.²⁸ The objective is to mobilise the maximum capacity of which the EU is capable, drawing on whatever instruments are available from whatever source. ESDP cannot and will not work if it relies massively on a few contributors, with the others as bystanders or paymasters. Eventually, the logic of the strategic context in which the EU will find itself operating will require it to integrate into the objectives of ESDP an explicit collective defence article similar to article 5 of the WEU or NATO Treaties. Moreover, as ESDP missions grow in size and significance, the need for an EU Operational Planning Headquarters will become irresistible. Most EU Member States have already recognised this requirement, as have the United States themselves.²⁹ Whatever the future arrangements for synergies between ESDP and NATO, eventual EU autonomy in intelligence and operational planning is implicit in the entire thrust of European security and defence policy since St. Malo. The EU as an international actor cannot sub-contract to another organisation, still less manage without such a key enabler. In addition, ever greater cooperation and coordination in the defence industrial sector will be an inevitable corollary both of the expanding EU military capacity and of developments in defence-related R & T. Considerable progress was made in this direction under the

26. See, above all, on this, Bastian Giegerich, *European Military Crisis Management; connecting ambition and reality*, Adelphi Paper no. 397 (London: Routledge, 2008).

27. The Lisbon Treaty Article 28B sees the ESDP missions as covering: ‘*joint disarmament operations*, humanitarian and rescue tasks, *military advice and assistance tasks*, *conflict prevention* and peacekeeping tasks, [and] tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis management, including peacemaking and *post-conflict stabilization*.’ (expanded Petersberg Tasks in italics).

28. Sven Biscop, “Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Future of the ESDP: Transformation and Integration”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 13, 2008.

29. Alessia Biava, « Vers un Quartier Général Européen ? » *Cahiers du CEREM* no. 7, 2009.

French Presidency of the EU in the second semester of 2008.³⁰ This process is bound to accelerate and intensify.

But over and beyond military capacity, the EU will need to make a much more concerted effort in the field of *civilian* capacity. It is far more difficult to deploy overseas policemen, judges, tax lawyers, auditors, customs officers and the like, all of whom are invariably volunteers. The key reason why the EU has had such difficulty meeting its own (very modest) targets for police trainers in Afghanistan is that there is little incentive for European police officers to spend a perilous year in Kabul. It is even more difficult to persuade judges to go. They have their careers and are understandably unwilling to go overseas for long periods – thus being taken out of their national systems, out of the promotion circuit. And yet, as the Council fully recognises, ‘there is a continuous need to develop a body of crisis management capabilities and to ensure that the EU uses all available means to respond coherently to the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks, including in a substitution scenario.’³¹ The *Civilian Headline Goal 2010* has set itself ambitious objectives in terms of improving quality, enhancing availability, developing instruments and achieving synergies with other actors – military, Pillar 3, NGOs etc – and this will take time. It will be necessary to draw up a strategic inventory of available personnel – possibly concentrating on recent retirees from the civilian sector who can rapidly be retrained in the appropriate nation-building skills. The Pentagon is proceeding with such a scheme in the US. The EU cannot afford not to replicate that effort.

General David Leakey, the Director General of the EU Military Staff, has noted that, as commander of the EUFOR-*Althea* mission in Bosnia in 2005, 200 auditors were of more use to him in stemming state corruption than 2,000 soldiers. But again, if these objectives are to be optimised, some serious consideration will have to be given to introducing a strategic framework. Fortunately, the work on this has already begun. Within the European Union Military Staff, considerable thought has been devoted to the vexed (and, to date, seemingly intractable) problem of planning the coordination of the civilian and the military aspects of EU missions. A path-breaking paper was prepared for the European Council meeting in December 2008. There are several innovative strands to this work, notably concerning the development of a Crisis Management Concept for each given operation, the formulation of strategic options – military, civilian and police – and the emergence of a clearly focused Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and an Operations Plan. Therein lies the embryo of a strategic approach to planning and capacity generation.

30. Jolyon Howorth, « Quelles avancées pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ? », in *Annuaire français de relations internationales* (Paris : La Documentation française, 2009), pp.85-98.

31. GAERC, *Civilian Headline Goal 2010*, 19 November 2007, in Catherine Glière (ed.), ‘EU Security and Defence Core Documents 2007’, Volume VIII, *Chaillot Paper* no. 112 (Paris: EUISS, October 2008), p.370.

Conclusions

Since 1945, the US has trail-blazed grand strategy. The problem is that it has not done it terribly well. Ever since the Korean War, let alone Vietnam, it has demonstrated that a grand strategy focused overwhelmingly on the application of military force has very serious limitations.³² The EU will not go down that road. Its unique and distinctive civil-military profile is far better conceived for the challenges of the twenty-first century.³³ It is already doing and will continue to do international relations differently – but only on condition that it adopts a comprehensive strategic approach. Eurosceptics as well as Euro-realists will reject this approach as ‘cloud cuckoo land’. But then nobody foresaw the end of the Cold War or the collapse of the Soviet Union; nobody believed (as recently as 1998) that the EU would ever become a serious security actor; only eight years ago when the Laeken Declaration announced operationality for EU military missions, the strategic world scoffed and chortled. Only three years later, Operation *Artemis* demonstrated the reality of EU autonomy. Who, in 2000, would have imagined that German troops would be patrolling in Africa or in the Hindu Kush. The notion of a nuclear ‘Global Zero’ was rejected until very recently as a utopian pipedream. Today, it is official US policy.

Europe made a terrible mess of this world in the early twentieth century. The US bailed the Europeans out and continued to do so during the Cold War. But in 2009 the world looks very different and Europe – even collectively – is an increasingly weak player. On their own, even the big European countries cannot hope to have any serious purchase on global events – the small ones none whatsoever. History is not just knocking on the door. It is in the process of knocking the door down. If the EU does not maximise its assets, Europeans may well find themselves, in the twenty-second century, as migrant workers roaming the world looking for low-paid jobs in Asia and Latin America. Either the EU develops a strategic approach or it will fail.

32. Christopher A. Preble, *The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous and Less Free* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

33. See, on this, the Finnish Crisis Management Centre *2008 Yearbook on Civilian Crisis Management Studies* (Kuopio: CMC Finland, 2008). Available at: www.cmcfinland.fi.

The United States and the evolution of ESDP

F. Stephen Larrabee

The US attitude toward the European Security and Defence Policy has been marked by considerable ambivalence. The United States has had difficulty deciding whether ESDP is NATO's companion or competitor.¹ In principle, the United States wants – and needs – a strong European partner to help manage the new security threats, most of which emanate from beyond Europe's borders. However, Washington has not wanted to see ESDP evolve in a way that would undermine NATO and has reacted strongly to any attempt by the EU to develop an autonomous capability not closely linked to NATO.

These concerns were reflected in the US reaction to the Franco-British summit at St. Malo in December 1998. While the Clinton administration generally supported the development of a strong and cohesive European partner, many American officials worried that the summit represented an attempt to develop an autonomous European military capability outside of NATO.

These concerns were temporarily defused at the EU summit in Helsinki a year later. At the summit, the EU announced that it would only act when 'NATO as a whole is not involved. This statement seemed to indicate that NATO would be given priority in any crisis and that the EU would only act if NATO decided it did not want to get involved. It thus diminished – but did not entirely eliminate – the US fear that ESDP might develop as a rival to NATO.

US concerns resurfaced with great intensity over the proposal by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg at the so-called 'chocolate mini-summit' in April 2003 that the EU should set up a separate operational planning cell at Tervuren. The proposal set off alarm bells in Washington, as it seemed to signal a move away from the Berlin Plus formula, whereby the EU could draw on NATO assets to manage a crisis if NATO did not want to become involved. In the eyes of many US officials, it appeared to be the first step

1. See Robert E. Hunter, *The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO's Companion – or Competitor?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002).

down the slippery slope towards the creation of a European military capability outside of NATO – and thus a threat to NATO's primacy as the key forum for transatlantic security cooperation.

The strong US reaction to the proposal to establish a planning cell at Tervuren also reflected a broader concern that some members of the EU, especially France, were seeking to establish the EU as a 'counterweight' to NATO. These fears were reinforced by President Chirac's emphasis on 'multipolarity' – a codeword for balancing or containing US power – and by Franco-German opposition to the US invasion of Iraq. In the eyes of some US officials, France appeared to have moved from being a cantankerous ally to an outright opponent of US policy.

The winds of change

However, in the last several years, US attitudes towards ESDP have begun to shift in a more positive direction. The difficulties with which the United States has been confronted in Iraq have made it clear that Washington cannot manage the current security challenges on its own and that it needs allies. The US military intervention in Iraq has also underscored that simply toppling a repugnant regime is not enough. The United States also needs to be able to carry out stabilisation and reconstruction measures after the major combat phase has been concluded. This requires civilian skills and capabilities. After years of denigrating ESDP, US officials have begun to recognise that the EU, with its emphasis on civilian capabilities, has something to offer even if it cannot contribute much to dealing with conflicts at the high-end of the conflict spectrum.

This has important implications for the future. In the coming decade, many, if not most, of the conflicts the United States and/or NATO are likely to confront will be insurgencies and unconventional conflicts at the low end of the conflict spectrum.² These operations require different capabilities than the combat phase – police, election monitoring, civil affairs units etc. NATO is not well equipped to handle these tasks, whereas the EU is.

The United States has also begun to recognise that the threat to NATO posed by ESDP is nowhere near as strong as many US critics tended to think. While ESDP enjoys strong support among European public opinion, there are a number of important obstacles to the emergence of an ESDP that could pose a serious challenge to NATO's primacy. The first and most important is British policy. In the last few years, it has become increasingly

2. For a detailed discussion, see F. Stephen Larrabee, John Gordon IV and Peter A. Wilson, 'The Right Stuff. Defense Planning Challenges for a New Century,' *The National Interest*, no. 77, Fall 2004, pp. 50-58.

clear that a strong ESDP cannot be built without Britain and that London is not willing to sacrifice its special relationship with Washington on the altar of ESDP.

Indeed, Britain today is a bigger obstacle to the advancement of ESDP than the United States. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is much less of a Europhile than his predecessor Tony Blair. Moreover, his political position is very weak. Faced with strong opposition at home and within his own party, the last thing he wants is a new push for European defence. Thus initial French hopes for a new St. Malo – a Franco-British summit to re-launch ESDP – are not likely to be realised in the near future.

This is even more true if the Conservatives come to power in the next election, which given Brown's domestic problems and declining public support, looks increasingly likely. The Conservative party has moved in an increasingly Eurosceptical direction lately and its leadership has little enthusiasm for ESDP. And without strong British support, reinvigorating ESDP will be difficult,

Nor can France expect strong support from Germany for an ambitious new effort to re-launch ESDP. Franco-German cooperation has lost the warmth and centrality it enjoyed under Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. On the surface an attempt is made to give the relationship an air of amity but behind the smiles the relationship is marred by suspicion and a scarcely concealed rivalry for leadership of Europe. This rivalry is reinforced by different political styles. Sarkozy's hyperactivity and tendency to launch initiatives without prior coordination with his EU partners, especially Berlin, has irritated Chancellor Angela Merkel, who favours a more methodical and consultative style of diplomacy. In addition, Paris and Berlin are at odds over a number of substantive issues, including nuclear power, energy and climate change and the role of the European Central Bank.

In the defence area, Germany continues to punch well below its weight. Defence spending remains at only about 1.27% of GDP, considerably below that of France and Britain. This limits Germany's ability to play a leadership role both within NATO and on matters related to European defence. In addition, there is growing concern in the Bundestag about committing German troops to peace operations abroad, as highlighted by Berlin's unwillingness to participate in the French-led mission in Chad. Hence Germany cannot be counted on to pick up the slack created by Blair's departure and Brown's more reserved approach to European defence.

At the same time, the addition of ten new members from Eastern Europe has shifted the political balance within the EU and strengthened the influence of the 'Atlanticists'

within the organisation. While the new East European members support ESDP, they do not want to see a strengthening of ESDP lead to a weakening of NATO. The same is true of the Atlanticist West European members of NATO – Portugal, Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy. Taken together, the ‘Atlanticists’ can be counted on to block any effort to orient ESDP in an anti-American direction.

The shift in the US attitude toward ESDP has been part of a broader shift in US thinking about the EU more generally. For much of the 1990s, the United States either ignored the EU or tended to regard it as a potential rival to NATO. The latter fears were particularly prevalent in the early Bush years. Abandoning the principled support the Clinton administration had given the EU, the Bush administration adopted a much more sceptical approach to European integration, fearing that a stronger EU would be a less compliant partner and undermine NATO.

In its first term, the Bush administration was wary of efforts designed to strengthen European cohesion, especially in the security and defence field. However, the administration began to adopt a much more positive approach toward the EU in its second term. During his trip to Europe in February 2005, President Bush not only paid a visit to NATO headquarters, but also visited the EU – the first visit ever by an American president. In his speech in Brussels, Bush explicitly stressed that the United States supported a strong, cohesive Europe.³

Bush’s speech reflected an important shift away from the administration’s early ambivalence toward European integration. This shift was prompted by the changed strategic realities of the post-Cold War world, especially since 9/11 – the greater need for allies in order to address new security challenges, the EU’s effort to develop a stronger security and defence dimension, and NATO’s own limitations in meeting some of the new challenges. These developments contributed to a growing recognition that a stronger, more cohesive European partner is in the US interest – a position that has been embraced even more strongly by the Obama administration.

This does not mean the United States and EU leaders will always see eye to eye regarding the future evolution of ESDP and NATO. While the United States is likely to be more relaxed about the development of ESDP in the coming decade, Washington will continue to regard NATO as the primary forum for the discussion of European security issues. In addition, several issues are likely to remain contentious and subject to dispute.

3. For the text of Bush’s speech, see: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050221.html>.

Operational planning

Operational planning has been and remains one of the chief US concerns. Some EU members, particularly France, argue that the EU needs its own capacity to conduct operational planning for contingencies where the United States does not want to get involved. The United States has traditionally opposed such an arrangement, fearing that it would complicate planning and result in unnecessary duplication. This was one of the prime reasons Washington reacted so strongly to the proposal to set up an EU planning cell at Tervuren.

However, the row over Tervuren arose in the context of growing US-French differences over Iraq and a perception in Washington that President Chirac was trying to establish ESDP as a rival or counterweight to NATO. Today, however, the context for the development of ESDP is quite different. US-French relations are much more cordial. Unlike Chirac, President Sarkozy sees NATO and ESDP as complementary, not rivals. France's return to the military wing of NATO, moreover, should reduce the sense of suspicion and mistrust on both sides and make the establishment of an EU planning capacity less contentious and easier to manage.

The United States needs a strong and militarily capable European partner that can help address new threats and challenges. If the EU is going to play an effective role in helping to manage crises, it needs to be able to act independently of NATO in some limited instances, especially during crises such as those in Chad or the Democratic Republic of Congo, in which the United States does not want to get involved. However, these instances are likely to be relatively limited in number and scope. If a serious crisis were to arise that threatened Western interests, the United States would almost certainly get involved, though it might not take the lead.

Crisis management

The United States has traditionally regarded NATO as the organisation of choice for crisis management and has, in effect, demanded an informal 'right of first refusal.' France and a number of other EU members have opposed this claim on the grounds that it implicitly subordinates the EU to NATO – a status they firmly reject.

The Helsinki summit in December 1999 seemed to resolve this dispute by establishing the principle that the EU would get involved in managing crises 'when NATO as a whole was not involved...' This was widely interpreted as meaning that the EU would only take the lead in managing a crisis when NATO did not want to get involved.

However, France and several other EU members never felt comfortable with this interpretation because it constricted the EU's freedom of action and implied that the EU was subordinate to NATO. France pushed hard for the EU to get involved in the Congo crisis in June 2003 – the first EU deployment outside of Europe – and provided the bulk of troops for the operation (Operation *Artemis*). The Congo operation was conducted without recourse to NATO assets and without consultation with NATO. While it is unlikely that the United States would have wanted to involve NATO in the crisis, the lack of consultation annoyed some US and NATO officials and set a bad precedent.

Since then, efforts have been made to ensure greater consultation and complementarity. However, this cooperation leaves much to be desired – as the crisis in Darfur (West Sudan) demonstrated. The crisis initially led to an unseemly 'beauty contest' between the two organisations. The United States saw the crisis as an opportunity for NATO to demonstrate its continued relevance and more global orientation, while France argued that the EU, not NATO, should take the lead in managing the crisis. In the end, two airlifts were conducted – one by NATO and one by the EU.

The differences over Darfur underscore the limitations of relying on ad hoc arrangements. If future problems are to be avoided, mechanisms agreed upon in advance, including joint planning and force generation, will need to be set up. Without such arrangements, NATO and the EU may find it difficult to agree on how to cooperate – as was initially the case in Darfur.

At the same time, there is a need to rethink the modalities of NATO-EU cooperation. In the past, the dialogue between NATO and the EU focused largely on how NATO could help the EU conduct military operations. However, as James Dobbins has pointed out, of the two organisations it is NATO that needs EU assistance to successfully execute many of the tasks that it is called upon to perform today, not the reverse.⁴ As he notes, it is quite possible to envisage an EU-led operation being completed without the involvement of NATO. However, it is nearly impossible to imagine a nation-building operation being completed by NATO without the involvement of the EU.

The EU has a number of civilian capabilities that NATO lacks and which are needed in the stabilisation and reconstruction phases of peace operations. It makes little political or financial sense to try to duplicate these capabilities within NATO. Rather, in some cases NATO should have the ability to draw on EU assets. Thus, in the future closer cooperation and coordination between NATO and the EU will be increasingly important for effective crisis management.

4. See James Dobbins, 'Friends Again?' in Marcin Zaborowski (ed.), *Friends Again: EU-US Relations After the Crisis* (Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, 2006), p. 26.

France's return to the Alliance's military command should make this cooperation easier, reducing the sense of competition and rivalry between NATO and the EU that has hindered cooperation in crisis management in the past. However, currently the main obstacle blocking closer NATO-EU cooperation is Turkey. Ankara has prevented closer NATO cooperation – in an attempt to bring pressure on the EU to make concessions on Cyprus and its EU membership bid – a tactic which has antagonised both EU and NATO officials.

Given the importance of closer EU-NATO cooperation for enhancing crisis management, greater effort needs to be made to overcome Turkish objections. However, this issue cannot be resolved at the bureaucratic level; it will require high-level political intervention, especially from the American President. In addition, it will require European leaders to show greater flexibility in addressing Turkey's concerns and to put greater institutional pressure on the Greek Cypriots to make progress in resolving the Cyprus issue.

A European caucus

US officials also worry that a stronger ESDP could lead to the formation of a 'European caucus' within NATO – that is, that non-EU members of NATO could be faced with a unified front on the part of EU members in discussions within NATO. Such a caucus has been strongly opposed by successive US administrations because it could significantly complicate Alliance decision-making. European allies who are members of the EU might be unwilling to compromise on hard-won positions within the EU. In addition, a European caucus could slow the process of Alliance decision-making if the Alliance had to wait until the EU had first come to a position before it could act.

The formation of a European caucus could have a particularly disruptive impact on relations with the United States. It might provoke a strong backlash in the Congress and result in reduced support for both NATO and the EU. EU enlargement, however, is likely to diminish the prospect of such a caucus emerging. The pro-Atlanticist countries in the EU, especially Britain, Spain, and the new invitees from Central and Eastern Europe are not likely to agree to any position on defence or security matters that would be openly opposed by the United States.

Collective defence

Collective defence has been a core mission of NATO since its founding. However, some EU politicians and analysts have suggested that the EU should provide a security guarantee to its members. There are several problems, however, with this idea.

First, the EU currently does not have the military capacity to provide for the collective defence of its members. Some European members argue that there is no danger in making such a commitment because there is no imminent danger of attack. However, it is extremely dangerous to make military commitments that cannot be carried out even if the probability that they will have to be implemented is low.

Second, such a commitment overlaps with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (NATO), without adding any significant capability for European defence. Moreover, some Americans fear that such a commitment risks opening up the problem of 'backdoor commitments' – that is, if an EU member who is not a member of NATO were the victim of an attack, the United States could be dragged into the conflict 'through the backdoor.' These concerns have been particularly strong within the US Congress.

European defence integration

Europe has nearly 1.7 million men under arms. However, only about 10 percent of these are deployable. While efforts have been made to address this problem in the last several years, important deficiencies remain, particularly in the areas of strategic transport, strategic intelligence and command and control.

Given the current economic and political climate in Europe, there is little chance that defence spending in Europe will rise in the near future. Raising taxes or cutting social expenditures in order to increase defence outlays would not find support among European publics. The only way to find the necessary resources for defence improvements, many Europeans argue, is for the European members not to organise their defence nationally but to strive to create a more efficient European defence.⁵

European defence integration will help Europe rationalise its defence procurement policies and overcome its inefficient defence spending. Greater capabilities cannot be created only through NATO; they must also come through greater defence cooperation within the EU. Thus if the United States really wants increased European defence capabilities, it will need to accept a greater degree of European defence integration. This may be the only way to free up the investment funds needed for transformation.

At the same time, it will be important to ensure that European force development priorities are closely harmonised with those of NATO and the United States. This will require close coordination between the force development process under the EU's European Ca-

5. See Rob de Wijk, 'European Military Reform for Global Partnership,' *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 22, no. 1, Winter 2004, pp. 197-210.

pabilities Action Plan (ECAP) and efforts within NATO undertaken by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) as well as the US Joint Forces Command (JFC).

NATO's geographic scope

One of the most contentious issues is likely to be NATO's geographic role and scope. The United States favours a broad security role for NATO. However, many Europeans oppose such a role. They believe that the EU, not NATO should play a global role and that NATO's geographic role should be essentially limited to Europe. Many Europeans reacted sceptically, for instance, to US efforts to build 'global partnerships' with countries such as Australia, Japan and South Korea, fearing that this would dilute NATO's European focus and overstretch the Alliance's capabilities.

In principle, the EU is not limited geographically; its mandate allows it to act anywhere in the world. However, the EU's ambitions continue to exceed its capabilities. The 1999 Helsinki goal – the creation of a 60,000 man intervention force – has still yet to be met in practice. The EU is currently conducting twelve ESDP missions, two of which are military. However, the key question, as Daniel Keohane has noted, is not the number of missions but their size, intensity and robustness.⁶ The 'battle groups' are designed to provide a capability to intervene far from Europe's shores, but only in small and limited crises such as the Congo. And even in such instances there has been a clearly visible reluctance on the part of some EU members such as Germany to contribute forces to such peace operations.

Building a more robust intervention capability will not be easy, especially given the impact of the global economic crisis. The crisis is likely to heighten the tension between domestic demands to preserve the main provisions of the welfare state built up in Europe after World War II and pressures for greater defence spending. Given the lack of an overriding unified threat, most European states will be reluctant to increase defence budgets.

The way ahead

ESDP has made considerable progress in the last decade and enjoys strong public support. As ESDP proceeds, the United States and Europe need to ensure that it strengthens, rather than weakens, transatlantic relations. Several steps are necessary to ensure that this occurs.

6. Daniel Keohane, '10 Years After St. Malo,' *Issues* no. 27 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, October 2008), p.6.

First, the United States should accept that Europe needs to have some autonomous operational planning capacity outside of NATO. Given US preoccupation with Iraq and the war on terrorism, the European concern that the United States will not want to be involved in some contingencies is justified. Thus for those few instances when the United States does not want NATO to be involved in managing a crisis, the Europeans need the capacity to act on their own. The key task is to ensure that ESDP develops in an open and transparent manner and in a way which strengthens the capacity of the United States and Europe to effectively address future security challenges.

Second, US and European defence transformation processes and priorities need to be closely harmonised. The United States and Europe need to develop common threat perceptions and common, or at least compatible, military doctrines. The new EU security strategy paper is a step in the right direction. It represents the beginnings of what Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards have called a 'European strategic culture'.⁷ Moreover, many of the threats identified in the paper are very similar to the ones identified in the US National Security Strategy published in September 2002.

Third, NATO and the EU need to develop mechanisms that will allow for a rapid coordinated response in times of crisis. This should involve developing mechanisms for planning and force generation as well as enhanced political consultation. Unless such advanced planning is undertaken, NATO and the EU are likely to find it difficult to cooperate in the future and many of the problems that occurred during the Darfur operation are likely to be repeated.

Fourth, the United States needs to recognise that the EU is becoming an increasingly important political and security actor. In the future, European defence policies and decisions will be increasingly made within a European framework. This will require the United States to develop a stronger security relationship with the EU.

7. See Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, 'Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: the Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture', *International Affairs*, vol. 77, no. 3, 2001, pp. 587-603. For a more sceptical view, see Sten Rynning, 'The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?' *Security Dialogue*, vol. 34, no.4, 2003, pp. 479-96.

The globalising security environment and the EU

Tomas Ries

The EU is a democratic process, not a ‘finished’ political actor. Any significant decisions depend upon the agreement of its key Member States. As these retain diverging agendas, particularly in security, the results where security and grand politics are concerned are either no joint EU policy at all (Russia, China, energy), or else a watered down compromise (the European Security Strategy) or a belated *post-facto* response to external events when they become so imperative or challenging that the key members see a clear and present need to react (enlargement, the European Security and Defence Policy).

While EU consolidation is gradually deepening, the process is slow and cumbersome and this inherent weakness is likely to persist until 2020, even if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified. Thus it is unrealistic to expect that the EU proactively develops a coherent global strategy and the instruments to support it. This does not preclude significant developments, but these are most likely to be the result of belated responses to external challenges. The focus of this chapter is thus to see what challenges are likely to emerge in the coming ten years, and what military capability the EU will need to meet them.

First, however, it is useful to clarify what the ESDP actually is, and what we are trying to achieve with it. In other words, what is the military and what is security?

What is the military?

As André Beaufre noted, war is the dialectic of opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.¹ The military (in the generic sense of the word) is the main instrument for applying such violent force. This can either be wielded apolitically – as a sort of blunt bulldozing where the opposition is physically removed – or politically, applying violent force or its threat as a means to influence another’s will. Finally the military can be used for things for which it is neither designed for nor should be, but which governments may impose on it when they have no alternative. These three functions are outlined below.

1. André Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy* (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), p. 20.

Essence – the expert application of physical violence

The unique core capability of the military is the expert application of physical violence. This is its specialty and no other agency wields this capability to inflict severe destruction. Other instruments for more indirect forms of violence and coercion exist – technological, economic, psychological – but they are indirect and do not yet generate as immediate and imminent a threat as direct kinetic violence. It is, however, worth noting that this is currently changing, as our dependency on information systems increases and our vulnerability to technological attack grows. In coming decades it will be possible to inflict catastrophic damage on post-industrial societies by striking at their cyberinfrastructure. So the first point is that by 2020 the ability to manage cyberwarfare will be vital for our security. However, this task will probably not be assigned to the military or the ESDP, although it is closely linked to the military instrument.

While there are no sharp dividing lines, the application of brute force can be divided into two broad categories. Firstly, *unleashed kinetic violence*. Here direct destruction is used to physically remove an opposing will (e.g. the war against Hitler or shooting down a hijacked airliner to prevent a 9/11 scenario). Such high intensity combat can be placed on a scale between two poles. At the one end is Big Violence, consisting of large-scale destruction operations, from power projection (the 2003 war against Saddam Hussein), to defence (the national defence which Finland's Armed Forces still have as their major priority and which many Eastern EU members see as a real necessity). At the other end is Surgical Violence, consisting of focused destruction for specialised tasks requiring a high level of expertise, such as theatre ballistic missile defence, intercepting and shooting down a hijacked airliner or hunting, capturing or destroying terrorists. Although the EU lacks the big capability, the full spectrum of high intensity combat will remain necessary at least until 2020.

The second major application of violence is *leashed kinetic violence*. This is the active use of violence, but in this case as a means to influence the opposing will rather than removing it. This is Clausewitzian war as the extension of politics, in which the violence is – ideally – strictly tailored to the psychological objective. During the industrial age the peer states and their leaders constituted the psychological centre of gravity in this Clausewitzian game. Today this is changing as a result of four trends. Firstly, because the world's elite states are increasingly integrated in a peaceful and wealthy community where the benefits of cooperation and integration vastly outweigh those of violent conflict. This is, however, entirely dependent upon the global economy functioning. If it crashes it would probably also erode the benign political order within the elite as outlined above. Secondly, new non-state actors are becoming increasingly powerful and significant. Thirdly,

the key political fault lines generating violent conflict have shifted from within the elite peer community to the tensions between unequal global socioeconomic classes of society. The drivers of intersocietal violence have shifted from the Westphalian horizontal peer competition towards the vertical asymmetric tensions of the globalised world village. Finally, because the conventional military supremacy of today's global elite states, or rather that of its champion the US, is so overwhelming that it would be suicidal for any of the world's weaker states to challenge them with conventional military means in a traditional game between nations (e.g. Serbia 1999, Iraq 2003).

Instead Clausewitzian violence is shifting to two new arenas and it is here that we are currently learning how to apply leashed violence. Firstly, Boots on the Ground (BOG) operations, providing security for conflict resolution or state building, from consensual peacekeeping to enforcement. Such peace support operations differ from the direct unleashed use of violence since they are in essence a subordinate part of a broader social engineering campaign. Here military force may be essential but nevertheless is strictly subordinated to the overall societal construction effort and its psychological demands. This is the predominant focus of today's military agenda, and the ESDP and EU Battle Groups are typical products of this requirement. Our main challenge, however, is to learn the psychological rules of this game, which vastly differ from those of the Westphalian inter-state environment.

The second form of leashed form of violence is very different, and consists of Regional and Global Policing, using the military for law enforcement, barrier operations and rescue and evacuation. Typical examples are enforcing ecological norms (fisheries protection), barrier operations against smuggling and illegal migration (the Rio Grande or Mediterranean efforts) and rescue and evacuation of EU citizens abroad (West Africa, Lebanon). All three are increasingly important for the EU, from the Barents (fisheries) to the Mediterranean (migration) to the waters off Somalia (piracy). By 2020 their importance – and particularly that of the ecological protection missions – will have grown considerably. Whether this is the task of military, paramilitary or civilian organisations is a moot point – the demands of these robust policing tasks remain the same. However, since their global range will increase the military will probably become their main executor.

Spinoff - The ability to influence

The ability of the military to inflict unpleasant violence in turn provides a key spinoff effect which traditionally gave the military tool its main day-to-day utility. This is its ability to support diplomacy, again through the ability to influence another will, but now as part of foreign policy, directed towards a clear 'opposing will'. The distinction between

military Foreign Policy Support operations and BOG operations is that the first target a centralised hierarchical actor, whereas the latter strive to influence and enlist the support of an amorphous society and a spectrum of often nebulous and shifting actors. It is the transformation, in General Sir Rupert Smith's words, from inter-state industrial war between states towards wars among the people.²

This political use of the military to influence a clearly distinguishable opponent is more cost-effective than the blunt effort to physically remove him. However, it demands psychological skill, and is easily derailed by the emotional tensions inherent in conflict and/or the technical and tactical demands of winning a violent conflict. Today, however, the number of states towards which this form of Westphalian military influence has been directed is shrinking, and only a handful currently constitute a direct challenge (North Korea) or a potential challenge (perhaps Russia, Iran). This could, however, change if the global economy crashes and leads to historical regression.

The application of military influence for foreign policy support also takes two distinct forms. The first is the most obvious, using the stick of potential or actual violence to frighten another will into complying with one's wishes, either through deterrence or coercion. North Korea is a case in point, but the same deterrence and coercion principles can apply to all alienated regimes if conditions deteriorate. The second is less obvious but very common, and consists of using the carrot of military services as a means to attract interest and influence. In this case military assets are used as enticements, attracting favourable attention and increasing influence among partners. Examples include offering troops for international operations, technological know-how, military assistance and expertise, exercise areas and so forth. They offer a seat and a voice at the round tables in Brussels (NATO and the EU) and/or access to the imperial throne (the White House). This is also a major driving force behind the ESDP today (and of course to NATO-led operations).

Default – the improvised application of military assets, faute de mieux

The third main use of the military is to do things for which it was never designed and should not do, but which society requires of it when it has no other resources to do the job. Most of these tasks fall under the heading of societal support during and after functional disasters. Examples include providing logistical services when normal peacetime infrastructures break down, reinforcing civilian authorities and police under times of heightened terrorist alert, enforcing law and security in the aftermath of major disasters,

2. General Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 428.

replacing civilian services when they go on strike (e.g. rubbish collectors in Naples, firemen in Liverpool or air-traffic controllers in the US), cleaning up beaches after oil spills and so forth. These are all things that the military is not designed to do and should not do, but for which society often has no alternative when major disaster strikes.

Most of these scenarios would be best dealt with by civilian organisations. However, they are lacking and efforts to create them are slow. In their absence the military will need to retain a readiness for improvised societal support missions. With the increasing urbanisation of society and its growing vulnerability and dependence on central authorities this need will increase in the coming decade.

What is security?

The second basic question is what are we actually striving for? In other words, what is security? At its core security means functioning vital life systems. For human society these can be divided into two major types. The deepest vital life system is harmony of spirit, or the ability to find a psychological harmony with one's surroundings and one's life. This is fundamental but is not dealt with here as it is far removed from the preoccupations involving the ESDP.

The second category of vital life systems is material and consists of three systems. Firstly the social dimension, where security means harmony between sentient beings or societies, or freedom from fear. Secondly the functional dimension, where security means having a sustainable livelihood, or freedom from want. This includes two main subsystems: a functioning economy, putting food on the table, and a functioning technological base, providing a roof over people's heads and ploughs in the soil. The third security dimension is ecological, and consists of finding a comfortable habitat and access to natural resources – and adapting one's life to allow both to continue in a sustainable fashion.

These three dimensions are central to our security since existential threats can now emerge in all three. Thus for instance the danger from the Y2K syndrome (a technological challenge) to the functioning of our technological infrastructure, the danger from a deadly pandemic (an ecological challenge) to society and the global economy, or the current dangers of the global economic crisis for the entire emerging post-Westphalian world order, are far deeper and more catastrophic than that currently presented by any traditional state actors or the new non-state actors such as transnational terrorism. Our primary analytic task today is thus to become discriminatingly holistic – broadening our threat perspective from the purely political to cover all three dimensions, but at the same

time focussing on those challenges that present a real systemic threat and are not merely ‘shock and awe’ – ‘full of sound and fury, signifying nothing’.

At the same time, however, the three dimensions interact intimately. A pandemic would impact directly on societies first through the dead and dying, then erode our technological infrastructure, if the experts needed to run it were sick or dead, then choke the global economic flows by restricting the free movement of goods and people, which would in turn ricochet back and hit society through greater scarcity and poverty, which in the worst case scenario would affect global politics. This in turn means that we need a dynamic, multidimensional and synergistic perspective that can anticipate how a crisis will cascade and mutate as it hits our vital life systems.

And this is just one type of crisis. Several crises emerging at once can interact generating a megacrisis far greater than the sum of its parts, for instance if a pandemic or a successful terrorist attack targeted against our global technological infrastructure flows were to combine with the current economic crisis. We can – perhaps – just manage the economic crisis on its own terms, but if it were to be compounded by other crises then the complexity could become unmanageable.

Finally each dimension operates according to a partly different logic. The social dimension is driven by political logic, which is a psychological quest for influence. The functional dimension is driven by engineering logic, which is a more mechanically causal quest to construct. The ecological dimension is driven by complex systems of systems beyond human control and where major human intervention causes more damage than good. This last presents a new challenge. This is the need to limit our own appetite and voluntarily subordinate our desires to the needs of our environment, finding a symbiosis between our livelihood and the demands of the ecosystem.

Finally, the diversification of our security challenges and their complex interaction means that the world is becoming far more volatile and unpredictable. The need for a holistic and synergistic perspective means that we can no longer rely exclusively on yesterday’s narrow reductionist and linear causal analysis. While this narrow specialised expertise remains essential, it must now be complemented with a broader consilient perspective. Rather than attempting to impose an artificial and misleading clarity on our security environment we will have to accept a fuzzier and foggier perspective. It will be less clear, but it will also avoid the delusion that we can see what is coming. The implication for policy is that we must complement our efforts to prepare for specific crises with an ability to react to the unexpected. This means a shift from rigid planning and barriers towards agile improvised response and flexible resilience. For society at large, as well as for the

slow-moving government bureaucracies, this is a large step that, despite several warning signals, still seems beyond our reach.

The security of the EU (and indeed of human society as a whole) rests on these three vital life systems. The task of security policy is firstly to ensure that all three vital life systems function harmoniously, and secondly to tailor society's behaviour so that it does not conflict with the functioning of the life systems. It is on this level that the spiritual dimension is paramount, and where the materialism of late modern industrial society is most damaging. The revival of more stringent ethical norms is, however, almost certain as the constraints of a shrinking world become more apparent – particularly in the ecological sphere. The task of the military in the coming decades will increasingly focus on supporting the functioning of all three vital life systems. The forms this will take is outlined below.

The security environment in 2020

If we examine current trends we can identify three major changes in our vital life systems. In the social dimension a deep transformation of the global political order is underway. In the functional dimension our economic and technological power is increasing (though this now depends on the outcome of the global economic crisis) but is also creating correspondingly more vulnerable and technologically dependent societies. In the ecological dimension we are entering a deepening global crisis. These trends are outlined below. They will all affect the type of military strategy the EU will need in the coming ten years.

The above extrapolates current linear trends. In addition, unexpected 'black swans' will almost certainly emerge. Certain developments may also reach culminating tipping points, resulting in regional or global systemic collapse. One such is the current economic crisis, others can be found in the ecological dimension. It is possible to speculate on others but this lies beyond the scope of this chapter. It should also be borne in mind that consequences of a major systemic collapse would be so great that the relevance or existence of the ESDP itself, or even the EU, would then be in doubt.

Social

The social dimension is in the midst of a transformation away from the Westphalian age. The defining political fault lines generating major violent confrontations are shifting away from yesterday's horizontal peer competition between elite states and towards the vertical tensions between different global socioeconomic strata. Technology is shrinking

the world into a global village, but it is a village on the verge of revolution. While we have an increasingly integrated elite community, we also face increasingly explosive tensions from the poorer strata below.

Elaborating on Robert Cooper and Thomas Friedman,³ and simplifying greatly, the global political map can today be divided into a hierarchical class society consisting of six layers:

Globalisers	Example	Share of world pop.
Transnational Corporations - TNC	Fortune Global 1,000	0.1%
The Postmodern Community - PMC	OECD +	15%
Rapid Transition Societies - RTS	China, India, Brazil +	5%
Localisers		
Struggling Modern States - SMS	Much of the Arab World	10%
Alienated Modern States - AMS	North Korea, Burma, Russia?	5%
Premodern Societies - PMS	The Bottom Billion	65%

For the EU, as part of the dominant Postmodern Community, each of these presents a different challenge. With the TNC we need to find a symbiotic relationship. The TNC wield ever more economic and technological power, from which other forms of power eventually flow. However, they need the state and the state needs them. Within the PMC we need partly to ensure that our dominant global system does not collapse – cf. the current economic crisis – and partly to unite and develop a joint strategy for dealing with our shared global challenges. The RTS are rapidly joining the PMC economic sphere and gradually following politically. The task here is to facilitate their integration. The regimes of the SMS are trying to follow the RTS but with varying degrees of success. The task here is to assist them, both economically and with security. It is also among these frustrated societies that much of transnational terror and organised crime is emerging. The AMS are actively alienated from the PMC and see our globalising system as a threat. The task here is to convert them if possible and, failing this, to manage their challenges to the globalising world. This will require a capability for hard power politics. Finally the PMS bottom tier generate a host of transnational problems. The task here is state building.

We thus face several simultaneous political agendas. The ESDP is playing a part in some of them – the softer end of peace support operations – and is sorely lacking in others –

3. See: Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 180; Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), p. 490.

hard power politics. By 2020 we can expect the ESDP to need to perform several tasks. Towards the TNC, high technology enticement. Towards the SMS, military assistance, from Security Sector Reform (SSR) to crisis resolution and peace support operations. Towards the AMS, a capability to support hard power politics, both for Clausewitzian influence and possible direct military confrontation. Towards the PMS, support for state building. Finally, towards the less developed parts of the world generally, a capability to contain the transnational problems. This includes barrier operations against migration and smuggling and evacuation of EU citizens from crisis areas. These do not remove the root causes of the problem, but will be increasingly necessary as long as they are not solved.

The strategic task of the PMC in the coming decades will be partly to ensure the stable development of globalisation, but also to act as midwife for the new political system that is emerging with the rise of new actors and power relationships. If we do it right the EU can emerge as a major partner in a new globalised political and economic system. If we do it wrong we risk collapsing into an impoverished and violently multipolar world of conflicting societies. If we do it halfway right we may avoid system collapse but the EU could be left as a very subordinate player – a quaint tourist resort for the global power brokers, surviving on charm but with little influence.

Functional

The deep trend in the functional dimension – assuming we weather the current economic crisis – is towards more economic and technological power, but increasingly vulnerable urbanised societies. The key challenges here are firstly to manage the global economic, technological and human flows on which the globalising system depends. Secondly, to assist urbanised post-industrial society recover from eventual catastrophes.

In the Westphalian age security largely depended upon defending state borders and protecting the political and economic systems within these. Today our security is increasingly dependent upon global transnational functional flows. Protecting these flows and their critical nodes will be the main security concern of the globalisation stakeholders (TNC, PMC and RTS) by 2020, for the very practical reason that if these flows fail then everything else will collapse. Challenges include friction (piracy, crime, corruption), shocks (regional instability, terrorist strikes against critical flows or nodes, operations by alienated regimes, earthquakes), strangling (pandemics), corrosion (poor design or maintenance) and so forth. Protecting flows will require global military policing capabilities (protecting sea lanes and critical nodes, etc.) and some power projection (preventing choke operations, managing regional instability). It will also call for complex cross-government cooperation and very close cooperation between the private and public sectors.

For societal support, technological advances will probably lead to more resilient societies in the long run, but by 2020 PMC societies will remain urbanised and vulnerable. Military tasks here will largely be of the default category – assisting civil society to contain or recover from major disasters. As societal vulnerability increases this support task of the military – or ideally parallel civilian disaster management organisations – will become more important.

Ecological

Finally, the deep ecological trend is towards a rising global crisis. This is more than climate change. It includes depletion of non-renewable resources (oil, minerals), degradation of regional biotopes providing renewable resources (water, fish, arable land) and disruption of the global ecosystem, which is generating climate change.

Our primary strategic task here is to limit and reduce the ecological crisis – if possible. This includes several strands: strengthening our scientific understanding of the problem; reducing our ecological impact through more environmentally-friendly technological solutions; reducing our ecological impact by cutting back on our own behaviour and appetite by setting ecological norms (the multilateral agenda) and finally a policing and enforcement agenda, to ensure that ecological norms are followed.

It is in this last area – ecological policing and enforcement – that the ESDP is likely to become increasingly important. As the global ecological crisis deepens its consequences for societies in the EU (and across the world) will become more and more unpleasant. Under these conditions the pressure to protect ecological norms can reach the level of grand politics.

Militarily this will include a variety of tasks, basically under the policing category. This includes ecological policing, controlling and enforcing ecological standards at home, e.g. fisheries protection. However, by 2020 it may also, if the ecological crisis becomes really severe, include more robust power projection requirements to protect remote rain forests, fish breeding areas or other critical global ecological assets that are deemed so essential for the global ecological system as a whole that they become a universal treasure, beyond the sovereign jurisdiction of any single state. This will obviously be a source of major contention, comparable to but exceeding that of universal human rights today. However, unlike human rights the ecological consequences of not enforcing standards may become so tangible and disastrous that universal enforcement will be seen as overriding sovereign considerations. If human security is high on the agenda today, ecological security is likely to become vastly more important by 2020. This will obviously make

the scientific body on whose judgement the norms are based of major global political significance.

A second major military task will be managing the consequences of the ecological crisis for our own societies. These belong to the category of default tasks and can range from sudden refugee and migration flows within the EU or around the EU, to disaster management, emergency assistance to society against fires, flooding, storms and so forth.

Military building blocks in 2020

No forecast of ESDP 2020 would be complete unless we include the transformation of the building blocks of which the military instrument consists. These are threefold: (i) the will of the leadership, soldiers and society; (ii) the skill with which they can apply that will; and (iii) the tools they have with which to implement their decisions. Two of these factors are currently undergoing deep change and this will affect the shape which the ESDP will have in 2020.

Firstly the will of a significant portion of EU leaders, and some of EU society, is declining. The EU has become, in Robert Inglehart's terms, a soft postmodern society.⁴ As Christopher Coker has emphasised,⁵ such societies are averse to suffering and sacrifice, both averse to experiencing it themselves but also towards inflicting it on others. If this trend continues it is questionable whether the EU will retain the will to maintain and use high-intensity military violence by 2020. And without that, the military will not mean very much. A proviso here is that will is contextual. A perception of an acute threat among EU leaders and societies can resuscitate a stronger will to act. This would, however, only arise after the problem has emerged, which is not the most healthy strategy.

The second major change is technology. In the coming decades three breakthrough technologies are likely to transform both our environment and our military tools. Advances in nanotechnology, data processing and sensor systems, and especially their fusion, will have at least two major consequences. Firstly, a vastly increased sensor grid. The world around us, and we ourselves, will increasingly become seeded with vast amounts of diffuse and networked miniature sensors. We will live in a sea of sensors and it will be increasingly difficult for individuals to unplug themselves from this information grid. Initially in the most advanced societies, but gradually spreading across the world. In addition, we will have the capability to seed uncovered parts of the world with sensors at

4. Robert Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 453.

5. Christopher Coker, *Humane Warfare* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 170.

short notice. Under these conditions the sphere of privacy will shrink enormously. This raises enormous ethical and political issues, but in this world decisive power will rest with those who control the sensor grid and the resulting datamaps.

The second major consequence of the nano-data-sensor fusion is that the tools of military force will be transformed, becoming smaller, more autonomous, more intelligent and very closely integrated. Today's individual big centralised manned weapons systems are likely to be increasingly replaced by dispersed miniaturised swarms of robots. Clusters of minute subcomponents, each with different specific qualities (sensors, communications, damaging agents) and integrated into networks will become capable of acting coherently and of morphing in various configurations to perform a wide variety of tasks. This lies beyond 2020, but the trend will be there, with more and more unmanned vehicles, robotics and miniaturisation. It may also offer us a technological means to compensate for declining will.

The consequences of these two trends are, firstly, that the focus of physical power is shifting towards the cybersphere. Secondly, that kinetic destruction will increasingly be replaced by what we may call corrosive destruction, capable of inflicting far more severe but also more controlled and precise damage than kinetic destruction.

Conclusion

By 2020 our security challenges will be more diverse and more severe. They will require military instruments capable of supporting six critical tasks. These are, in order of importance:

Flow security – protecting global technological and economic flows. This will become our number one priority, since it is both vital for the survival of our societies and the global political order. At the same time, our vulnerability to ruptures in these flows will increase, even though new design concepts and technologies will introduce greater resilience. This will require very close interaction between the business, government and scientific communities and a wide range of military capabilities, from regional power protection to keeping sea lanes open to highly technical intervention capabilities.

Ecological protection – the global policing and enforcement of ecological norms. As the global ecological crisis grows its impact will become ever more acute, raising ecological security to the top of our political agenda. This will multiply the intensity and scale of our efforts to protect the environment both at home but especially globally. This will require a host of global policing and enforcement capabilities, including in the worst case scenario robust power projection.

Barrier operations – shielding the global rich from the tensions and problems of the poor. As the ratio of the world population living in misery and frustration will remain massive, the tensions and spillover between their world and that of the rich will continue to grow. As we are unlikely to have solved this problem at its root by 2020 – i.e. by curing dysfunctional societies – we will need to strengthen our barriers. It is a morally distasteful, losing strategy, but will be unavoidable if we cannot solve the problems at their root. It could be further reinforced if we reduce our global engagement to solve the problems at source (see next point below.)

Social engineering – stabilisation for conflict resolution and state building operations. This addresses the core of the global social problem but the lessons of our last decade's efforts indicate that the difficulty vastly exceeds our capabilities. Both the UN Millennium Goals and our state-building efforts are floundering, at the same time as our will is slackening and resources are becoming overstretched. Hence the priority of this mission may well have been downgraded by 2020.

Hard power politics – Clausewitzian influence over alienated state regimes. Some alienated regimes will still exist in 2020 – the key uncertainty here being the Kremlin. If so, we will need to retain a capability to meet their deliberate challenges to our vision of the world. This will require hard military power, but also an increased focus on asymmetrical forms of destruction, notably in the cybersphere. This is of major concern to the Eastern members of the EU, and if the ESDP is unable to provide this then they will turn to NATO or directly to the US.

Societal support – default operations to assist society manage disasters. As post-industrial society becomes more dependent upon a complex functional base, and as urban society becomes less self-reliant, the potential for societal disasters will increase. Until we shift our functional and social base to become more resilient we will be vulnerable to major disasters, for which the military often will have only emergency response available.

This is a wide range of missions and capabilities, but it reflects the wide range of security challenges in 2020. It implies not only new orientation, organisation and capabilities, but also a growing need to interact with an increasingly diverse spectrum of non-military actors. These include firstly other government agencies, secondly the transnational business community and thirdly NGOs and civil society. It will also be impossible for any single state to manage the spectrum of challenges unilaterally, or fund such an effort, requiring ever deeper multinational cooperation.



The historical record indicates that the evolution of the EU's military capability to 2020 will be slow, cumbersome and reactive. The one exception could be science, where breakthrough technologies (nano-sensor-data) may lead to a revolution in our capability to control our social and technological environment. However, this lies beyond our current conceptions of the military and the ESDP, and the technologies will only become operational after 2020.

The gradual path to a European defence identity

Stefano Silvestri

It is rather difficult to predict how ESDP will evolve given its present intergovernmental nature. Not only can individual governments change their minds at will, but they can choose one model as the best suited for a given contingency and then discard it entirely when confronting a different situation. Because intergovernmental cooperation is *à la carte*, predictions regarding ESDP are very uncertain. Certainly the Treaties say that ‘eventually’ the ESDP should evolve into a common policy, a fully-fledged European Defence. The ambition is there, and the Lisbon Treaty indicates two possible ways forward: the introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC), among able and willing member countries, and the establishment (already done in 2004) of the European Defence Agency (EDA). While the intergovernmental nature of the decision making would not change, ESDP will become a permanent feature of the EU political and institutional landscape the EU. The question is whether this will result in effective policies.

As things stand today, ESDP is evolving in a rather erratic manner, fulfilling some requirements and filling some gaps, but without a clear overarching strategy or plan (and this applies to its capabilities as well, notwithstanding all the defined Helsinki goals). This will remain the case, unless more thought is given to the strategic ambitions of the EU as an international security player.

What ambitions?

What ambitions should we have, regarding ESDP? If our objective remains to accelerate as much as possible its evolution from its present status to a fully-fledged European Defence, we should be capable of defining what exactly European Defence should mean. Relatively generic documents, like the European Security Strategy (2003), are of limited utility. Sometime they can even increase confusion. The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy approved by the European Council in 2008, for in-

stance, says among other things that ‘preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach’.¹ What does this mean? How can an existing threat be prevented from becoming a source of conflict, and early on, moreover? Is the document referring only to potential threats which do not yet exist? While F.D. Roosevelt thought that the Big Five of the UN Security Council should act as the ‘Police-men of the World’, such an interpretation seems to suggest that the EU could become its ‘Big Brother’. Should the EU attempt to translate this policy into an operational military strategy, it would be obliged to continuously interfere and intervene, pre-emptively, in situations of potential threat, thereby running the risk of transforming them into actual conflicts. If on the contrary this statement only points to economic and diplomatic initiatives it implies a permanent willingness to be involved in all areas and situations of potential crisis, with the inevitable consequences in terms of ‘mission creep’ whenever the attempted prevention fails.

More seriously, ESDP should be considered as the operational arm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. Neither can be effective without the other. This implies, however, that the CFSP should also be shaped in a way that takes account of the evolution of ESDP, and not just the contrary. There is a strict linkage between any ESDP mission and foreign policy. For instance, the EULEX mission in Kosovo cannot succeed if a clear strategy for dealing with the situation on the ground has not been thought out in the framework of CFSP. What would be the consequences of a failure of this mission for Kosovo and for the other regional actors? Is there a price to be paid by them, in case of failure? Is the EU prepared to increase as much as needed the leverage necessary to make the mission succeed? This is normally called credibility, and is an essential feature of any defence policy.

Of course, the work of both the European Military Staff (EMS) and of the EDA is already increasing the awareness of what the existing European capabilities may allow us to do, of what could be done and of which improvements are urgently required. Also, their work could heighten European consciousness of the structural absurdities, military weakness and economic wastefulness of the present European defence system, fragmented and dispersed as it is among the various Member States. Yet an explicit, European-wide, political debate on the global role of the EU is lacking.

Traditionally, a state’s defence policy starts by identifying the need to defend the national territory and vital interests from all military threats. A European Defence should include a solidarity clause, along the lines of Article V of the Brussels’ Treaty (WEU). However,

1. Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’, S407/08, Brussels, 11 December 2008.

while the Lisbon Treaty strengthens and enlarges solidarity among its Members, it stops short of any automatic defence commitment. In practice, it seems rather unlikely that a military attack against one Member State or its vital interests could be ignored by the rest of the EU and not acted upon. Yet, the absence of an automatic solidarity clause makes it harder to prepare the required military forces in advance, to plan for contingencies, to establish common command and control structures and to build a credible deterrence. As things stand currently, collective defence remains a national responsibility to be carried out inside NATO (for those that are part of it) and a kind of European ‘ghost mission’ which may or may not be carried out, should the need (and the will) arise. There are no compelling reasons to maintain such a divide. On the contrary, effectiveness and rationalisation of defence policies require an integrated European approach, one that is coherent with the continuation of the Transatlantic Alliance. The present situation increases costs and weakens the perception of a credible Allied common front to face external threats. The difficult and somewhat grotesque parleys conducted between NATO and the EU to shape their eventual cooperation, confirm this point.

The EU and NATO

One of the reasons why this unconstructive divide has not been overcome is probably to be found in the absence of a clear and present threat of continental dimensions, requiring a big standing army. Present contingencies only mobilise a limited amount of military resources, frequently projected overseas, or dedicated to specialised tasks such as surveillance, intelligence, anti-terrorism, police etc. European and American armed forces are not designed specifically to carry out these ‘new’ tasks. In the European case, in particular, the majority of the existing forces are armed and trained to perform combat operations conceived during the Cold War, unadapted to the new missions. Since the 1990s, the European Union countries have deployed an increasing number of soldiers abroad on specific crisis management missions (up to 80,000, excluding major wars and permanent troop presences) in an increasing number of countries (up to 38). Yet, while this represents less than 4% of the total available armed forces, our countries are not really capable of significantly increasing this contingent of projectable forces.

NATO, the EU and the Member States face the same problem: how to modernise their forces in a period of strong financial constraints, so that they can better carry out the new missions while maintaining a sufficient capability to confront a major continental contingency that could suddenly arise. In fact, each single European state today lacks the necessary resources, even if some, like France and Britain, are marginally better off than others. NATO has no resources of its own, and must confront the additional burden of adapting its forces to the new missions while maintaining as its main priority the capa-

bility to deal with a major continental war (because that remains its *raison d'être*).

The EU can mobilise some additional resources, has no strategic constraints and has the additional benefit of being able to mobilise economic and civilian resources as well as military ones. However, the EU lacks a clear political and military chain of command, sufficient autonomous planning and control capacities, a coherent strategic concept and possibly also enough strength and clarity of purpose to deter escalation in a volatile situation.

Yet, alternatives are lacking. NATO is making the biggest effort to update and modernise European military forces, but it is unlikely to succeed. The required national investments are not forthcoming, NATO's standing capabilities (such as the NATO Response Force – NRF) are reduced in terms of numbers and capabilities while the Allied operations in Afghanistan are in deep trouble. A new 'comprehensive concept' is being drafted, to adapt NATO's capabilities and strategies to the complex requirements of the new tasks of crisis management, anti-terrorism, state-building and peacekeeping. However, it is almost impossible to conceive coherent operations involving at the same time very different and distinct actors, largely independent of each other, with separate and diverse objectives. While a good 'comprehensive concept' may enhance the effectiveness of military operations, diminishing the probability of blunders due to ignorance or excessive rigidity, it is not possible to imagine that all the organisations present and active in the theatre of operations (public and private, religious and lay, non-profit and profit-oriented, transnational, international and national, armed and disarmed, etc.) will follow the orders coming from the military chain of command, notwithstanding its eventual 'comprehensiveness', all the more so when other legitimate powers exercise their role independently (local authorities, the UN, representatives of other international organisations, etc.). There is the risk of establishing a theoretical 'command chain' with no real control over the activities going on in the theatre of operations, thus increasing, instead of diminishing, the uncertainty.

The multiplicity of crises, their differences, the presence of diverse and sometime conflicting objectives, and the *ad hoc* approach chosen in the context of each intervention, are some of the reasons why the attempt to establish a clear-cut and all-inclusive new military doctrine, to be applied everywhere, seems an illusion. More likely, each crisis demands its own approach and its specific strategy, to be continuously monitored, verified and changed according to circumstances. It is a question of 'governance' that largely exceeds the competences and powers of any military headquarters: it requires a political decision-making body to be continuously and effectively in charge. Such an evolution could more easily occur in the EU than in NATO, provided that a clear chain of politi-

cal and military command is established and that an explicit delegation of powers takes place from the national to the European level.

The countries of the European Union currently spend slightly more than half of the US budget on their defence. However, given the fact that the US armed forces are 30 percent smaller than the total of the European ones, and that European expenditures are ineffectively divided among separate national budgets, European investment expenditures are just 27 percent of American expenditures, and those for R&D about 10%. However, considering these expenditures *per se*, and comparing them to those of the other major global actors (excluding the US), the European defence budget remains by far the second largest and could probably be amply sufficient to carry out all the necessary modernisations, provided that it is spent in a more rational and coordinated way.

Crisis management, peace-enforcing, state-building and other similar operations can go on for years, consuming increasing amounts of funds and materials and employing extensive manpower. The last point can become crucial. As of today, Europe and NATO have demonstrated their capacity of deploying 'overseas', at any given time, 50,000 to 80,000 men, the UN have effectively deployed over 90,000 more men while the US alone can probably maintain an average of 150,000 soldiers deployed continuously.

These numbers are important, but not very impressive if compared with the amount of soldiers serving in the armies of the contributing countries. The comparison changes, however, when budgets and materials are taken into account. It is extremely difficult for budgets that are relatively tight and inflexible to accommodate the considerable and increasing expenditure required. At the same time, the forces employed have rarely been trained specifically to perform the necessary tasks. On the positive side, the EU and NATO are striving to increase the expeditionary capability of their forces and their 'staying capacity' over longer periods. But other efforts are needed to train and equip a greater number of specialised forces. The European Defence Agency (EDA) and a strengthened Planning Cell are tasked with assessing the experience to date and the changes necessary, but no clear European commitment has yet been given.

The decision to form the EU Battle Groups (EU BG) was aimed at increasing the EU expeditionary capacity. In reality, however, no EU BG has ever been employed, even when it would have been technically possible. Similar doubts arise when considering the NRF, the expeditionary force of the Atlantic Alliance. In contrast to the EUBG, the NRF (or elements of it) has been deployed four times: in protection services at the Olympic Games in Athens, to support the presidential elections in Afghanistan, in carrying out disas-

ter relief after Hurricane Katrina in the US, and for the same purpose after the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. Considering that the NRF had the ambitious aim of becoming NATO's most modern and effective fighting force, to be the 'first in, first out' entry force in high-intensity combat scenarios, its actual interventions have been somewhat more modest and hence there is a certain sense of anti-climax.

Political factors have hampered the development of these forces and the decision to deploy them. It is easy to imagine how difficult is for the EU to deploy anything identified from the beginning with the word 'battle'. Technical reasons have also been quoted: the EU BG are probably too specialised and relatively small, while the NRF, after the withdrawal of part of the American contingent, has been somewhat downgraded and is now in a state of 'graduated readiness' (i.e. not ready), waiting for the end of the ongoing NATO operations to recover some of its capabilities.

In contrast, the European civilian response capability, has been employed extensively, mobilising its five priority areas: (i) police (5,000 personnel available when needed, up to 1,400 in less than 30 days); (ii) rule of law (about 600 judges, prosecutors and prison officers); (iii) civilian administration (a pool of about 550 experts deployable at short notice); (iv) civil protection (about 600 experts plus a staff of about 4,500 deployable in two intervention teams within a timeframe of several hours to one week); (v) monitoring (about 500 people). The reality is of course more modest than these numbers would suggest, simply because it is very difficult to project these civilian capabilities at short notice and with the necessary security guarantees and to maintain them in place for a long time. Moreover, for civilian operations to produce the best results it is essential to be able to build up a viable relationship with the people concerned. Unfortunately, the rapid turnover of the civilian personnel has very negative consequences in terms of personal relationships, knowledge of the local situation and culture, and the ability to win the cooperation and the confidence of the local population.

An integrated and effective strategy could use the civilian capabilities to greatly reduce the risk of new 'Golden Hour' failures, provided that it could apply an integrated military-civilian strategy, well suited to peace-making, state-building and other complex crisis management operations. No artificial division between a military and a civilian crisis management phase should be attempted, however, as proposed by those that think that NATO, or other *ad hoc* coalitions, could take charge of the military, warlike part, and the EU the civilian, reconstruction and governance part. First, there is no clear temporal or territorial division between these two phases: they generally proceed in parallel. A division between two separate commands and political responsibilities would simply increase confusion and inefficiency. Second, it is clear that military decisions will condition

civilian actions and vice versa, and that only a single strategic plan can avoid multiplying negative interferences.

Also, some ambiguities need to be dispelled. There is the tendency today to emphasise the importance of ‘human security’ as a guiding principle of ESDP. The reality appears more complex. While human security is certainly an important criterion, it should not be the only one. It is important to avoid limiting the possible scope of European actions unnaturally. Positioning the EU outside the military dimension of security would greatly diminish its freedom of action and its global role. Also, the European priority cannot simply be one of ‘doing good’ but of securing its vital interests, which could require the use of force.

Not just a civilian but a security actor

Usually the EU is defined mainly as an international ‘civilian actor’. The ESDP aims at transforming the EU into a ‘security actor’, more in line with the reality of the European engagements and actions on the field. However, it should be made clear that the EU is capable and ready to use its ‘hard power’, commencing with the military, when needed. And, in order to do so, ESDP should dispose of all the necessary ways and means, from the command and control structures, to the requisite military forces. Of course, as the ESS says, ‘none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means.’² The stress placed on multi-dimensional approaches reinforces the utility of mobilising the full spectrum of the civilian as well as military capabilities of the EU, but should not be seen as a constraint tending to preclude the use of military force.

No useful European military capacity can be developed or employed without an effective command and control system, a proper Headquarters, fully interfaced and in continuous communication with the projected headquarters of the various missions. The ‘non-duplication’ principle should be applied more equitably to NATO, the EU and the Member States with the relevant capacities. A complete reassessment of all the existing command structures in Europe could easily identify a number of national and allied structures that could be modified, completed and Europeanised. It is important that the European command structure becomes permanently operational, rather than being ‘on call’ and fully activated only when it is deemed necessary.

Intelligence is a growing priority, but the existing EU structures (from the Satellite Centre to the Joint Situation Centre, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, etc.) cannot satisfy the demand. One problem is that intelligence remains basically in the hands

2. The European Security Strategy, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, p. 7, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

of national agencies that prefer to keep it outside the common framework or to trade it bilaterally. A second problem is that 'crisis intelligence' is different from the traditional military intelligence, much more fragmented and at the same time much less 'exclusive'. In many cases, open sources have been more rapid and effective than sophisticated technical intelligence or the 'official' human intelligence capacities. The new dimensions of organised crime and of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may be better served by developing a new kind of international 'security intelligence'. These aspects could open a window of opportunity for the development of new EU intelligence capabilities, which could be gathered directly through a European agency and then work in cooperation with the national agencies on a more equal footing.

Resources and expenditure issues

Because CFSP and ESDP are largely intergovernmental still, the bulk of the expenditure falls on the shoulders of those countries that are sending the forces. Thus, those countries take both greater risks and greater financial burdens. Is this a way to show European solidarity? There have been some attempts to modify this situation, as in the case of Operation *Althea*. More should be done, going beyond the current *Althea* mechanism. A common budget should be established, to pay for the common structures and to finance a significant part if not all of the mission.

Other schemes for common financing should be studied with a view to the funding of the required force modifications and improvements, possibly leading to common European capacities (especially for specific sectors like strategic and theatre transportation, Space communications and intelligence, etc.). Logistics could also be modified, to make them less burdensome. Today Europe (just as NATO does) mobilises practically as many logistical chains as the number of national forces that are projected. This is partly a consequence of the low level of standardisation and interoperability (a problem that is already being studied by the EDA. However, the EDA, at the present time, have very limited means to correct this). The principle of a common logistical chain for expeditionary forces should be agreed upon, to reinforce the aim of effective standardisation as well.

The question of additional resources for defence has not been solved. The EU Member States spend about 180 billion euro on defence each year. However, out of this respectable sum only about 22 percent is earmarked for investment and acquisitions. The amount needed for the necessary modernisation and reinforcements, and to attain the Helsinki Goals, is greater (the investment budget should reach about 30% of the total expenditure, i.e. about 15 billion euro more each year). It is impossible to increase the various national defence budgets to cover this gap. Thus a different strategy is required, one which diminishes duplication

and increases the effectiveness of expenditures. The more logical solution would be to increase commonalities and integrate a large part of the acquisitions at the European level.

Should Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) be established among a few able and willing EU members, the prospect of common defence expenditure standards will arise, and of fixing targets and conditions, similar to what has been done for the core euro-zone states in the monetary field. All the relevant decisions would have to be taken by the states participating in PSC, and the Protocol No. 4 (on PSC established by Art. 27 of the Treaty) already fixes a number of objectives such as a stronger development of defence capabilities, harmonisation of armaments programmes, the fielding of new forces, attaining agreed-upon budgetary objectives, identifying military requirements in common, etc. Thus it would be useful if the EU institutions prepared a common position on these matters, indicating the best criteria and objectives, to ensure a higher degree of understanding and solidarity among those inside and those outside the ESDP core.

All this is inextricably linked with industrial and market policies. The EDA and the European Commission have proposed some initial positive measures (a Code of Conduct, a Directive on public procurement, etc.), but a single European defence market remains a very distant objective. It is not simply a question of market liberalisation, but of public policies. Defence, industrial and research policies are closely interconnected. The EDA has neither the power nor the funds to replace the existing national agencies. This means, however, that the European defence policy and market remain an uncomfortable patchwork of the national markets and policies. The development of a stronger European common defence policy, or the establishment of PSC, would require a strong industrial and market chapter.

Conclusions

All that falls well short of the establishment of a single European Army, or of the closing down of the various national defence authorities. Yet it is also incompatible with the present complete exercise of national sovereignty over defence matters. A process of progressive shifting of sovereignty from the national to the European level should be endorsed, applying the principles of subsidiarity to the defence and security field. We can imagine the possibility of a partial or total reversibility of the committed assets to national control, should any imperative need arise (something like the Falklands War for example). However it will be increasingly difficult to imagine major national contingencies that will not receive full European support, especially if and when important military assets and foreign policy commitments will be managed in common.

These developments are a real possibility. There is of course no guarantee that they will take place. There is no formal European commitment or obligation to develop the present CFSP and ESDP. On the contrary, criticism of the policies abounds, just as Member States are reluctant to relinquish national powers and prerogatives. All decisions have been formally maintained inside the framework of intergovernmental cooperation, to ensure their full reversibility. Yet progress is forthcoming and incremental steps are being taken that are increasing European competencies and establishing precedents. No one thought that the EU could efficiently manage a naval operation in the Indian Ocean, but the Atalanta mission has been a clear success. To this end, the EU has utilised existing national competencies, 'Europeanising' them as much as needed. Practical developments are preceding institutional and doctrinal developments, justifying their necessity. Resistance to change remains, but it is getting weaker.



Part II

Practitioners' perspectives



A noble ambition

Claude-France Arnould

There is always an element of ambivalence in talk about the ambitions of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), evoking in the minds of some a rather pointless quest for self-assertion and in the minds of others Montesquieu's dictum that 'a noble ambition, when properly directed, is a sentiment useful to society.' The ambition of the ESDP certainly has the potential to be 'useful to society', European and international alike.

The key parameters for a 10-year forecast go beyond the ESDP question itself but will determine the answer. Where will the EU be in a decade's time?

How will it be functioning institutionally? Will the Lisbon Treaty have been ratified? If it has not, but perhaps even if it has, will another Treaty have been negotiated in the meantime? There were three Treaties, one after the other, between 1990 and 2000. Will provisions have been implemented without any need for a Treaty, as in the case of the European Defence Agency? Regardless of where we are in the ratification process, much will depend on the will of the Council, the European Council and the decision-makers in Brussels and the capitals.

Who will the Member States be? How many enlargements will there have been and will these have been accompanied by institutional reform, with or without closer cooperation within or outside the Treaties?

What will the international context be in terms of strategic positions, the economy, access to natural resources and climate, and what tensions will it have produced?

The long list of questions illustrates the uncertainties. Security and defence policy is highly sensitive to the state of the institutions and to events on the perimeter of the European Union. Defence and security policy can develop only in the context of functioning institutions with clearly defined levels of responsibility and decision-making, coherent policies and solidarity between Member States, without prejudice to instances of closer cooperation.

I will not dwell here on the analysis expounded by General Bentégeat in a separate chapter in this volume, with which I am in broad agreement, but rather focus on a number of challenges which I believe have to be met to give ESDP – perhaps, who knows, tomorrow’s ‘security and defence policy’ – the chance of fulfilling the expectations created by it and of responding to the needs which it is best placed to satisfy.

The challenges to be met

ESDP has ten years of success behind it, a fact that is as undeniable as it is little known. That success is amply illustrated in this publication by the EUISS. In defiance of all the shortcomings commonly attributed to it, the EU has succeeded in taking the initiative by promoting the conduct of military and civilian operations based on conceptual and institutional architecture (i.e. by acting on the ground rather than by fine-tuning structures). Stemming from consensus on the need for the Union to assume its responsibilities in the Balkans, including through the deployment of force, the EU has since adapted to changing needs and circumstances, whether it be by deploying military operations in Africa or civilian missions in other highly demanding theatres, including most recently Georgia and Kosovo. The latest projects entrusted to the European Defence Agency and the research and technology and equipment programmes also illustrate the eminently practical nature of ESDP work in the field of capabilities.

The challenges are formidable nonetheless.

The most important, or at least the most pressing, is clearly to avoid a gap developing between what is expected of the ESDP and the means at its disposal. In fact, *the gap is in danger of widening* as a result of the combined effect of the current financial crisis and Europe’s increasing engagement within the Atlantic Alliance in Afghanistan.

Demand for European Union intervention in crisis situations is growing exponentially, particularly in the civilian field. With its ability to deploy a wide range of instruments, the European Union is in a position to address that need and is expected to provide intervention capabilities, such as police officers, judges, observers, etc., on a large scale. However, the duties of police officers and judges, unlike those of the military, are, *a priori*, primarily domestic in nature and, under growing budgetary constraints, priority is bound to be given to domestic needs. In the military field too, shrinking defence budgets and the operational needs in Afghanistan, the effects of which will continue to be felt for the next few years at least, will increasingly impinge on the ability to contribute to EU operations. That is even truer of certain critical capabilities, the desperate search for helicopters and aircraft being a well known problem in all operations at NATO, United Nations and EU levels.

The paradox of diminishing engagement by the larger Member States and increasing engagement by the other Member States, including in particular the new Member States, is becoming more glaring with each operation. The trend may be surprising and might not have been foreseeable, for example, when the clause on permanent structured cooperation (PSC) was drafted as part of the Lisbon Treaty. Why the lack of interest? Because the case for the legitimacy of an operation is not sufficiently convincing or because the operation does not seem to warrant a review of priorities. Why, by contrast, the increasing involvement of the smaller Member States? In some cases because, as non-members of NATO, they are not as strictly bound by the demands of the operation in Afghanistan; and, in all cases, because the desire to play an exemplary role as members of the European Union and to consolidate their support for the United Nations overcomes the natural reluctance to engage in theatres which are at times foreign in all respects.

A question troubling the minds of many in Brussels, despite explicit confirmation of French commitment to ESDP, is whether, in the years to come, France will continue to be the main contributor to EU operations given its new position within NATO and in the light of the reorganisation of its defence system. But, is there an alternative? Whatever the value of the Battle Groups as rapid-response capabilities bringing together in certain cases, such as the Nordic Battlegroup, highly trained forces from a number of medium-sized and small Member States, they cannot respond on their own to crises where there is a risk of escalation altering the extent and duration of the operation.

Although the mobilisation of small and medium-sized Member States and the participation of third countries are major assets to the Union, the ESDP cannot develop or be pursued, even, without the engagement of those Member States with the strongest defence capabilities. In particular, are those Member States with the greatest capabilities going to turn into a reality the possibility of a group of Member States being entrusted with the implementation of a mission, as provided for under the Lisbon Treaty?

There will likewise soon be a new slant to the question of capabilities themselves: commitments under joint programmes are in danger of being affected by budgetary restrictions; for off-the-shelf purchases, expectations in terms of price competition and industrial and social returns will be greater, expectations which are partly in conflict with each other.

Even if, here too, the phenomenon is not going to have any particular effect on the EU, it will be increasingly difficult to demonstrate, to our American partners in particular, the value of ESDP as a generator of increased capabilities.

The trend towards a growing scarcity of ESDP resources can be counterbalanced only by an enhanced perception of the need for ESDP itself, not only because ESDP is a fine idea politically but also because it responds effectively to the most urgent security needs to be addressed by Member States. As things stand, the ESDP is essentially an effort made by the Union in response to painful humanitarian situations, an embodiment of the EU's political commitment. The ESDP is suspected now and again of 'inventing operations or missions' to justify its existence. Curiously, that suspicion is reserved for it alone.

The humanitarian objective, for all its importance, and a show of diplomatic commitment cannot be the sole drivers of the European Security and Defence Policy if the Member States are to engage in a context which will be marked in the coming years by a shortage of resources. The Member States have vital defence interests, which these days most of them protect through NATO, but they also have wider security interests including internal security, particularly in terms of the fight against organised crime and terrorism, security of supplies, neighbourhood stability and protection of citizens (disasters, evacuations, hostage-taking, piracy, etc.). At the same time as it fulfils its humanitarian and diplomatic objectives, the ESDP must play a role in satisfying those wider security demands and do so visibly.

Furthermore, the ESDP will not acquire full legitimacy unless it is accompanied by genuine solidarity, both financial and political. Financially, because military ESDP is at present the only policy area of the Union almost entirely lacking in solidarity. Admittedly, under the Treaty, where a policy has military implications, the financing for it must come from national contributions as opposed to the Community budget, but nowhere is it stated that national contributions necessarily have to be shared according to the system of 'each contributor pays its own costs', the arrangement which has been in place since the ESDP began (with a very low proportion of common expenses). But the ESDP must also manifest political solidarity and meet the expectations of all Member States, obviously insofar as the strategic situation enables those expectations to be defined by the EU, rather than conveying the impression that its focus is on traditional areas of interest to certain Member States.

The Member States of the EU must also be able to allocate efforts rationally between the various multilateral frameworks and the national level. The most appropriate framework can be determined by answering the following question: who do we want to act with and who could we act with to best possible effect? Is it partners from both sides of the Atlantic (in the framework of NATO or specific coalitions), is it Europeans, including possibly Russia or other neighbouring States, for example in the Mediterranean region, that have expressed a desire to act in conjunction with the EU, or is it the entire international

community under the UN framework, notwithstanding the possibility of an EU force, capable of rapid deployment, facilitating a subsequent, more international engagement of the UN or supporting the UN in a difficult situation, as we did in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Chad? The crisis-specific circumstances are what should determine the preference, and the EU should be able to discuss openly the best option with its partners, in particular the United States. Member States also have to make a clear choice between national action and EU action, including in matters relating to assistance for countries exposed to external or internal crises. Each of the two levels can usefully reinforce the other, but only if they are effectively coordinated.

The assets

Conceptually, the development of the ESDP is as sensitive and as potentially conflictive a question as that of the single currency or foreign policy. Indeed, it is more explosive still since it strikes at the heart of national sovereignty and defence relations with the United States. This is why the ESDP has been developed with such caution, through compromises peppered with ambiguities and limitations, making the task of the players involved complex and at times frustrating. But the pragmatic approach has nonetheless proved invaluable to the ESDP and is likely to prevail increasingly in the future. Indeed, pragmatism leads directly to the conclusion that responding to crises and guaranteeing security demand a joint approach, and this at a time when the case for Brussels deciding on matters affecting the daily lives of citizens is being subjected to increasing scrutiny on grounds of subsidiarity. Leaving aside dogmas and hyperbole about a 'European army', this is undoubtedly the reason why polls show consensus on a Union-level approach to crisis and security matters, even in Member States where euro-scepticism is prevalent. We frequently hear talk of the need for a Europe that protects. It is in the area of security that this protective function is expected most and contested least.

No Member State has the budgetary or human resources to be an isolated player in crisis situations, particularly in view of population trends. Furthermore, doubts about the political legitimacy of unilateral action are growing. The point of the exercise is no longer to intervene in the name of more or less spurious national interests, as European States with the means to do so did throughout history until comparatively recently, but rather to intervene in the name of common values and objectives validated by the United Nations. The European dimension reinforces that legitimacy and avoids historically sensitive confrontations, the disadvantage being new constraints to which one must grow accustomed.

ESDP, which is an integral part of the CFSP, has also profoundly transformed the latter by enabling it to gradually overcome the shortcomings of political cooperation: when the aim is not only to agree on declarations but also to act on them, the significance of the ac-

tion required and the extent of the ensuing responsibilities change the way in which the 27 work, as the Georgian crisis last summer clearly illustrated. Initially Member States were divided in their opinions. However, the decision to immediately send a mission of observers compelled States to agree on the arrangements for that action. The initial confusion was followed by concerted effort.

The value of ESDP lies not only in the fact that it clearly complements CFSP; the security and defence policy must converge with all the policies of the Union.

Whatever the crisis or threat, the solution can only lie in placing the appropriate instruments (economic aid, trade measures, visas, development, humanitarian aid, civilian and military crisis-management operations, measures to combat illegal trafficking, police cooperation, etc.) at the service of a policy to be defined. Any response must therefore rest on the three pillars of the EU, as well as on the policies and capabilities of the Member States. The instruments could be merged under the existing Treaties but not to perfection and subject to all actors concerned showing significant determination, to which the current structures are not conducive. The Lisbon Treaty improves matters substantially. Although it does not place all the instruments in the same set of hands, except at European Council level, the High Representative does have the means of ensuring, and the duty to ensure, consistency.

ESDP is therefore part of a general synergy not only in the area of external action but in other areas too. The EU must take care not to overly 'autonomise' external action from its other policies. It must be possible to forge a link between ESDP and the entire group of security policies, including internal security.

It is only a matter of time before the capabilities developed under ESDP are made available to a requesting Member State hit by a disaster exceeding its national response capabilities. In such an event, the chain of command (civilian in most cases) in place would doubtless be observed. The solidarity clause of the Lisbon Treaty specifically mentions the use of military resources and the coordination in the Council of assistance provided by the Member States, aided by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with support from the structures developed in the context of the common security and defence policy and by the competent committee for internal security matters.

A concrete demonstration of solidarity in the form of effective support to a victim country using all resources available for such purposes in the EU, including military resources, would certainly bring the European Union closer to its citizens. This is true not only of disasters but also of, for example, sea and space surveillance.

How to meet the challenges and exploit the assets of ESDP

The first condition is to ensure that consistency between Union instruments becomes a reality. The scope for this is greater if the Lisbon Treaty enters into force. However, it is neither a foregone conclusion even with the Treaty nor impossible without the Treaty. Given the probable budgetary pressures and the stakes in terms of international security (stability, non-proliferation, energy and supply security) an agreement to devote 8,000 million euro per year to the external action of the Community is inconceivable in the absence of assurances that the policies on which the money is spent will effectively serve the essential values and interests of the Member States. We must therefore ensure that all our actions in the context of the European Union are part of a strategy and are genuinely coordinated.

In concrete terms, how can this be achieved? If the Lisbon Treaty structures and procedures are put in place with the emphasis on effectiveness and a genuine desire for cooperation, a big step in the right direction will have been taken. But those improvements will only facilitate coherent implementation of the means of action. There are three keys to success. The first is that the Council – and, for decisions at its level, the European Council – must play its coherence-ensuring role to the full, for which the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) and the European Council must be working together in tandem. Because it is the Council that directs not only the CFSP and ESDP players but also the Commission in the implementation of Community policies. The work of ministers must therefore be prepared accordingly, both in Brussels, where the High Representative can provide considerable assistance, and in the capitals, with the required level of interministerial cooperation.

Secondly, the Commission must have more control over the operational impact of its programmes and financial instruments. However, unlike the ESDP players, the Commission does not act directly. Nor does it draw directly on the capabilities of Member States. For perfectly legitimate reasons to do with accounting security and equity between Member States, constraints imposed mainly by the Council and the European Parliament themselves, the Commission is required to follow public tendering procedures and, as a result, frequently ends up financing UN agencies, NGOs and consultancy firms instead of calling on the more directly operational expertise available in the Member States. It is difficult to imagine that in ten years' time the Community's external action policies will not be guided by greater insistence on measurable and visible effectiveness or that they will not be more closely linked to the CFSP/ESDP and to the capabilities of Member States, an additional factor here being the symbiosis facilitated by the External Action Service. Visibility is admittedly not an end in itself but nor is it an attack on the sovereignty of beneficiary States or on their 'appropriation' or 'ownership', and it is necessary for the political effectiveness of the action. If no State renounces the visibility of

its assistance actions, why should the EU? The last point, closely linked to the previous one, is the need to merge not only the first, second and third pillars but also to improve synergies with bilateral action by Member States, be they actions of bilateral assistance or positions adopted in multilateral fora other than the EU including, in particular, the United Nations and international financial institutions.

The second condition for success is knowing how to operate together and being capable of doing so, for which there are a number of requirements including, not least, interoperability of equipment and personnel. This is not about creating a European army (is that concept still relevant anyway?) but about Europeans, whenever they decide to do so, being able to deploy their military forces and means of civilian action as efficiently as possible, with interoperable materials and common action ideas, tried and tested during exercises on the ground and joint training operations, as well as common tested and approved capabilities. Common training at all levels, from cadets to senior officers in the latter stages of their career, will certainly become much more widespread, particularly in the case of civilian and military personnel involved in European crisis management tasks. The different types of reinforced cooperation, including permanent structured cooperation, could, in the event of persistent blockage, permit significant progress by those Member States willing to go further in all the above areas. Lastly, the EU must equip itself with the best planning and conduct resources so that it can converge its political strategy, military and civilian capabilities and all other resources, including those of the Community, into an overall approach, and offer the best guarantee of professionalism and effectiveness. These structures must be kept light, they must make it possible to react swiftly and sustain an effort for as long as circumstances require and they must provide the maximum expertise and experience based on lessons learned from past operations and on training in working together. The chain of operations command needs to be strengthened. The Lisbon Treaty offers the prospect of this happening, particularly by virtue of two important provisions: the role of the High Representative in implementing the ESDP and the possibility mentioned earlier of entrusting a mission to a group of Member States.

Success will depend on coherency of action. But it will also depend on the ability of the EU to manage ESDP information more effectively: information which must be gathered and information which must be disseminated in order to 'know and make known'.

Perhaps this is the area in which the EU has to progress most in the next ten years. The first requirement is to have all the necessary information to guide action at Union level. The EU needs to significantly improve its intelligence resources.

The achievements so far have been spectacular considering the difficulty of the subject

matter. The Situation Centre has developed rapidly and pooled intelligence provided by internal and external services of the Member States. In addition to these capabilities and those of the EU Military Staff, the Union has an intelligence capacity (the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity, or SIAC) for its operations. The Torrejón Satellite Centre is also providing increasingly operational support in terms of satellite imagery, particularly now that government imagery resources have been added to its capacities. Furthermore, cooperation between the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council should enable the Council to take full stock of internal and external security needs in the implementation of the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) programme and the future space debris monitoring programmes (SSA).

The Union should also be equipped with information technologies and secure networks of its own in order to share relevant information, based on arrangements adapted to its interinstitutional operating environment and those of the Member States.

But the Union should also be capable of informing its citizens, their elected representatives and its partners about what it does. Relations with members of parliament in the area of defence and security are necessarily at two levels, concerning, as they do, both the European Parliament and national parliaments (which have the power to adopt national defence budgets, and in the case of many Member States, decide on troop engagement). The Union must also act to prevent loss of the investment in ESPD made by the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU, once the situation of the latter has been clarified.

Relations with the people and their representatives will undoubtedly be one of the main responsibilities of the High Representative, as well as of the President of the European Council. They will need the support of adequate communications structures. However, Brussels will not be able to publicise what the Union is doing in the area of security and defence unless Member States relay the same message. If in the next few years we fail to rid ourselves of the seemingly irresistible temptation to present successes as national triumphs and difficulties as failures in Brussels, the enthusiasm among citizens for European construction, whether in defence and security or any other field, will continue to waver.

One might wager a bet that in the next ten years, unless the applecart is upset by a major event external or internal to European construction, a common security policy, based on the coherence of the instruments of the Union, will be in place, even though a common defence policy implemented within the framework of the Union may still be some way off, the mutual defence clause notwithstanding. The bet might be a bit daring, or it might not be daring enough, but it reflects a natural development following ten initial years of success and a realistic ambition that can be fulfilled.



What aspirations for European defence?

Henri Bentégeat

Predictions about the future often sound conceited. But it is difficult to dispense with them, for the simple reason that, at least in part, today's decisions forge tomorrow's realities. To make progress in an orderly and consistent way, we must define a strategy: we need to have an objective for the future and to make the appropriate choices to attain it.

So it is not altogether unjustified to try, today, to predict how the ESDP will have evolved, or should evolve, by the end of the next decade. Mapping out the objective and the main paths which might lead to it will at least give us the ability to take clear-sighted decisions.

What aspirations should we have for European defence in 2020?

Before replying, with all necessary caution, let us accept the premise that Europe really does have aspirations for its defence in 2020, since we will only make progress on this issue through shared political will. Similarly, what follows is largely based on the assumption that, at some point, the Treaty of Lisbon will be ratified or, failing that, that there will be consensus on the implementation of its main provisions concerning the common foreign and defence policy. The failure of the constitutional project in 2005 has taught us that, without the strong political drive that comes with ratification of a Treaty, the European defence policy might indeed grow gradually stronger as each presidency contributes its own worthwhile and productive initiatives, but it would never gain the momentum of an irresistible force – the only thing that can give cohesion to the project as a whole.

There are those who query the legitimacy of a European defence policy which is independent of any other security organisation. It is true that we would be able to conduct crisis management operations and civilian reconstruction missions under the aegis of the UN or NATO, to which we mostly entrust our collective defence at present. However, if we want to put a definitive end to our internal divisions, we have an absolute need of something which only the Union can provide: the sharing of a common destiny. A common destiny means common responsibilities for defence and security.

A policy

Does the position of the ESDP in the European Union edifice have to change? Should we try to give it a higher profile within the common foreign and security policy? The answer to this question must, first and foremost, be based on experience and pragmatism. In reality, it is the significance of security issues in the Union's relationship with States or regions around the world which determines the importance of the ESDP there. Nevertheless, in a future where the common foreign and security policy would apparently be more closely linked to the Commission's activities, it is clear that, as provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon, ESDP must be more present in areas relating to both pre-crisis management – prevention – and post-crisis management – stabilisation and reconstruction.

The impetus for the ESDP lies with the Member States. It is they who take the decision to launch a mission or operation; it is they who provide the capabilities which will make it possible to achieve the objectives which they themselves have approved. The first ten years of ESDP activity have demonstrated both the difficulty which the Member States have in agreeing on how to implement an operation, and the extraordinary speed at which they are able to react when an urgent crisis so demands. It took several months to set up the operation in Chad and the Central African Republic, but fewer than thirty days to deploy observers in Georgia. The process for 27 Member States to take a decision is thus not always cumbersome. And it is very likely that the tools of permanent structured cooperation and enhanced cooperation, proposed in the Treaty of Lisbon, will add flexibility. They should provide smooth and controlled acceleration, so that political obstacles can be surmounted or so that a few countries can quickly bring about a significant alignment of our defence equipment in the broadest sense.

In particular, the possibility afforded by the new Treaty of establishing enhanced cooperation in the field of the common foreign and security policy, opens up great potential for EU operations. Just one third of the Member States will be needed to take a decision in the Council to launch an operation, if it can be shown that the operation will further the objectives of the Union and protect its interests, and if it cannot be launched by all 27 Member States within a reasonable period. Moreover, if the Union agrees to make its structures available for the planning and conduct of the operation (OHQ), the full benefit of this approach will be demonstrated; it makes it possible to take decisions and act quickly, with the necessary capabilities for the intervention subsequently being supplemented through contributions from other Member States. Of course, from the start this would require strong political determination and solidarity on the part of the initiating Member States.

Clear missions

In order to improve our ability to react, should we think about a European army in the medium term? This would only make sense once the European Union had decided that it wanted a single defence structure, which would also mean a single political authority. Since at best it will take several generations to achieve this objective, Europe should be allowed whatever time it needs to follow such a history-making course. In particular, it would most likely be towards the very end of that process that any missions would be carried out under the Lisbon Treaty's mutual assistance clause. Article V of the Washington Treaty, which binds us strongly together across the Atlantic, gives us the time, if we want it, to plan such mutual assistance with all the realism such a step requires. We must be very clear on this: declaring the political will to take on this new responsibility between the Member States of the Union would be ridiculous without a concrete commitment to providing ourselves with the necessary means to assume it. Who can predict, today, what level of resources Europeans will be devoting to their defence in ten years' time? The potential effects of the economic crisis are still too difficult to decipher.

In the coming decade, the focus of missions under the ESDP will therefore remain the management of crises outside the Union, from their 'hot phase' to their stabilisation. Bearing this in mind, we should continue to develop the best possible interoperability between our armed forces, since our common interests and shared values will inevitably lead us to participate together in the same military operations. We have put in place the tools and procedures to do this. Let us not doubt that, at the end of the next decade, we will be able to enjoy the fruits of those efforts.

We should urgently take time to consider the implementation of the solidarity clause in particular. What is original about this clause is its area of application: within the borders of the European Union. Evidently, the use of military means on the territory of the Member States does require a certain amount of attention. The solidarity clause has two elements, the first of which concerns the prevention of the terrorist threat. It is likely that the effectiveness of its implementation will depend on very close coordination between national counter-terrorism bodies, whether they come under intelligence-gathering and processing, or under the police or justice systems. Military assets are regularly deployed to carry out prevention tasks but this is generally in a purely national framework. The second element is more interesting, since it envisages the use of military means on the territory of a Member State, at the request of its political authorities and to provide assistance following a terrorist attack or natural disaster. Given the sensitive nature of the deployment, even within the Union, of an armed forces unit in a territory other than its own, prior agreement between the 27 Member States

is indispensable on a set of rules of conduct and on any rules of engagement for such assistance missions.

Adapted capabilities

However, it is likely that the major tasks ahead for us will concern the reality of the European Union's added value in crisis management – in other words, our ability to use the entire panoply of our civilian and military instruments simultaneously in a single crisis. Our experience in this area remains weak. However, we are well aware that this need exists, and that it is not about to disappear. To deal with this, we must be even better organised.

The creation of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) contains the seeds of a more thorough reorganisation at the General Secretariat in Brussels. Underpinned by political will, this could be the forerunner of the construction of a complete crisis management structure bringing together civilian and military staff, and binding the second pillar and the Commission together in a more solid and permanent fashion. Alongside the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, this structure would incorporate the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and a similar capacity for the planning and conduct of military operations (the MPCC – Military Planning and Conduct Capability). Cross-cutting areas such as intelligence, the management of information and communications systems, logistics and management, and the administration of resources – human, financial (*Athena*) or material – would be integrated wholly or partly into this structure.

We would thus have a coherent whole, allowing:

- seamless planning of our commitments at the levels of strategy and policy (CMPD), military strategy (MPCC) and civilian strategy (CPCC);
- freedom from any detrimental geographical over-extension of our military chains of command;
- the benefits of a single location for the strategic command of all our commitments, whether civilian or military, and of their proximity to the centre of political decision-making;
- sounder planning at political and military or civilian strategic level, thanks to the pooling of expertise within the second pillar and at the Commission.

This organisation would alter the current structure of the European Union Military Staff, insofar as its current directorates would be divided between the large planning and conduct entities or devoted to cross-cutting functions (logistics, resources management, intelligence etc). Should we worry or be pleased about a unique opportunity to provide a physical structure for the comprehensive handling of crises on which the success of the ESDP has been founded for the last ten years? Given that the immutable principle of an exclusively military chain of command would not be infringed within the MPCC, there is no reason to fear that this structure would lead to either confusion or disorder.

Given the prospect of the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon being implemented, some of the current tasks of the Military Staff, such as drafting military opinions and providing regular support to the Military Committee, could usefully be taken on by a more substantial private office of the chairman of the Military Committee, which would enable him to act effectively as the sole military adviser to the High Representative and the President of the European Union.

As well as merely seeking consistency in the functioning of the operational bodies of the ESDP, there is also an institutional logic to this sort of crisis management structure. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the future High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the Commission, will have a large European External Action Service at his disposal for his diplomatic activities. For that High Representative, the whole crisis management system described above would be a guarantee of the ability to take concrete action on the ground which would be fully consistent with the approach taken and the efforts made diplomatically and in terms of crisis prevention by the members of that Service. In the same spirit of synergy, we should reflect on the possibility of including some military staff among the members of this future large diplomatic service. At the very least, it would seem sensible to assign one or more military advisers to work with the Special Representatives or heads of delegation in post in regions where crises are most likely to occur.

It is easy to see how organising our institutions in Brussels in this way would benefit the Union's staff, both civilian and military, deployed on the ground in a crisis. The commander of the military force, the heads of civilian missions and, where relevant, the head of the Union's delegation would then be certain of receiving orders and instructions which were perfectly in line with the overall political management of the crisis, and thus able to take action which was mutually effective. However, local coordination of such action would remain necessary. This task, which is usually performed by the Special Representative where one exists, deserves particular attention, if only because of the generally very different time-scales within which action by the Commission, civilian missions and military operations takes place.

Areas where progress could be made

In the context of strengthening international security, and as a background for crisis management operations, we could develop two areas.

The first concerns what we might call the diplomacy of defence, that is to say all military advice and assistance missions. In this area we are already conducting missions to reform the security sector which consist of helping the armed forces, police and justice system of a country to reorganise themselves to achieve optimum effectiveness at the most reasonable cost. Where necessary, such missions may be preceded by demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) missions such as the one conducted by the Union in partnership with ASEAN in the Indonesian province of Aceh.

This type of commitment may, however, be supplemented or supported by longer-term assistance missions. For example, many Member States send military experts for several years to the armed forces of third countries, as part of bilateral cooperation. These efforts could be rationalised by pooling such cooperation arrangements at European level. One model for this has been created with the transfer to the European Union of the French programme to reinforce African peace-keeping capabilities (RECAMP). A similar approach could be followed by creating – for example within the future European External Action Service – a pool of European training experts who would be able to involve the Union in assistance missions to the armed forces of countries requesting such help. This type of mission helps to increase security and thus prevent crises.

The second area on which we need to reflect is that of action at sea. Beyond current events which have led to the launch of the first European Union naval operation to combat piracy in the Indian Ocean, in the years to come we should be able to control our seas and to ensure the security of the maritime routes which are essential for our trade and for our interests in the broadest sense. To do so, we must align the work of the Commission with work conducted under the ESDP and in particular with the work of the European Defence Agency in the area of maritime surveillance. To combat trafficking at sea, whether of drugs, arms, or materials connected with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the most basic condition for effective action is to anticipate and be aware of what is happening in our maritime areas. Just and humane management of flows of migrants to the Union also requires the collection and appropriate sharing of information. Our naval aviation forces must be able to operate near the coasts as well as on the high seas in perfect synergy with the European agencies concerned with safety and security at sea. The exchange of liaison officers between those agencies and the crisis management structures would surely facilitate this common effort.

Of course, for this European Union maritime initiative and for many others, the use of space resources will have a key role to play by 2020. In fact a large part of our knowledge and ability to anticipate relies on satellite systems, whether they are used for surveillance, early warning or communications. The programmes which the Union is developing with the support of the European Space Agency, such as Galileo or Kopernikus, as well as those covered by multilateral agreements between Member States, such as Muis, are fundamental to the future credibility of the European Union's action, whether in the political field or in the more restricted field of security and defence. Given the amounts of money involved and the complexity of space technology, we should be able to entrust the European Defence Agency with the task of harmonising the identified space-related needs of the Member States as much as possible with those of the Union, and to explore the possibilities of bilateral or multilateral agreements with third parties, so as to benefit from the best possible cost/effectiveness ratio.

Operational credibility

There is no point in putting organisations in place – which will inevitably be complex when 27 parties are involved – or in developing comprehensive capabilities for action, if one of our ambitions is not to acquire sufficient operational credibility so that in 2020 the Union is unambiguously recognised as a reliable and effective actor on the international stage.

The first element in the credibility of our operations lies in the legitimacy to which they lay claim. In addition to the framework of a UN Security Council resolution, which is an indispensable precondition for any commitment, the support of public opinion is a key factor. Whether it is expressed nationally in the form of an agreement to make troops and capabilities available, or by any other European parliamentary resolution or declaration, it is and will remain essential throughout any operation.

The second element is the unreserved recognition that intervention by the European Union to resolve a crisis is justified. Such recognition will depend on a combination of the argument of geographical proximity (as is the case with the Balkans or Africa) on know-how (the benefit of the comprehensive approach) and on political arguments, as may be the case in the Middle East or when the Union intervenes on the ground to protect its own interests.

Finally, the third element in our credibility is effectiveness. This third criterion is the fruit of our interoperability, our know-how, our past experience and the lessons we have learned from it. It is also the fruit of appropriate, consistent and sufficient force generation.

It is first and foremost this operational credibility which will enable the ESDP to be an active security policy, in other words a policy which does not just react when a crisis emerges but a policy which anticipates, prevents and finds a lasting solution to crises.

In this respect, the occasional tendency to promote an ESDP which is mainly based around the somewhat hazy notion of human security, focusing on the security of individuals rather than that of States, and on using armed force for protection rather than for combat tasks, requires careful consideration. The range of missions presented in the Treaty on European Union, whether or not amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, prioritises missions which are covered by the concept of human security: disarmament missions (Lisbon), humanitarian missions, military advice and assistance missions (Lisbon), conflict prevention missions (Lisbon), and peacekeeping missions. However, in the Treaty of Nice as in the Treaty of Lisbon, missions by combat forces to manage crises, including peacemaking missions, feature prominently. The ESDP cannot afford to do without an active military component which is sufficiently well trained and equipped to carry out combat missions. If it limits itself to the protection side of the spectrum as regards crisis management missions, it may no longer be able to fulfil its role of defending the strategic interests of the Union, identified as such by the European Council in its definition of the strategy and guidelines for the common foreign and security policy. Implementing a comprehensive approach in the Union's commitments evidently serves the concept of human security in a flexible manner, but to make it a guiding concept for the ESDP would entail the risk of leading to great confusion.

Action on an ambitious scale

The ESDP must primarily be the instrument for protecting the European Union's interests. Not only are those interests not limited to the neighbourhood of the Union's territory, they are also varied and their defence requires an extensive range of capabilities. To reduce the Union to a regional organisation which was only concerned with the stability of its immediate surroundings would run counter to the aspirations set out in the European security strategy. Given the challenges facing the world now and in the future, no single entity can go it alone in dealing with security issues. This applies particularly to a political organisation which comprises five hundred million citizens and a quarter of the world's wealth, and which has ambitions to be a key player in the service of effective world governance based on multilateralism. The Union is declaring its willingness to assume its strategic ambitions ever more clearly in many areas such as the environment, energy supply, the protection of its citizens wherever they may be and, above all, in diplomatic action which it is gradually re-inventing by speaking with a single voice on countless issues and by acting on behalf of 27 Member States, in more than 130 countries around

the world. Could we imagine all that being reduced to purely regional aspirations? If, in the decade to come, the Union were to renounce the global dimension of its role in providing security, it is very likely that it would not count for much in the twenty-first century world order: it would be a respectable and respected regional economic player, but it would be absent when solutions to the world's major problems were being planned.

A full partner

To put these aspirations on a sound footing, the Union's relationship with the leading power, the United States, must continue to evolve. Currently, as seen from the other side of the Atlantic, there is not 'one' Europe. On fundamental issues for our future, such as energy supply or the rationalisation of the defence industry, our internal divergences are still too great. And yet the context of the financial crisis should make it evident to all that the critical dimension to face such challenges really is the European dimension, not just the national dimension. We therefore have to make progress to present a more united and politically more dynamic image; otherwise, it is very likely that the lure of the rapid growth in Asia and the Pacific will induce the United States to review the balance of its partnerships, to the detriment of the European Union.

In the specific area of defence, everything in the short analysis above shows the distance we still need to go to ensure the balance of a strong transatlantic link based on closer cooperation. The European Union's relationship with NATO should help us to make progress on this front. On two conditions. The first is that the Union resolve the Cyprus question as quickly as possible. This is an urgent political responsibility. The second is that the necessary decision-making autonomy of the two organisations be understood and respected both by our transatlantic partners and by those Member States which are also signatories to the Washington Treaty. There, too, the unity of the European Union will help. As long as we remain unable to ensure the development of our own capabilities because of our internal divisions, as long as our political vision is not unanimous, we will be like a player who holds all the cards but is unable to play them.

The future of the Union is in its own hands. The decade to come will be the one in which choices have to be made. Either the Union will be hampered by its internal barriers and will remain an economic area with no international ambition other than its trade, or it will address its problems at the highest political level and acquire the capacity to gain stature as an effective global player and a respected partner of the leading powers.

It is certain that the successful ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon is the first bridge to cross. Let us not lose time: our world is already tomorrow's world.



Improving capabilities for ESDP's future needs

Alexander Weis

Looking at the 2020 horizon and beyond is already established practice in the European Defence Agency (EDA). In its early days the Agency proposed an assessment of the long-term military capability needs for ESDP operations. Why? Because the timeframe of the existing Headline Goal 2010 is problematic: decisions to invest in the development and procurement of equipment entering the inventories of the armed forces today and in 2010 were taken five years ago and often even longer, with the timelines for Research and Technology being longer again, as it takes five to ten years before new technologies deliver concrete products to the users. To guide capability development, a *Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs*, focussing on the 2020-2025 timeframe, was elaborated by the EDA and endorsed by its Ministerial Steering Board in October 2006.¹

Capability Development Plan

The next phase was the elaboration of a Capability Development Plan (CDP), based on close cooperation between the Agency and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and carried out with full involvement of the Member States. Four work strands were initiated. The EUMC had the lead for Strand A, the results from the Headline Goal 2010. In essence, this input into the CDP is about the EU's collective short-term capability needs and shortfalls. Strand B, led by the EDA, built on the *Long Term Vision*. It elaborated in more detail future capability needs and technological developments. Strand C, also led by EDA, consisted of the construction of an electronic collaborative database, in which the Member States would list their medium-to-long term plans in order to seek early opportunities for collaboration with other European partners. Finally, Strand D focused on lessons learned from recent or current crisis management operations – a kind of 'reality check'. This Strand was led by the EUMC. All the work was conducted in about 18 months. Inputs were brought together in one document and in July 2008 the Steering Board in Capabilities Formation endorsed the CDP.

1. European Defence Agency, *An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs*, Brussels, 3 October 2006. Available at : <http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?id=146>.

The CDP is not a plan in the traditional sense. It does not define the number of units or the number of tanks, ships and aircraft needed for ESDP operations. That would be Cold War planning. Rather, the CDP pictures the future challenges, from tomorrow until 2025, and on that basis identifies capability needs, capability trends and shortfalls. It assists the Member States in developing their national capability plans in line with these needs, trends and shortfalls. Also, its purpose is to ‘drive’ Research & Technology, armaments cooperation and industry – after all the EDA is a capability-driven agency.

So, what are the principal conclusions emerging from the CDP analysis? The main points may be outlined as follows:

- the increasing importance of ‘knowledge’ for operations in complex environments – clearly, this underlines the need for a broad array of information-gathering, analytical and distribution capacities;
- the comprehensive approach to EU crisis management operations, which sets requirements for civil-military structures but also for seeking synergies between civil and military capability development;
- the need for ever-greater flexibility, agility and responsiveness in order to be able to deliver the precise effects at the right time and the right place – setting requirements, for example, for command & control systems and precision munitions; and
- the human factor – the most critical requirement to recruit, train and retain motivated military personnel to meet the most demanding challenges.

Based on the CDP conclusions the Steering Board selected an initial tranche of twelve prioritised actions, listed in alphabetical order:

- (i) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence
- (ii) Comprehensive Approach – Military Implications
- (iii) Computer Network Operations (CNO)
- (iv) Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED)
- (v) Counter-Man Portable Air Defence Systems (C-MANPADS)
- (vi) Increased Availability of Helicopters
- (vii) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Architecture
- (viii) Medical Support

- (ix) Military Human Intelligence and Cultural/Language Training
- (x) Mine Counter-Measures in Littoral Sea Areas
- (xi) Network Enable Capability
- (xii) Third Party Logistic Support.

Most of these priorities are not surprising as they are related to existing shortfalls, such as with regard to the availability of helicopters, C-IED, Network Enabled Capability and Logistics. Others result from long-term analysis. For example the threat of MAN-PADS is likely to increase and it might become one of the next weapons in the hands of rogue elements in the future. The list of twelve selected actions, established in close consultation with the Member States, thus forms an excellent basis for prioritising capability improvement. But, naturally, it can only be the start list. Further actions will have to be selected when the time has come, based on proper analysis in the context of the CDP.

Three of the initially selected actions are taken forward by the EU Military Committee, supported by the EU Military Staff: CNO, Comprehensive Approach and Military Human Intelligence. All the others are pursued by the EDA.

Projects already launched before the CDP was endorsed will continue. In fact, CDP conclusions also provide a capability-driven basis for these activities, such as Maritime Surveillance, various Space-related activities, Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and Non-Lethal Capabilities.

Other strategies

The CDP is the ‘overall strategic tool’, but there are three other long-term strategies in place, reflecting the other functions of the Agency:

- The *European Defence Research & Technology (EDRT) strategy* to enhance more effective R&T in support of military capabilities. The EDRT strategy defines the ‘Ends’ (in which key technologies to invest), the ‘Means’ (how to do this) and the ‘Ways’ to implement the ends and means through roadmaps and action plans.
- The *European Armaments Cooperation (EAC) strategy* to promote and enhance more effective European armaments cooperation in support of ESDP capability needs. The EAC strategy defines how to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of European armaments programmes by a series of actions, applying lessons learned from past experiences through a ‘Guide to Armaments Cooperation Best Practice’.

- The *European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) strategy*, which describes the future European defence industrial landscape, based on the three Cs: Capability-driven, Competent and Competitive. The future EDTIB has to be more integrated, less duplicative and more interdependent, with increased specialisation, for example by establishing industrial centres of excellence. It refers to action fields for which governments will be responsible, such as consolidating demand and investment. Logically, the strategy links the work on realising the future EDTIB to the Agency's activities on the European Defence Equipment Market. Special attention is paid to the importance of small- and medium-sized enterprises with their typical flexibility and capacity to innovate.

Together with the CDP these strategies provide the EDA with the objectives to be realised and with the way to proceed. But the strategies do not produce capabilities by themselves. These have to be generated through concrete projects and activities.

Concrete work

It would be impossible to list all projects and initiatives. Just to list the most important ones:

- *Helicopters*. There are approximately 1,700 helicopters in the military inventories in Europe, but many of these are not available for crisis management operations because some crews are not trained to fly in more demanding environments (for example over deserts or in mountainous terrain) or because some helicopters are technically not equipped for such environments. The EDA is addressing both elements, with an initial focus on training, which can quickly deliver additional capacities. Some initial training capacity has already been arranged in 2009 for urgent needs. In 2010 a more structural solution will be launched: the *Helicopter Tactics Training Programme*. Under this programme helicopter crews will be trained at the European level to fly in challenging environments. Concerning *upgrading helicopters* the Agency is closely working with European helicopter industries. The initial focus is on the MI-transport helicopters, which feature prominently in the inventories of many Central and East European Member States. Coordination work by the EDA will help those nations to streamline upgrading programmes and to increase delivery schedules and it might reduce costs. Finally, there is the long-term track. In May 2009 France and Germany brought their bilateral initiative for a *Future Transport Helicopter (2020+)* to the EDA, thus opening up the project to other interested Member States. There is also scope here for transatlantic cooperation, as the market for this type of helicopter is too small in Europe alone.

- *Air Transport.* Defence Ministers of 12 European countries signed a Declaration of Intent on 10 November 2008 to launch EDA work on establishing a *European Air Transport Fleet* (EATF). The EATF aims at reducing shortfalls in European air transport by pooling aircraft such as the A400M and C130 (Hercules). Different forms of pooling will be considered: making existing or ordered aircraft available to other users; flight hours, to be offered or to be requested; combining training, logistics and maintenance. The signature of a Letter of Intent is planned for later in 2009, after a business model has been developed. On the same occasion – 10 November 2008 – Defence Ministers of Belgium, Germany, France and Luxembourg also signed a Declaration of Intent regarding the establishment of a Multinational A400M Unit. This Unit will be part of the EATF.
- *Maritime.* This is an example of an earlier EDA work strand, now supported by the CDP conclusions. These conclusions point to increasing future risks and challenges at sea, in particular in littoral waters. Ten Member States plus Norway have launched a project under the auspices of the EDA for the replacement of the existing generation of Maritime Mine Counter-Measures (starting in the 2018-2020 timeframe). Another group of seven Member States have begun to prepare for the development of a Future Unmanned Aerial System, able to take off and land on a ship's deck, to increase the capability of wide area surveillance. This project is related to the EDA's work on Maritime Surveillance.
- *Space-based Earth Surveillance.* Again, the CDP points to the importance of this capability. Space-based observation satellites are indispensable for information-gathering. Six European countries – Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy and Spain – have formed a group for the Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS), which aims at continuity of space-based earth surveillance services from 2015 onwards. In early 2009 the MUSIS partners brought the project to the EDA, opening it up for other Member States' participation. The EDA's specific role will also be to liaise with the European Commission to seek synergies with civilian users' driven technology investment and with projects such as the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES).
- *Unmanned Air Vehicles.* As there are already so many different UAVs the Agency's focus is not on another platform, but on an important enabler, namely to realise the insertion of UAVs into normal airspace. As UAVs are getting bigger and wider they increasingly will have to fly by themselves to operational areas. This is currently only possible, once specific slots have been granted by the European Air Traffic Control Authorities. In some cases this can take weeks – not quite in line with the needs of crisis management. The ambitious challenge EDA has set itself is to have UAVs flying in normal airspace

by 2015. This will require coordinated efforts of many actors, including the Commission and specialised air traffic and air safety organisations to change existing rules and regulations. But it also requires new technologies (e.g. so-called ‘Sense and Avoid’ technologies), which enable a UAV to look *around* (and spot other aircraft) rather than only looking *down* and spotting what is going on on the ground. Another important aspect of EDA work is (military) frequency management.

Other areas where the EDA is working on concrete solutions for identified capability needs are as follows: Network Enabled Capability, CBRN, Counter-IED, Intelligence, Logistics, Software Defined Radio, 21st Century Soldier Systems and others.

Changing R&T Investment

In October 2005 an Informal European Council took place at Hampton Court under the UK Presidency. This meeting was mainly dedicated to pushing forward the 2000 Lisbon agenda for improving Europe’s economic performance including through Research & Development. At the meeting the Head of the Agency, High Representative/Secretary General Javier Solana, introduced the theme of investing more together in Defence Research and Technology (R&T). In December 2005 Solana sent a more detailed report to the European Council.

With this high-level political wind in its sails, the Agency launched a series of R&T activities. The most important one was to prepare the first Defence R&T Joint Investment Programme (JIP). A new formula was developed, breaking with the past format of multinational Defence R&T collaborations. What are the major differences?

- Firstly, as the title indicated a JIP is an investment *programme* for a bigger number of Member States rather than a collaboration of a few countries. The latter (called Category B projects) continues to exist in the EDA, focusing on research into specific technologies. The JIPs (called Cat. A programmes) are theme-driven and, therefore, more suited for a larger number of contributors. Individual projects are defined and selected later on. The advantage of a programme with projects is also that the legal basis for contracting can be based on one single programme arrangement, while for Cat.B projects this has to be settled for each project over and over again.
- Secondly, investment under the JIP-formula is truly *joint*. Once the subject has been defined, all EDA Member States are invited to join and to indicate their financial contributions. Rules on financial ceilings and on minimum contributions prevent domination by bigger contributors and allow for smaller but still significant contri-

butions. The contributing Member States form the Management Committee, which decides on project definitions and awards of contracts.

- Thirdly, projects are awarded to bidders (universities, R&T institutes, laboratories, companies, etc.) on the basis of *competition* rather than on the principle of *juste retour* (the old principle whereby funds are channelled to national R&T providers in the exact proportion to the national amount of money subscribed to the multinational project. Bidders have to form a consortium with at least one other bidder in another contributing Member State and this has to include a small and medium-sized enterprise. This rule stimulates cross-border R&T networking in Europe.

Two JIPs are up and running. The JIP on Force Protection (JIP-FP) was launched in November 2006 and a good year later the first contract was signed. This is a time-record compared to the average duration for Cat.B projects, namely 2-3 years between launching and signature. Nineteen Member States plus Norway participate in the JIP-FP. Capability planners and technology experts worked very closely together in selecting and connecting capability areas with technology goals. Eighteen specific R&T goals were selected, grouped under five capability areas: collective survivability through enhancing detect and identify and response performances; individual protection; data analysis; secured tactical wireless communication systems in an urban environment; and mission planning/training in an asymmetric environment. The investment (by nineteen Member States plus Norway) through the JIP-FP is approximately 55 million euro. Industry is supplying additional funds for the contracts.

The second JIP, dedicated to ‘Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies’, was launched in May 2008. The JIP-ICET looks into technologies such as nano-materials and structures, remote detection and health monitoring. Ten Member States plus Norway contribute just under 16 million euro to the JIP-ICET.

For selecting future JIP subjects the CDP will play an important role as the ‘driver’. An exercise is underway to look at connectivity between the twelve CDP priorities and EDRT strategy key technologies, starting with four: CBRN, counter-MANPADs, Counter-IED, CBRN and MMCM.

The defence market

Finally, the Agency has important agendas related to the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). As recognised in the EDTIB strategy, European defence industries will need to be competitive. That means competitive on a global scale, but also in Europe itself. However, traditionally the defence market in Europe has been characterised by a

lack of transparency and lack of competition, as Member States in general have relied on the 'national security' clause in Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. In essence Article 296 has allowed Member States to make the bulk of their defence purchases on a national basis.

To create openness on defence contract opportunities and to allow for cross-border bidding the EDA launched the 'Intergovernmental Regime to Increase Competition in the European Defence Equipment'. In November 2005 the Ministerial Steering Board agreed the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement. Though voluntary and politically binding, 25 Member States plus Norway have subscribed to the Code, covering the territory where the overwhelming majority of European defence industries are located. The Code covers defence equipment purchases (with a value over 1 million euro) where the provisions of Article 296 of the EC Treaty are applicable. The contracts are placed on the Agency's Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB).² Implementation of the Code started on 1 July 2006. As of March 2009 over 400 contracts with an estimated value of approximately 10 billion euro have been placed on the EBB and around 180 of them have been awarded representing 2.7 billion euro. Concerning cross-border awards an encouraging increase has taken place between 2007 and 2008 from 20 to 33 percent. The future will tell if this percentage will further increase – it is yet too early to conclude. In any case, the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement is a breakthrough. It has opened up a hidden segment of the market, as defence procurement legally is the last bastion of protectionism.

In May 2006 a Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain (CoBPSC) was approved. This Code extends the benefits of greater competition through the supply chain, in particular to lower tier companies and small & medium-sized enterprises. The CoBPSC is supported by an Electronic Bulletin Board for industry-to-industry contracts. This tool was launched on 27 March 2007, providing an electronic platform for advertising sub-contract opportunities by prime contractors and commercial buyers.

Lastly, the Steering Board agreed a Code of Conduct on offsets in October 2008. This newest Code will apply to all compensation practices required as a condition of purchase or resulting from a purchase of defence goods or defence services. Offsets can be regarded as distorting the market but probably they will remain a fact of life as long as the European Defence Equipment Market itself is far from perfect. The new Code will not stop the use of offsets. However, it will make the use of offsets transparent and it will limit their use to not exceed the value of the procurement contract (the 100 percent limit). The Code on offsets will take effect as of 1 July 2009.

2. Accessible to any visitor at the EDA's website (www.eda.europa.eu).

Civil-military synergies

The EDA's *raison d'être* is to improve European military capabilities for ESDP. However, the classical distinction between defence and wider security is fading away. Firstly, military and civil means are used both in crisis management operations far away as well as in Europe for the security of its citizens. Secondly, capabilities overlap, in particular in the areas of communications, command & control and information gathering. Thirdly, technology research and development is increasingly based on 'dual-use' customers, both civilian and military.

The European Union's three pillar structure clashes with this logic of civil-military interaction. But this does not mean that even in the existing constellation efforts across the three pillars cannot be harmonised. This is exactly what the EDA is doing, for example by seeking civil-military synergies with research investment of the Commission under the 7th Framework Programme and with the European Space Agency. In the same context the EDA is developing military requirements which can be taken on board for programmes, which so far are only focussing on civilian users. The Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) programme is a good example. GMES Services (using imagery from satellites and from other assets) can also be of use for crisis management operations. This has nothing to do with 'militarising' civilian projects. It has everything to do with making optimum use of available assets and services by different customers, and by doing so, preventing that the money has to be spent twice.

Conclusion

The European Defence Agency is well-aware that defence budgets of its Member States will most likely remain constrained, in particular under the impact of the financial-economic crisis. At the same time the costs of equipment rise annually between five and ten percent. Logically, the Ministries' of Defence room for investment will decrease. Therefore, the European countries will have no other choice but to invest more together and to seek civil-military synergies. Working together in Europe will reduce costs and that is of paramount importance. The EDA is well-placed in the family of European institutions to coordinate and stimulate this development.



The authors wish to thank Kristin de Peyron for her contribution but claim sole responsibility for any errors. The views expressed are those of the authors alone and do not represent those of the European Commission.

What ambitions for the civilian ESDP?

Richard Wright and Juha Auvinen

This chapter focuses on civilian aspects of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), in particular from the point of view of the European Commission.

First, the state of play in civilian ESDP is examined, with an analysis of the greatest challenges and the proposal of some solutions. While the ultimate challenge is political and related to Member States' preparedness to hand over sovereignty on security-related matters, many other challenges are operational, and can be addressed in the short to medium term – well before 2020. The Commission has an important role to play: it manages the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, which finances all civilian ESDP operations. It contributes to a more effective ESDP through training of staff, by establishing framework contracts to procure essential equipment and services, and manages preparatory measures to launch ESDP missions. The Commission also finances a number of operations in the broad field of conflict prevention and crisis management, some of which are directly supporting the objectives of ESDP missions.

Second, civilian ESDP is looked at in the overall EU context. An important reason for the relative success of civilian ESDP derives from the EU's legitimacy, its capacity to use soft power by engaging a number of instruments, and the general perception of the EU as a civilian power. The December 2008 review of the European Security Strategy underlines that the security threats confronting the EU have expanded to include issues such as energy and climate change. The review also emphasises the security-development nexus, which is fully justified by empirical evidence of intra-state conflicts in the past 30 years.¹ In order to be most effective, the EU has to deploy the right mix of instruments, ranging from targeted military to civilian crisis management operations to conflict prevention, peace consolidation, mediation, humanitarian measures, support to building of sustainable institutions and poverty alleviation. The EU is in a unique position to fulfil a globally important role. It would be a mistake to focus solely on the military-

1. Paul Collier, 'Doing well out of war' in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.) *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agents in Civil Wars* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); and Paul Collier, 'Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy' (Washington DC: World Bank, June 2000). Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/civilconflict.htm>. See also: Juha Auvinen and Wayne Nafziger, 'The Sources of Humanitarian Emergencies', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 43, no. 3, June 1999, pp. 267-90; E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen, *Economic Development, Inequality, and War. Humanitarian Emergencies in Developing Countries* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

civilian ESDP, which should be only one aspect of a coherent EU security policy from here to 2020 and beyond.

We conclude by cautioning that the current legitimacy enjoyed by the civilian ESDP will be challenged by the EU's engagement in more dangerous missions involving executive mandates in precarious security environments. To fulfil its ambitions in the civilian ESDP, the EU needs a clear strategy to make civilian ESDP more effective, with adequate budgets, a strengthened planning capacity and continued reliance on the broad security concept and 'soft power'.

State of play and current challenges in civilian ESDP

If we start with the **track record** of civilian ESDP, the most visible successes have been achieved by monitoring missions, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia. In both cases, a rapid reaction was necessary in order to maintain or restore stable conditions. The AMM (1995-96) succeeded in monitoring the ceasefire agreement between the Indonesian Government and the GAM rebel movement, negotiated by President Ahtisaari. The mission withdrew after the holding of elections, which were broadly considered free and fair. The EUMM was launched in September 2008 to provide an EU monitoring presence on the ground in Georgia. The dispatching of 340 staff including over 200 EU monitors from 22 countries in just three weeks by a deadline of 1 October was a precondition for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia (excluding South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and a major achievement by the EU. It should be noted, however, that in many ways these were atypical civilian ESDP missions, being reliant on rapid mobilisation of personnel, equipment and resources by EU Member States, rather than a steady build-up of capacity and equipment as per most missions.

In the longer-term post-conflict context, experience has shown that operations supporting the police and the rule of law can also be effective. Monitoring, mentoring and advice to local police and administration have been the key concepts in these types of missions. While the record is more mixed than with monitoring missions, these missions can be politically important in bringing visibility to the EU in a certain country or region. The challenge is to devise appropriate exit strategies, ensuring appropriate follow-up through institution-building measures supported by Community programmes.

If we look at the necessary **capacities** of civilian ESDP, one of the greatest problems is the lack of a joint *recruitment* system for civilian operations. The missions are essentially based on seconded staff being made available, but this is proving to be increasingly dif-

difficult in particular for missions that take place in challenging security environments. There should be an EU-level roster of staff with precise job descriptions. Member States also need to fulfil their commitment, made in the European Council of December 2008, to adopt national strategies for the recruitment of personnel to civilian ESDP missions. Serving in Missions should also advance careers in national administrations.

Civilian ESDP missions need specialists such as policemen, judges, and rule-of-law experts. The Commission has financed the training of Member State staff belonging to the Civilian Response Teams (CRTs), and of 600 police experts on civilian crisis management through the French 'Centre National de Formation de Gendarmerie' in Saint-Astier, to be followed by the Carabinieri in Vicenza, according to UN training standards, so that the robustness, the flexibility and the interoperability of the EU police elements is improved when deployed either by the EU or by the UN and OSCE. The Commission is willing to develop training activities to meet operational requirements in EU crisis management.

Qualified staff are also needed in administration, procurement and finance, which are the least exciting area of crisis management, but the one which can determine whether a mission functions effectively or not. The Commission has provided training for ESDP mission staff on procurement and financial administration to ensure a speedy delivery of quality goods and services. It is also hiring procurement experts for immediate deployment to missions to further facilitate mission start-up. Further, the Commission plans to progressively sub-delegate responsibility for procurement and financial matters to Heads of Mission, moving from the present system of *ex-ante* to *ex-post* control of expenditure.

What we also need is a *stock of basic equipment and services* to be deployed when a new operation is set up. This can be virtual stock (framework contracts) or, once a critical mass has been reached, a warehouse. The Commission has established framework contracts for armoured and 4WD vehicles, and intends to expand the number of 'pre-approved' suppliers in other fields such as telecommunications/IT equipment and high-risk insurance.

Structures and mechanisms for the *preparation* of ESDP missions will need to be strengthened. The Commission will further develop the concept of 'preparatory measures', which allow a mission start-up before political decisions are finalised. For the Georgia Monitoring Mission these measures contributed to a timely deployment of the full ESDP Mission.

Operational capability also depends on structures. At the moment operational, administrative and financial support functions are dispersed between civilian missions themselves, the CPCC and the Commission. Centralising all of them to one *Agency for Crisis Management* could bring synergies and increased efficiency in the long term. This agency

could manage contracting, procurement, assets, logistics, human resources and recruitment for all civilian missions. The agency, which could also manage crisis response measures financed by the Instrument for Stability under the first pillar, would require close political oversight by the relevant EU institutions and the eventual Joint External Action Service.

The European Union as a civilian power

Characteristics of civilian operations

Why are EU missions considered legitimate from the point of view of host states? Why are the host states ready to accept EU missions? Part of the explanation is to be found in the characteristics of these operations themselves.

First, EU Member States broadly participate in operations. Civilian operations clearly have an EU label attached. ESDP operations are carried out under the leadership of a 'Head of Mission' appointed by the Council. The Head of Mission works under the authority of the High Representative for the CFSP, to whom he or she² reports. Thus, missions are seen as representing the EU, which gives them visibility and political weight.³ Furthermore, most staff are seconded by the EU Member States.

Member States' readiness to send seconded staff to missions varies from state to state. The decision to second staff depends on the resources available to Member States, cooperation of key Ministries such as Interior and Justice Ministries and interest in a particular political issue or geographic region. Despite the varying interests and resources of Member States, the missions have been identified as European Union missions and not missions by particular EU Member States. This has made them more acceptable to host states.

Second, legitimacy results from actions – i.e. when we do our job correctly, effectively and impartially. While the Council has never commissioned independent experts to evaluate how well the missions have attained the stated objectives, Council bodies conduct lessons-learned exercises, which do not avoid critical analysis. In the coming years, the Commission will conduct evaluations of the civilian missions in accordance with the EC Financial Regulation, with a focus on economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Even in the absence of any rigorous independent evaluation, it is difficult to label any of the opera-

2. Thus far, the only female Heads of Mission of civilian ESDP operations are Sylvie Pantz (EUJUST Themis in Georgia) and Maryse Daviet (EUMM in the Western Balkans).

3. Liisa Laakso, 'A Capability-implementation Gap in the Making: Multi-level Governance and European Crisis Management', in G. Walzenbach (ed.), *European Governance: Policy Making between Politicisation and Control* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 190-221.

tions as a failure. The two monitoring missions, in Aceh and Georgia, and the military mission in Chad and the Central African Republic, can be classified as clear successes.

Third, when judging the success of the operations, one must take into account that until recently none of the ESDP civilian missions has had executive powers. Therefore, conflicts between mission staff and the local population have been extremely rare. No serious incidents have been reported. The risk of conflict would be greater if the missions had executive or correctional powers, which substituted for local authorities in law enforcement. EULEX Kosovo, which declared full operational capability on 6 April 2009, is the first civilian ESDP mission with executive powers.

Leverage of the Union

The characteristics of ESDP missions are not the only explanatory factor for the EU's acceptability as a partner in crisis management. The overall leverage of the Union is also an important factor from a host state perspective. Other international organisations that are active in crisis management, such as the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), lack this leverage.

The notion of 'mentoring, monitoring and inspection' has been the dominant approach in all police and rule-of-law missions. In particular, mentoring responsibilities largely entail a response to long-term structural needs. Thus, they come close to the 'institution-building' approach advocated in European Commission programmes. EC programmes, however, lack the same visibility that ESDP operations receive. They are implemented through third parties, such as UN organisations, independent consultants or non-governmental organisations. For host states, identification with the European Union in EC programmes is less evident than with civilian ESDP operations. However, the volume of Commission assistance is superior to that provided by any other international organisation. It negotiates trade agreements on behalf of the EU. The Union as a whole is the largest donor of development aid in the world and the largest trading partner for many less developed countries.

In short, the Union has many instruments at its disposal, which increases its leverage in the international field. Trade, economic cooperation and development cooperation are all sources of 'soft power' for the EU. Other sources of power include the external aspects of the EU's internal policies (energy, transport, trans-European networks), the power of the internal market (including the strong euro), a functioning Schengen area and the EU's ability to provide a coordinated response to the threats posed by pandemics, climate change, and competition for scarce resources.

Community instruments

Community instruments have for a number of years been providing the Commission's contribution to the Union's overall crisis responses, be it in response to natural disasters or to political crises in third countries, in the latter case often alongside CFSP operations.

The launch of the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in 2007 considerably enhanced the Commission's crisis response capacity.⁴ Compared to the earlier Rapid Reaction Mechanism, the crisis response component of the IfS represents a considerable increase in financial allocations (approximately 130 million euro in 2009) and in duration of programmes (18 months, with the possibility of extension, or of follow-on Interim Response Measures).

Crisis response measures under the IfS address a wide range of issues, including support to mediation, confidence building, and interim administrations, strengthening rule of law, transitional justice, Disarmament/Demobilisation/Reintegration of combatants (DDR), equitable access to natural resources, disaster response and rehabilitation.

Such activities can be supported in situations of crisis or emerging crisis, when support cannot be provided rapidly enough under other EC financial instruments. Typically, the IfS can be mobilised in the event of a major new political crisis or natural disaster, a window of opportunity to pre-empt a crisis or advance on conflict resolution, the urgent need to secure the conditions for the delivery of EC assistance, or alongside CFSP/ESDP missions in order to facilitate achievement of their political goals. Approval procedures are designed to ensure rapid adoption of programmes.

Two years after its inception, the IfS crisis response component is now well established as a highly complementary EU crisis management tool. In terms of geographic distribution, 220 million euro were committed in total in 2007 and 2008 for 58 actions worldwide. The main share of support was provided in Africa (mainly the DRC, the Central African Republic, Chad, Somalia – 29%), followed by actions in Asia (mainly Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Southern Thailand, Aceh, East Timor – 19%), the Middle East (Lebanon, Palestine, Iraqi Refugees in Syria – 12%), Kosovo (24 million euro) and Georgia (17 million euro).

One of the priorities of the IfS is to provide effective flanking measures alongside ESDP missions securing the political objectives of the Missions. The EU has made progress in

4. Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability. Official Journal of the European Communities L 327, p. 1-11, in particular Article 1.2, paragraph (a) thereof. The instrument also includes provisions for crisis preparedness and capacity building to address specific global and trans-regional threats (Article 1.2, paragraph (b)).

pursuing such ‘comprehensive’ approaches in crisis management – e.g. in Kosovo, DRC, Chad, Afghanistan and Georgia.

In Georgia, for example, the post-conflict support from the IfS was 15 million euro in 2008, with a focus on the needs of new IDPs, clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXO), support to IDPs displaced before the current conflict, and peace and confidence building measures. This has been identified as the most pressing need in terms of stability in the country and has been developed in close cooperation and full complementarity with the deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia.

The IfS was mobilised early on, in the days after the conflict, when additional funding enabled the EU’s Joint Research Centre, in close collaboration with the EU SATCEN in Torrejon, to produce a detailed damage assessment based on high-resolution satellite imagery, in particular on areas in and around South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were not accessible. This assessment was carried out in late August in the context of the Commission fact-finding mission and is a contribution to the World Bank-led Joint Needs Assessment and provided the basis for the donor conference in October.

In Kosovo, the IfS supports the costs of the International Civilian Office (whose head Pieter Feith is the EUSR at the same time), the vetting of new judges and prosecutors and the phasing out of UNMIK’s Pillar IV.

In Afghanistan, the Commission mobilised the IfS to develop a programme to enable the Afghan government to reform its civil justice sector, alongside and in parallel to the launch of EUPOL Afghanistan. This represents another good example of how the first and second pillars can be effectively mobilised towards supporting a comprehensive state-building approach.

Another example is Chad and the Central African Republic, where alongside, and in support of the EUFOR mission, the IfS is delivering 15 million euro for the MINURCAT police programme protecting refugee camps and the election census in Chad, as well as 6.5 million euro for security system reform in the Central African Republic.

The stated objectives of the CFSP are related to security, whether inside the EU or internationally,⁵ while the main purpose of the Instrument of Stability is to provide as-

5. Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) specifies five objectives for the CFSP, namely ‘to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; to strengthen the Union in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

sistance to help re-establish conditions for long-term development. In practice, the scope of the two instruments is similar and the challenge is to use them in a complementary and mutually reinforcing way, with a view to consolidating a comprehensive EU approach.

Assistance measures under the Instrument for Stability, combined with the more conventional development cooperation measures addressing poverty alleviation and institution-building, can act effectively in conflict prevention by transforming the conflict setting⁶ and eliminating sources of relative economic and political deprivation in societies. The Commission has also made an effort to mainstream the search for the ‘root causes of conflict’ within the programme planning of its development cooperation measures.

It is important to recognise that not only the major actions in civilian crisis management are political – development cooperation is also political and rarely seen as neutral within the host countries. Even the most politically-motivated interventions can have beneficial outcomes for people in target states. Nevertheless, the EU would not be as acceptable a partner in crisis management if it was perceived to be striving just for its own political (and economic) goals. In such circumstances, even its leverage would not be sufficient to bring acceptability.

Human Security and Responsibility to Protect

Neither the Treaty on European Union (TEU) nor the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) define in direct terms the common values of the EC or the EU. However, the founding principles for the Union are set out in Article 6 of the TEU: liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. These building blocks of the European Union, which probably do in fact encapsulate its core values, will remain as fundamental in 2020 as they are today. The promotion of these values will continue to be pursued in the EU’s external action, whether on its own or in partnership with others, notably the United Nations.

Concretely this can take place through a **human security** approach, focusing on the protection and empowerment of populations, especially of those groups with the least access to security, to justice and to the means of earning a sustainable livelihood. In the shaping of mandates for ESDP missions, this could mean greater focus on the protection of individuals threatened by violence and insecurity (for instance the protection of refugee camps or training of local forces by the gendarmerie and police), on the effects of

6. See Raimo Väyrynen, ‘To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts’, in Raimo Väyrynen (ed.), *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation* (London: Sage Publications, 1991).

violence and insecurity on individuals' possibilities to survive and develop, and on empowering people to better fend for their own security – rather than the more traditional focus on the development of capacities of national authorities.⁷

The **responsibility to protect** populations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, which was endorsed by the UN membership in 2005 at the World Summit, is a more narrow and targeted concept than 'human security', focusing on the prevention of mass atrocities. The concept relies on the primary responsibility of states to protect their own populations, together with the responsibility of the international community to help states build their own capacity to shoulder this sovereign responsibility. It does however also entail a responsibility for the international community to act if states are unwilling to protect or incapable of protecting their populations. Both the preventive and capacity-building action in partnership with states, to strengthen them in their own responsibility to protect, and any potential action by the international community in cases of dire crisis comes in many shapes and forms.

The EU is particularly well-placed to contribute, through its broad range of policies and instruments, including through both civilian and military ESDP. Building in preventive elements into mandates of ESDP operations in areas risk-prone to mass atrocity crimes or having experienced mass atrocities in the past, is also a possibility – the Council Joint Action on EULEX Kosovo is the first example of such a direct reference to the responsibility to protect.⁸ An ESDP mission can act through consent from the government – for instance through support to mediation and preventive diplomacy, or to help the government protect its population against armed groups – but also in more challenging situations of non-consent, should the EU decide, on the basis of a UN Security Council mandate, to deploy military force to physically protect populations from acute risks of mass atrocities.

For military ESDP operations, the EU legally requires a mandate of the Security Council. While we have much greater leeway for the civilian action, we are in reality likely to continue to develop our partnership with the UN, as well as with other international – and for that matter regional – organisations, in the area of peace and security in the years ahead. This is inevitable: needs are huge and the means available to all actors are limited – and sometimes engaged in many arenas at the same time. The UN and the EU are cur-

7. As in for instance support to Security System Reform (SSR) – where, admittedly, elements of for instance Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) can also be seen as having clear human security implications, and the indirect effects on the population of SSR in the long run can contribute to increased human security.

8. Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo; OJ L 42/92, 16.2.2008, p. 1, par. (3): 'There is a need to prevent, on humanitarian grounds, possible outbreaks of violence, acts of persecution and intimidation in Kosovo, taking account, as appropriate, of the responsibility towards populations as referred to in Resolution 1674 by the United Nations Security Council on 28 April 2006'.

rently the only multilateral actors with the ability to draw on a wide range of instruments at all stages of the conflict cycle and to build bridges with longer-term stabilisation and development efforts. In the longer term, however, regional and sub-regional organisations should take greater responsibility in preventing conflict. Building up capacities in these organisations, such as the African Union, is a prerequisite for them to take on these tasks.

Within the EU, common security is one of the issues most positively assessed in opinion polls conducted in EU Member States. Part of the value in common security is that we work together as the EU and are perceived as a collective entity from the outside. It is difficult to see how an effective ESDP could be achieved through *géométrie variable*.

Outside the EU, the EU's image as a 'civilian power,' working in the context of multilateralism and reflecting a positive experience of integration, rule of law and 50 years of peace within its borders,⁹ is a source of legitimacy. This image of the EU, combined with the characteristics of ESDP civilian operations and the Union's overall leverage due to its economic strength and variety of instruments at its disposal, places it in a unique position to work towards peace and security in the world.

Conclusion

The EU has demonstrated its capability to play a stabilising role in conflicts (and their aftermath) and it follows that EU assistance will be more and more solicited. The EU will be called upon to act in more difficult situations. The emphasis of ESDP has been on the promotion of security and stability in the world.¹⁰ The Union acts because it expects positive effects and a positive spillover on security in Europe. However, this begs fundamental questions concerning the level of ambition in the EU. Should the EU be a global actor or concentrate more of its efforts on its immediate neighbourhood? Clearly the EU should not over-stretch its capacities: it should certainly concentrate on its immediate neighbourhood and at the same time continue to play a key role in Africa due to traditional ties and intertwined history. But should we refuse challenges in other parts of the world if we consider that our important security and political interests are at stake and if we are best placed to help populations on the ground? Does the EU want to play the role of the global policeman?

As stated, one of the characteristics of EU civilian missions is that until recently they have not had executive or correctional powers. The Union has been a 'global trainer of police-

9. François Duchêne, 'Europe's Role in World Peace', in Richard Mayne (ed.) *Europe Tomorrow* (London: Fontana, 1972).

10. In other words, the last three objectives in Article 11 TEU.

men' rather than a 'global policeman.' However, the risk of conflicts is becoming more real. EULEX Kosovo's executive powers include elements such as riot control and witness protection. Missions are entering more risky and perilous environments. The EU police mission in Afghanistan is deployed in a number of dangerous locations throughout the country. The mission is required to implement considerable security measures to protect its staff.

The EU's reputation as a partner for host states will be tested much more seriously in the future than in the past. As the Union takes on more responsibility for crisis management, it is bound to be confronted with challenging issues with local populations. This might be described as the 'curse of the global policeman.' The reality is that those who have the capacity and legitimacy are being called to act in riskier environments with a concomitant increase in the difficulties in achieving success.

If the EU wants to play a global role, what is needed? First, the EU needs sufficient funds to carry out its missions. This is on track: in the past four years, CFSP has been the quickest-growing external relations policy area in terms of budget. Funding has not been an obstacle to the achievement of political ambitions in CFSP. The European Parliament, the second arm of the budget authority, has been supportive of increased resources for CFSP. Adequate resources need to be ensured also in the future financial framework 2014-2020.

Secondly, Member States need to back up ambition with human resources committed to civilian ESDP. Current arrangements of providing staff are not robust enough, leading to shortfalls in key missions and successive calls for contributions. To act quickly, staff rosters in Member States need to be drawn upon so that missions can get up and running quickly. The rapid deployment of EUMM in Georgia in September 2008 demonstrated what can be achieved when the political will is there.

Thirdly, strategic planning functions for ESDP civilian and military missions need to be strengthened. This work is underway in the Council Secretariat.

Fourth, to enhance efficiency the EU needs to concentrate all support functions for civilian operations in one single body, which we have above labelled Agency for Crisis Management. The feasibility of such an agency should be studied in the near future. Possibilities of combining support to military operations could be explored at a later stage.

Fifth, and most importantly, what the EU needs is a clear strategy, based on commonly



agreed goals and policies. The European Security Strategy¹¹ has to be implemented. It is not difficult to predict that the ESS will be increasingly based on a broad security concept, recognising the need for a comprehensive approach. This calls for a more effective and coordinated use of all EU instruments. This will be easier to achieve in the framework of the Joint External Action Service – if the Lisbon Treaty is adopted.

11. Council of the European Union, The European Security Strategy, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', Brussels, 12 December 2003. Revised in December 2008.



Part III

Politicians' perspectives



In search of smart power

Alexander Stubb

December 2008 saw the tenth anniversary of the St. Malo Summit between the French President Jacques Chirac and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The event is often regarded as the historic moment that paved the way for the development of the European Union as a security actor, and more specifically, ESDP. Soon after that, in Helsinki during the Finnish EU Presidency in 1999, the framework for the ESDP was set up.

The developments since St. Malo have been remarkable. The EU has progressively put together the institutional framework required to mount operations and missions, both military and civilian. EU Member States have jointly agreed that they should be able to deploy 60,000 troops within 60 days. The decision-making structures are well established, and the structures to undertake operations continue to evolve.

Since the first ESDP operations were launched in 2003, the EU has launched more than 20 crisis management operations – civilian and military – ranging from small advisory missions to military operations with thousands of soldiers deployed. Few of us could have expected that at the time when ESDP was established.

And yet, there is a degree of scepticism, as the EU and its Member States struggle to find the resources to match the ambition of strengthening the global role of the Union. Last year's review of the European Security Strategy (ESS) acknowledged what has been achieved but also underlined that the EU has to do more.

The next few years will test the EU's resolve to proceed in conformity with the strategic vision it has made its own.

A safer world and a more secure Europe

The EU's external action: gaining strength

The global scene is rapidly changing, and so is the EU itself. The EU is both a product and a driver of globalisation, an example of what Anne-Marie Slaughter, the current Direc-

tor of Policy Planning at the US Department of State, has called ‘networked power’¹ – a post-sovereign polity which depends on institutions and norms it sets in interaction with other actors.

At the same time, we are facing a challenge – we may be moving to a more multipolar world where the emerging powers, the so-called BRICs, are gaining in importance and seeking a more influential role. We need to ask ourselves whether the EU is ready for the changing international order. Is the EU sufficiently equipped to be able to play a key role and to promote its interests?

The nature of the challenges is also changing. Our interests are becoming increasingly global and less tied to a certain territory, and the distinction between external and internal security is becoming increasingly blurred. Whether it is tsunami, financial crisis, failed states or more conventional conflicts, or new challenges like climate change or pandemics, we are affected and cannot stand idle.

The Union must be able to act in a coherent manner and to speak with one voice. All too often, the Council meetings in Brussels lapse into traditional multilateral gatherings, where the main interest lies in presenting national positions and scoring points. Instead of tradeoffs between national and European considerations, we should find ways that would benefit both. We need to resist the alternative – which would mean more national positions and a more fragmented Union.

The EU’s quest for common security

But the question is not just about a stronger foreign policy for the Union. The EU also plays a key role when it comes to the security and stability of Europe both within the Union as well as in the neighbourhood. As a result, the prospect of a common defence has been part of ESDP from the beginning.

Deepening integration, a common currency, the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies, the development of the Union’s area of freedom, security and justice, as well as evolving partnerships, all these are contributing to our common security. Therefore, ESDP is not simply a matter of external relations. It has a direct impact on the security of our own region – we should bear in mind that the ESDP began with actions in the Balkans, the transformation of which is now being driven by the perspective of EU membership.

1. Anne Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004.)

This dual objective – to be stronger in foreign policy on the one hand, and the development of the Union’s security and defence dimension on the other – has been at the core of the ESDP’s development all along.

Moving ahead

Much now depends on the Lisbon Treaty. The new Treaty introduces measures which would make the Union stronger in foreign policy and provide better tools for effective action. The new European External Action Service (EEAS), the double-hatted High Representative who will be both Vice-President of the Commission charged with external relations and President of the Foreign Affairs Council responsible for the common foreign and security policy, the new position of the President of the European Council – all these are welcome steps.

Moreover, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty would bring new momentum also to the development of the ESDP. It includes a number of important innovations: the mutual assistance clause in case of armed attack, the solidarity clause in the event of a disaster, permanent structured cooperation for those Member States which wish to go further in the field of defence, as well as the application of the so-called enhanced co-operation in the context of the enlarged Petersberg tasks.

The mutual assistance obligation in the Lisbon Treaty reinforces solidarity among the Member States. The Member States will now commit themselves to assisting each other by all available means in the event of armed aggression. This is an important step, equally binding on all Member States.

Taking stock of these developments, the recent Government Report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy² underlines the role of the EU as Finland’s fundamental security policy choice. The White Paper looks forward to further strengthening the ESDP, and confirms our intention to participate in the Permanent Structured Cooperation, assuming that the Lisbon Treaty will finally be ratified. It promises advances in pooling and sharing military capabilities and advances the cause of European defence material cooperation. That contributes to our own security, but is important also in view of the development of the EU and its role in the world.

From the beginning of Finland’s EU membership, it has been clear to us that the EU also includes a security dimension. There continues to be solid support for this role in

2. ‘Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009. Government Report’, Prime Minister’s Office Publications 13/2009, Helsinki 2009. Available at: <http://www.vnk.fi/julkaisukansio/2009/j11-turvallisuus-j12-sakerhets-j13-finnish/pdf/en.pdf>.

Finnish public opinion. Our citizens expect a security dividend from the EU. As a result, Finland has been a strong proponent of ESDP. We have actively participated in ESDP, including both civilian and military crisis management operations, and will continue to do so.

ESDP today: lessons learned

Act in time

While the EU has demonstrated its ability to launch an operation extremely rapidly, as was the case recently with the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, getting operations fully up and running continues to be a difficult and laborious process. The same challenges were present earlier when the EU started its Monitoring Mission in Aceh, Indonesia, in 2005-6.

Improvements need to be introduced in the whole sequence of crisis management, from early warning and conflict prevention, advance planning and preparedness to deployment and execution of operations. To this end, decision-making structures in Brussels need to be streamlined. Strategic and operational planning, situational awareness as well as support services for the operations, must all be strengthened.

The planning phase and launch of an operation remain particularly challenging. Also the current headquarters system for conducting military crisis management operations needs to be examined more closely. It would be much better and simpler if the EU had permanent operational headquarters of its own. The current alternatives – national headquarters or NATO headquarters – could still be used for EU operations of some type or of particularly demanding nature. For instance, national headquarters could be used for naval operations, such as the current Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia.

Much has been done to create rapid response instruments, both on the military as well as the civilian side.

The EU has set up a system of Battle Groups, two of which are always on standby. Finland has participated in them twice, and is preparing for two Battle Group turns in 2011. It is a paradox that while the EU faces difficulties in force generation in the so-called normal military crisis management operations, there are two Battle Groups on standby at the same time, waiting to be activated for rapid response purposes. We need to find ways to make better use of this capability. Ideas such as modular use or their use to support an ongoing military crisis management operation should be looked at in more

detail. Funding arrangements should be expanded as well, to share the financial burden of Battle Group operations.

Further work is also needed to improve the rapid response capability for civilian crisis management. The Civilian Response Teams could be further improved so that they could be used as an effective instrument – as a kind of civilian crisis management package – for various kinds and phases of civilian crisis management missions. Further work is also needed to ensure that the EU has the right equipment available for rapid deployment when required.

Capabilities are key

We all know the saying ‘it’s all about capabilities’ and I believe that this is understood by us all. But still, matching capabilities to political ambitions remains a challenge. Given the total military spending by EU Member States, the Union should be able to do more to tackle critical shortfalls, such as airlift. Another important issue is the financing of crisis management. The Athena mechanism, which covers some costs of EU operations, should be expanded. For example, a good step forward would be to cover strategic transport as common costs.

Many experts argue that Europe is spending too much on items that are not really needed and that, given the size of its total military budget, Europe should be able to do more in crisis management. The EU Member States have jointly agreed that they should be able to deploy 60,000 troops within 60 days. Still, force generation for even much smaller operations tends to be painful. Just look at the experience from the latest operations in Africa, one in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the other in Chad and the Central African Republic.

Meanwhile, efforts are being made, for instance, through the pooling of resources and intensified industrial cooperation. There are high expectations of the European Defence Agency with regard to capability development. Much depends on how the Member States are ready to support the work of the Agency.

Sometimes it appears as if there was a rivalry between the requirements of crisis management and those of national defence. This is, of course, a false proposition, as these are really two sides of the same coin. The improvement of capabilities and interoperability are important from the perspective of both crisis management and national defence.

The same challenge continues to exist in civilian crisis management. The EU has a great number of missions doing excellent work. At the same time, there is a constant struggle to ensure that the missions have the required personnel at their disposal. The recruitment process as a whole should be improved. In particular, efforts are needed in meeting the demand for adequately trained personnel, following the same operational procedures. In time, this may entail new institutional arrangements on the European level, to support the rapidly expanding civilian dimension of crisis management and to guarantee a uniform approach.

Strengthen the comprehensive approach

One key lesson – perhaps *the* key lesson – from recent crisis management operations is that a more comprehensive approach is needed.

Nowhere is this more striking than in Afghanistan. The challenge extends from addressing the insurgency to building the state structures, supporting social and economic development, countering the drug business, strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights, and supporting the build-up of Afghanistan's own security structures. Long-term engagement of the international community is a necessity.

At the same time, there are a number of international actors participating in these efforts – UN organisations, NATO, the EU, even the OSCE, individual countries, non-governmental organisations. How can we ensure that different actors – international as well as local – are pulling in the same direction? How can coherence and efficiency be increased? If there is a consistent plan, what is it? These are questions each Member State is frequently facing in domestic debates.

A comprehensive approach requires a toolkit – having all the necessary tools at our disposal, in order to achieve the desired outcomes. There must be a continuum of actions at the various stages of crisis management and post-conflict peace-building. It is important that military and civilian crisis management as well as development efforts and humanitarian cooperation are coordinated so that international efforts are more effective and more coherent.

The role of local actors cannot be over-emphasised. Building up state institutions, including security structures based on the rule of law and operating under democratic control, is of key importance in developing a comprehensive approach. Local ownership is crucial: chances of success in crisis management will be low if our plans are seen as foreign imports, lacking legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.

Therefore, debate about Security Sector Reform (SSR) activities has become extremely important. It is the key to success and part of building an exit strategy for international crisis management presence. Support for training the army and the police as well as for the judicial system are areas where the international community, and the EU in particular, needs to do more. For instance, we could improve our ability to send small advisory teams or mobile training teams to support security sector-related work.

Part of the challenge of the comprehensive approach may be in the mindset. Various actors – military, civilian, development people – should learn to work better together and perhaps to understand each other better than is the case today. In this respect, training efforts are crucial, as is the promotion of career paths combining civilian and military expertise.

The advantage of the EU is that it has the wide toolbox that a comprehensive approach requires. For the EU, the challenge is more about fine-tuning and using the tools more effectively.

In particular, the current effort of unifying strategic planning under the new Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) serves the goal of a comprehensive approach. That will help to build one comprehensive plan that makes use of both military and civilian crisis management instruments. Building civilian-military headquarters would be a logical next step. Further work on the comprehensive approach should be pursued on issues such as situational awareness, intelligence, logistics and procurement.

Cooperate with other actors

Finally, one of the particularly appealing characteristics of the ESDP is its openness. Even today, a large number of personnel from third countries – the United States, Turkey and Norway, among others – are serving in the EU civilian crisis management missions. A long list of countries, including Russia, have participated in the EU's military operations.

The EU has also drawn lessons from its cooperation with the United Nations. We should not forget the key role of the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is by far the biggest organisation doing crisis management. And crucially, with very few exceptions, it has mandated all crisis management operations that the EU, NATO or other organisations have undertaken. The UN Security Council is clearly the best way of lending international legitimacy to crisis management. EU cooperation with the UN extends to the practical level, the latest example being the handover of military crisis management from the EU to the UN in Chad and the Central African Republic.

Besides the UN, another key partner for the EU is NATO. In the area of defence planning and capability development, the relationship is and should be close. Whether deployed in an EU operation or a NATO operation, the pool of forces from which Europeans will draw their troops for deployment will largely be the same. Therefore, it is important to develop capabilities in a mutually coherent manner.

As to crisis management operations, we have currently several models for organising cooperation between the EU and NATO. In Bosnia, the EU has implemented a military operation under the so-called Berlin Plus Agreement that gives the EU access to NATO assets in crisis management. In Kosovo and Afghanistan, the EU is implementing its own civilian crisis management missions alongside NATO military operations, and cooperation takes place at a practical level on the ground. Off the coast of Somalia, both are involved through military crisis management in wider international efforts to combat piracy.

In my view, this sort of flexible approach for cooperation is welcome. At the same time, more could be done to strengthen strategic dialogue between the EU and NATO. But the challenge of effective cooperation with various actors involved in crisis management remains.

The EU is working with a large number of other actors which may include other international organisations, non-governmental organisations, national governments and development agencies. It is acting through its own arms – the European Commission, the EU crisis management instruments – and alongside Member States. The Union has developed the system of Special Representatives, who are well placed to co-ordinate overall EU efforts in a particular conflict area. The forthcoming European External Action Service (EEAS) will hopefully reduce intra-EU competition, not only between the Commission and the Council but also between the EU institutions and the Member States.

But there will be more scope for concertation. The issue is particularly pressing in the case of stabilisation and reconstruction, where the EU loses influence by having too many actors and a cacophony of voices both on the ground and in the capitals.

ESDP in 2020: a stronger security and defence dimension

The EU is an excellent example of a networked power. It has a wide range of instruments at its disposal: political tools, development, neighbourhood policies, crisis management. On many fronts, it is showing by example and leading in norm setting. It is a leading actor on climate change issues. It plays a key role in supporting human rights and the rule of law, and through its activities it has been developing a human security approach of its own.

Hence, the Union is well equipped to be active in a more globalised world. It has a Security Strategy, which is reviewed and updated from time to time. The European Defence Agency has drawn up a Long-Term Vision, which will be of great help in further capability development. At some point, the EU should also draw up a Security and Defence White Paper for itself. The real test is how much the EU can deliver in terms of action and influence.

From smart power ...

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Smart Power, co-chaired by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, argued in its 2007 report that the United States had recently over-relied on hard power and proposed a smart power strategy.

The EU, in contrast, could be criticised of doing the opposite. It has the soft tools. It is the frontrunner in developing civilian crisis management. The Union is doing a tremendous job in the field of development and reconstruction. Its weakness relates rather to its tools of hard power. As Armitage and Nye have underlined, 'Smart power is neither hard nor soft – it is the skilful combination of both.'³

Over the past few years, we have witnessed ESDP making steady progress. That can be expected to continue. By 2020, the EU will be more effective and more united in pursuing its foreign policy.

... to hard power

Consequently, the EU is likely to have a much stronger security and defence dimension in 2020 than it has now.

Much depends on the political will of the Member States and on their readiness to make available the necessary capabilities and resources to develop the ESDP. We have jointly set the level of ambition but, clearly, there continues to be different views among the Member States on how to proceed. This will ensure that internal discussion within the Union will be more or less constant, and hopefully that will result in steady progress.

Should the EU declare itself as a military alliance by 2020? The answer is no. The EU is much more than a traditional military alliance. The Member States are deeply bound together, the Union is built on solidarity among Member States, and the development of the EU's security and defence dimension will take place in that context.

3. Richard Armitage and Joseph S. Nye (co-chairs), CSIS Commission on Smart Power, 'A Smarter, More Secure America', (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), p. 7.

The mutual assistance obligation of the Lisbon Treaty will undoubtedly play a role in future discussions on the defence dimension of the Union. Occasionally one hears questions about whether this is taking the EU onto a collision course with NATO. In my view the Lisbon Treaty makes it clear that this will not be the case – the EU commitments are consistent with NATO commitments. It is not an ‘either-or’ situation: both the EU and NATO are needed and continue to play a role in the future defence integration in Europe.

Multi-speed integration?

The EU Member States are increasingly pooling, sharing and synchronising their military assets, not simply out of political will but also out of necessity. It is the only cost-effective way. Most Member States have already participated in the development of multinational forces, such as the Eurocorps, and that will continue.

There is much talk about multi-speed integration or differentiated integration. Elements of that can be identified already in today’s ESDP cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty would give more room for this sort of development also in the field of security and defence, for instance, through enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation. This may be useful in view of the Union’s further development.

At the same time, it is important to ensure that the system is inclusive rather than exclusive, and that those willing and capable can participate.

Somewhere along the road there is a prospect of a common ‘solidarity force’. It could have, as the European Parliament’s outgoing President Hans-Gert Pöttering has suggested, a standard doctrine and common rules of engagement. It could be used for both EU and NATO operations or to assist UN operations, building on the experience gathered on the multinational forces, such as Eurocorps, as well as the EU BGs.

Invest in partnerships

Our security depends on the global and regional security architecture. Russian President Medvedev has called for a revision of European security architecture. We already have functioning structures in place – the EU, NATO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe – and no overhaul is needed. We also have the common principles and values. It is more about making better use of what we already have. But dialogue about our common security interests as such is welcome. And through this dialogue we could also enhance cooperation with Russia.

In view of global developments, we should deepen our relationship with the UN, the largest provider of global security. In 2020, our engagement with the UN will be even closer than today. There is no question that UN peacekeeping operations are today very much in demand, with over 90,000 men and women deployed around the world, and this will still be the case in 2020. In Africa, the African Union (AU) is likely to strengthen its role, also in the area of crisis management. Investing in cooperation is in our interest.

The EU's relationship with NATO has been overly complicated but we all hope that by 2020, NATO and the EU will be working hand-in-hand. By then the EU troops may have been deployed in NATO missions. Perhaps the EU Battle Group concept and NATO Response Force function could, in time, evolve into one integrated system. The tandem of the EU and NATO has not resulted in duplication: both are needed and can contribute to common strategic objectives.

The importance of close transatlantic cooperation will grow as the build-up of the ESDP continues. We should have an effective triangle of cooperation between the EU, NATO and the US. President Obama has brought a new dynamism to international cooperation and expectations are high that this will open new prospects in transatlantic relations.

Changing scene

As we look towards 2020, we need to keep in mind lessons from the past decade. The pace of change is rapid. We may be going through a paradigm change towards a truly globalised order, towards a more multipolar order. But also unexpected events have shaped, and most likely will continue to shape, our environment. We need to prepare for the future with the right mix of flexibility and determination. Europe needs its own version of smart power.



European defence: a future challenge

Nuno Severiano Teixeira

This year it is the tenth anniversary of the approval of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) by the European Council of Cologne. Propelled into action by the Franco-British bilateral summit at St. Malo, in June 1999, the then 15 Member States of the European Union (EU) decided to take on the taboo subject of the military dimension of European integration – a topic that had been beyond the pale ever since the failure of the European Defence Community in 1952 – and to establish the conditions for the EU to ‘play its full role on the international stage ... [and] to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence.’¹ This intention was formally consecrated with the Nice Treaty in 2000, a historical step in the process of European integration.

Since then, ESDP has been one of the most dynamic areas of European integration, regardless of the advances and retreats with the various treaties of the Union.

European integration has advanced on the basis of two key methods. On the one hand, through the dominant process over the last few years, namely with the preparation of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union, which encapsulates the attempt to find a broad political vision and corresponding institutional architecture for the EU (which, by definition, will always be imperfect and incomplete). On the other hand, there is the method that prevailed from the time that Robert Schuman inaugurated the European project in 1950, which seeks to unite the ‘European ideal’ with a demonstrable European capacity to solve the day-to-day problems of its citizens.

We cannot deny the evidence of past experience – namely the failure of the European Defence Community at the start of the process of European integration, and of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 – which tells us that attempts to move ahead too swiftly can result in serious setbacks from which it is not always easy to recover. By contrast, the path of taking ‘small steps’ may be more labour-intensive and require greater patience, but it has also proved to be successful. ESDP illustrates the success of the second method.

1. Appendix III – Declaration of the European Council on the Reinforcement of the Common European Security and Defence Policy, Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council of Cologne, 3-4 June 1999. Available at: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/pt/ec/kolnpt.htm.

Based on the shared principles and values that lie at the heart of the Union – democracy, respect for basic rights and freedoms – ESDP has evolved since 1999 through prudent and concrete steps in the institutional, operational and doctrinal domains, and even gone beyond the literal terms of the treaty that frames it.

Institutionally, the EU now has the structures enabling it to respond to decisions with military implications. At the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, the Member States agreed to establish the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee, and the EU Chief of Staff, thus creating the necessary framing and decision-making mechanisms to address military matters.

In terms of capabilities, the *Headline Goal 2010* was approved in 2004,² following a methodology similar to that established at Helsinki – albeit with renewed goals. This guiding document provided for the creation of European Rapid Response capabilities to engage in military peace-keeping and peace-imposition missions and to help manage crises. It mandated the formation of Battle Groups, which were declared fully operational in January 2007. This was followed by the publication of the *Progress Catalogue* during the second half of 2007, under the Portuguese presidency of the Council of the EU. This document described the state of Europe's military capabilities and identified the main priorities and strategic gaps, the operational impact of which has to be addressed before 2010. Three areas stand out in particular: military force protection; the ability to deploy military forces (strategic transport in particular); and intelligence (in order to acquire information superiority).

Operationally, the EU has been carrying out missions on the ground uninterrupted, be it in coordination with NATO, within the framework of the 'Berlin Plus' agreements, or autonomously. In order to respond to demands for regional security and stability, the EU has promoted more than two dozen ESDP missions around the world – both civilian and military – and there are currently twelve missions underway, deploying more than 6,600 men and women on the ground.

In only a few years, the EU also proved to be capable of responding promptly to crisis situations – as shown by the response to the conflict in Georgia in the summer of 2008 – and of setting up missions in specific locations in a timely fashion (as evidenced by the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission, an operation that establishes a bridge with the United Nations mission on the ground).

2. *Headline Goal 2010* was approved by the General Affairs and Foreign Relations Council on 17 May 2004, and signed by the European Council on 17-18 June of that year. The document is available at: <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>.

Lastly, in doctrinal terms, the European Security Strategy document was presented in 2003³ and identified the main threats to common security. This document was groundbreaking, as it was the first in the history of European integration to define a joint strategic vision guiding European foreign actions. In December 2008, five years after its approval, the Secretary General of the Council and High Representative for Foreign Policy, Javier Solana, presented a document to the European Council assessing the implementation of the Strategy,⁴ in the light of the current international context and the new challenges facing the Union, and proposing new policies to render European foreign policy more effective and to ensure that it delivers by living up to EU goals and ambitions for the coming decade.

Regarding the achievements of the ESDP thus far, there are opposing views rooted in the historical cleavage between two different strategic visions of European security: the continental and the Atlantic. Thus, there are those who defend the ‘European army’ model, and feel that we are far from achieving our goals; and there are those who think that European security is about the defence of the Atlantic and who therefore feel that we have gone much too far. But this dichotomy makes no sense now. If we are to face the threats and dangers of today and tomorrow, we must set aside the prejudices of the past and address both European and trans-Atlantic security and defence needs.

European defence: what challenges?

In order to ensure that ‘European Defence’ can deal with the strategic and security challenges of the coming decade, we must first ascertain how ambitious a security and defence policy the EU wishes to have, as defined in the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007 by the heads of the 27 EU Member States; and second, we must establish which institutional, operational and conceptual adaptations are necessary to turn aims into reality.

As regards the dispositions of the Lisbon Treaty,⁵ and keeping in mind that ESDP is framed by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it is important to highlight three basic innovations. First, there is the introduction of two key solidarity clauses concerning security and defence matters: a mutual defence clause (Article 42, no. 7), according to which ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other

3. The European Security Strategy document, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, was approved by the European Council on 12 December 2003. The document is available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/031208ESSIIP.pdf>.

4. The European Council of December 2007 invited the Secretary General of the Council and High Representative for Foreign Policy, Javier Solana, to analyse the implementation of the Strategy together with the Commission and the Member States, and to propose new elements enabling the Strategy to be better executed. The final report presented to the Council of the EU is available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17104.en08.pdf>.

5. The consolidated version of the Treaty of the European Union is available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1296&lang=en>.

Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power'; and a solidarity clause (Article 222), which comes into play when natural or man-made disasters or terrorist attacks occur. According to these clauses, Member States commit themselves to mutually assisting their peers in specific situations, thus promoting the EU founding principle of solidarity among Member States.

Second, the Treaty of Lisbon has broadened the scope of missions – originally known as the Petersberg Missions – in which the EU can use civilian and military means (Article 43), and has, for the first time, specified the kinds of missions that fit into this category.⁶

Third and finally, two important mechanisms for security and defence cooperation have been introduced to the Lisbon Treaty: the 'reinforced cooperation' mechanism,⁷ and the permanent structured cooperation mechanism.⁸ Concerning reinforced cooperation, this was a mechanism established by the Amsterdam and Nice treaties that now covers foreign and common security policy in situations where the Union as a whole cannot achieve the cooperation goals within a reasonable time frame, and whenever at least nine Member States participate in the proposed action. The permanent structured cooperation mechanism, by contrast, provides for closer cooperation between the Member States that show a capacity and the willingness to make greater efforts in the security domain. The goal of this mechanism is clear: to promote the establishment of an effective political framework and instrument to develop European military capabilities, according to criteria agreed to by the Member States. More specifically, the goal is to encourage states to channel the resources they already spend on defence to focus on collective interests, particularly when it comes to the deployment and maintenance of military forces and the promotion of defence research and development (R&D).

The development of this cooperation mechanism can be seen from two different angles. Critics consider that it merely creates the opportunity for the main European powers to deepen cooperation, sidelining all the other Member States, but others feel that this may promote the development of the defence capabilities of all the Member States, large and small alike, which show a willingness to contribute to a common defence and security goals, namely by enabling them to participate in international military missions. It is the Member States of the EU that must choose which of these interpretations they find most persuasive.

6. This includes joint disarmament actions, humanitarian and evacuation missions, military advisory and assistance missions, conflict-prevention and peace-keeping missions, missions by combat forces to manage crises, including missions to re-establish peace and stabilization missions at the end of conflicts.

7. See Title IV of the Treaty on the working of the European Union.

8. Articles 42 and 46 of the TEU, and the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation established by article 42 of the TEU.

The essential goal of these newly created instruments is to give the EU a broad and coherent vision that allows it to become a global player with a decisive role to play in the promotion of a safer and more stable world. For this to happen, it is essential to consider European defence a priority. It is therefore necessary to strengthen ESDP.

In order to achieve this, and taking into account the challenges that the EU faces in the international arena, it is crucial to promote a series of changes in the institutional, conceptual and operational (in terms of capabilities) domains.

First, as regards the institutional domain, in addition to defining ‘threats’ (already outlined in the European Security Strategy document), we must examine how these threats relate to one another, and how the Union can address them effectively. Clearly, it is important to promote coordinated inter-pillar action, so that the strategy is mirrored in the policies and mechanisms that are adopted to promote global and integrated action. Although complementary, the Security and Development domains are divided between two pillars of European integration: the Community pillar, which is managed by the Commission; and the Foreign Security Policy and CFSP pillar, which is under the aegis of the Council and the Member States. Thus, emphasis should be placed on EU internal coordination: both coordination among those institutions with security and developmental competences (the Council and the Commission), and coordination between Member State national policies.

Further, it is indispensable not only to ensure that the general public, political parties and civil society as a whole support ESDP goals, but also to improve democratic control of the military instruments at the disposal of the EU. This is one of the functions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU). After the approval of the Treaty of Lisbon and notwithstanding the competences of the European Parliament, this will also be a reinforced responsibility of national parliaments. The European public needs to be made aware of the importance of security and defence issues, not just at the international level but also for the process of European integration itself.

Second, a conceptual change is needed: more specifically, we need to update of the European Security Strategy. The Union must recognise and face new challenges and risks and keep in mind not just the prevailing international context but also the need to affirm the EU as a global player that is willing to share the burden of international security responsibilities. As regards challenges, the EU cannot ignore the importance of relations with Russia and with new emerging powers such as India, China and Brazil; it must also address issues related to globalisation and the increasing rapidity of flows, be they financial, informational or other. As regards the risks, in addition to those already identified

by the Security Strategy, we must consider concepts like energy security, maritime, food, and internet security, as well as the dangers posed by climate change, including natural disasters and pandemics.

It is also necessary to define the rules on and framework for military intervention, namely in high-level risk environments. We cannot pretend that the international system is free of uncertainty, or ignore growing calls for EU civilian and/or military intervention; and we must also consider that intervention scenarios may increase with the introduction to the Treaty of Lisbon of the mutual defence and solidarity clauses among Member States.

Furthermore, the EU must take on increasing security and defence duties not just within its own borders on European territory, but also to promote stability within its 'near neighbourhood', particularly in Africa and the Mediterranean. For this reason, it cannot depend exclusively on the military capabilities of the Atlantic Alliance, which would anyway constitute a negation of its own defence responsibilities. We should state things clearly in this regard: the goal is not to establish a rivalry with the Atlantic Alliance but, on the contrary, to ensure that capabilities are complementary and autonomous, so that Europe becomes a useful and credible ally in the task of bringing peace and stability to the international system.

Third, we need to change capabilities. To speak about 'European Defence' is to speak about the development of autonomous, credible and adapted military capabilities, which take the new international strategic environment into account.

Given the challenges that the EU faces, it will be necessary to deepen Europe's Rapid Response capabilities to address crisis situations in three major ways: forming land, air and naval Battle Groups; reinforcing the capacity for autonomous planning and operations; and creating a European Defence technological and industrial base. To that end, we need an intergovernmental mechanism to promote the harmonisation of military needs, establishing the kinds of economies of scale that can sustain a shared defence industry among the EU Member States. This should be the central role of the European Defence Agency (EDA).

As regards the development of European capabilities, three broad guidelines should be followed: first, developing capabilities that include European rapid response mechanisms; second, developing capabilities that permit more demanding operations; and third, promoting projects within the framework of the EDA. The ultimate goal of this effort, one that should be shared by all the Member States, is the creation of a competitive and efficient European defence market.

Finally, as regards the operational dimension, the EU has played an increasing role in conflict-prevention, conflict-management and conflict-resolution missions, particularly on the African continent. These missions have a civilian as well as a military component, and they involve various state institutions (military and police forces, judiciaries), and instruments (development assistance). In other words, the goal is to promote integrated security, state-building and development capacities. This can happen at two levels: first, by promoting shared and ‘integrated’ knowledge about security and by working jointly on development issues; and second, by establishing multi-disciplinary teams – which include representatives from the areas of defence, foreign affairs, development, justice and home affairs, among others – to promote the adoption of integrated strategies to frame the foreign action of the European Union.

On the other hand, we must try to improve the operational results of European military forces. More specifically, it is essential to increase the percentage of deployable vis-à-vis effective forces, and to develop the capacity to sustain them abroad, establishing smaller more expeditionary groups based on combined or joint forces. This is the path followed by various European countries in the modernisation of their armed forces.

Finally, we must rethink and adapt ESDP financing mechanisms to suit the needs generated by international crises, particularly those requiring a rapid response. Member States must take on the civilian and military costs of ESDP missions just as they have accepted the duties associated with the creation of international security conditions. On the other hand, it is also important to consider innovative financing formulas both at the national and community level, which may facilitate the availability and use of military forces within the framework of the EU.

European and transatlantic defence: what future?

The Atlantic Alliance and the EU are two fundamental pillars of multilateral security and defence. Insofar as this is the case, any ESDP developments will be coordinated with, and complement, the central role that NATO plays in Western European defence. We must find the institutional means permanently to articulate their respective priorities, coordinate their missions, and maximise their security and defence capacities and means. The goal is not to create a rivalry between the two, but rather to establish a useful and credible alliance between them.

European defence should not rival the international security system or NATO; it should, without a shadow of doubt, play a complementary role. This is the spirit of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements, which are the foundation of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, and should be the spirit guiding the Member States and the Atlantic Alliance.

We must define clearly and reinforce the strategic framework of relations between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union in the areas of security, defence and crisis management. It is true that there is already concrete cooperation between the two institutions, but what we need most is a shared strategic vision, without which defence and security complementarities between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union cannot evolve stably and permanently. This must be the goal we strive to achieve in the context of the transatlantic relationship, to fully restore trust between the two pillars of the Alliance: the European and the North American. And the time to do this is now. Today, the United States recognises the need for a strong and cohesive Europe and for the reinforcement of autonomous European defence capabilities with a framework that allows the EU and the Atlantic Alliance to share responsibility for the collective defence of European citizens. It is also necessary for the Member States of the EU to confirm their determination to reject strategies that stand in the way of, rather than consolidate, the internal cohesion of the Union as well as the cohesion of the transatlantic relationship.

We need this kind of commitment so that the Atlantic Alliance can address its growing international security duties, and for the European Union to take on its European defence and near neighbourhood security responsibilities.

The EU must accept its responsibilities if Europe is to have a future as an international player. It will remain an economic power, and it will still be a civil power, but it must also have a military dimension. There is no doubt that this is Europe's 'destiny,' and it is one to which Portugal subscribes.

Thirty years ago, the idea that the European Community might become an international player was nothing short of utopian. Today, that is indispensable for European security and global stability. The goal of making the EU a global player with broad capabilities should guide our efforts to consolidate Europe's Security and Defence Policy.

Security and defence in the enlarged Europe

Jacek Saryusz-Wolski

The process of postwar European integration was driven by the idea of the creation of a peaceful community of nations in Europe. Hence, while the EU was committed to building peace among its members, the notion of military power was to some degree deleted from the dictionary of European integration. Even the Pleven Plan to create a supranational European army had to a large extent been a political response to the controversy related to the reconstruction of the German *Bundeswehr* rather than to the challenge posed by the growing power of the USSR. In this way, the real burden of defending Europe was placed for the entire Cold War period upon the US acting through NATO. It was against this background that François Duchêne wrote in the early 1970s that the ‘one thing Europe cannot be is a major military power.’ ‘Even if federated’, he argued ‘with a nuclear deterrent controlled by a European President, the psychological and physical vulnerability of cramped urbanised societies to threats of nuclear attack, and the inner diversity of what would still be a politically loose agglomeration of power, would make it inconceivable for a European deterrent to be anything but self-protective.’¹ Although this observation still has its merit, the present security context in the world leaves Europe no choice but to attempt to contradict it. In a post-post-Cold War era characterised by the emergence of new power centres in the world and the mixture of both old and new types of security threats Europe needs some military power not only to be viewed as a genuine actor in international affairs, but also to provide for the defence of its citizens.

But apart from the new security context two other factors have been instrumental in the emergence of a European defence policy. First, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) launched the process leading to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), encompassing ‘all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.’² Second, if Maastricht provided an institutional framework for the subsequent development

1. François Duchêne, ‘Europe’s role in world peace’, in Richard Mayne (ed.), *Europe tomorrow. Sixteen Europeans look ahead*, Royal Institute for International Affairs (London: Fontana, 1972), pp. 37-8.

2. Title V, Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union, February 1992.

of European Security and Defence Policy from St. Malo until Lisbon, it was the two rounds of EU enlargement of 1997 and 2004 that gave European defence a solid geographical basis and a new geopolitical context. The accession of new Member States clearly enriched the Union's strategic outlook by adding different foreign and security policy perspectives that had never been present before in the European security discourse. As a result, the EU's potential to intervene, mediate and help in different parts of the world was greatly enhanced. On the other hand, however, enlargement made the interpretation of security and defence in Europe a more ambitious task than ever. It requires a fresh and an unbiased approach to the interests and political sensitivities of all EU members.

NATO- EU: indispensable partners

A strong and vibrant Euro-Atlantic partnership is the best guarantor of security and stability across Europe. ESDP and NATO can therefore flourish if and when both organisations view one another as indispensable partners, and enjoy the confidence of their members. This somewhat trivial reflection has tended, however, not to always be remembered. The year 2009 seems to be a harbinger of a new transatlantic debate in which institutional rivalries may be superseded by common perspectives. The Obama administration's approach to Europe and the French decision to enhance its role within NATO offer a fresh departure point for the NATO-EU relationship. For Europeans do not really care whether it is the EU or NATO that provides security and defence for them as long as they feel safe and secure. Effectiveness is hence the most important criterion for NATO-EU cooperation. And effectiveness depends on political leadership, an efficient and flexible decision-making process and resources that can be mobilised for the sake of common actions. Therefore, whenever we debate the EU-NATO relationship we should accept the premise that Europe, and indeed the whole transatlantic area, needs both organisations.

For the entire post-Cold War period there was an ongoing debate about whether a division of roles between the EU and NATO is necessary. A tacit assumption was made that the EU should remain a civilian player with a small military component, whereas NATO would remain responsible for demanding military missions. But the vision of 'NATO cooking dinner, and Europe washing the dishes' has always been a caricature. It stemmed from an old fashioned, Cold War-type approach to security in which the so-called hard, military dimension was viewed as a priority and was strictly separated from the 'political aspects' of security. The debate was hence largely inconclusive and reflected certain national preferences rather than a European consensus. We should therefore devote no more time to continuing this discussion. The initial transatlantic competition between the 'soft' and 'hard' concepts of power is gone. Today, civilian operations and

commitment to long-term stability and reconstruction are no less demanding than precisely guided air strikes. Afghanistan and Iraq are illustrative cases. For the only division between NATO and ESDP comes from the uneven amount of money spent on defence in Europe and the US.

The EU and NATO should therefore strengthen each other by avoiding competition and developing greater cooperation in crisis-management operations based on a practical division of labour. Both NATO and the European Union need enhanced focus on strengthening their basic capabilities, improvement of interoperability and coordination of doctrines, planning, technologies, equipment and training methods. A decision on which organisation should deploy forces should be based on the political will expressed by both organisations, on operational needs and political legitimacy on the ground, and last but not least on their ability to deliver peace and stability in a given conflict situation. Attainment of this objective requires cooperation between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in elaborating the new NATO Strategic Concept and future revisions of the European Security Strategy (ESS). The security strategies of the EU and NATO should be not only complementary but also convergent, each giving due weight to the potential of the other.

The 'Berlin plus' arrangements, which allow the EU to have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, need to be improved in order to allow the two organisations to intervene and effectively deliver relief in crises, especially where a multi-task civilian-military response is needed. For that purpose it is of vital importance to improve the pooling of intelligence among NATO allies and EU partners.

Lessons learned from deployments under ESDP have shown that a permanent planning and command capability for EU operations would definitely increase the effectiveness and credibility of such operations. The proposed EU Operational Headquarters provides the solution to this problem. Given the civilian-military focus of the EU, such a structure would not duplicate anything that exists elsewhere. An EU Operational Headquarters should be viewed as complementing the current NATO command structures and not undermining NATO's transatlantic integrity.

Scope and tasks

European defence is a process that has no limits. It depends solely on Europe's strategic needs and military capabilities that EU members are willing and able to provide for European defence. ESDP will thus become what we can make of it. A pragmatic and project-oriented approach is essential to keep the policy high on the European agenda.

This means that we need not dwell on what kind of missions ESDP should or should not perform. The changing context of European security sets no limits for the type of missions the EU needs to be prepared to mount in the future. The lessons learned in the last two decades have forcefully illustrated that it is not up to us to define which threats are more likely, and which should accordingly be given priority. Nor can European security and defence be framed within a pre- or post-modern paradigm. Since the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London we have been confronted with cyberwar in Estonia, a classical interstate conflict – the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia – and a new wave of piracy on the seas. Regional instability in Africa, semi-frozen conflicts in the Caucasus and fragile stability in the Balkans will pose challenges for Europe's security in the foreseeable future. The heterogeneous and diversified security context in which ESDP operates is the best proof that the demand for missions and tasks will never be exhausted, and that they cannot be formulated in advance. We need more early-warning and prevention, but ultimately it takes more partners than just the EU to prevent crisis situations. The European Security Strategy should therefore remain a document that sharply defines the nature of the threats 'as they are' and then identifies general guidelines for action along with relevant countermeasures.

The challenge of transformation and adaptation to the new security context demands intellectual creativity and institutional flexibility. Therefore we need solutions embedded in the Lisbon Treaty: the enhanced role of High Representative as the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Vice-President of the Commission, supported by a unified European External Action Service. At the same time we should avoid delusions that new institutional changes alone will boost ESDP. Ten years after Cologne and Helsinki, ESDP is losing ground in the European public debate. In a January report the Parliament's Committee for Foreign Affairs expressed its regret that despite extensive preparation, but in consequence of a loss of momentum caused by the impasse over the Lisbon Treaty, the revision of the ESS has resulted not in a new strategic orientation but merely in a report expressing day-to-day policy concerns. A situation in which there was only limited parliamentary debate and no public debate before the adoption of the report proposing the revision of the ESS will have negative long-term implications for European defence. Without a lively political debate the Union will never make progress in defining what are common European security interests, or on defining criteria for the launching of ESDP missions. Nor will it elaborate proposals for a new EU-NATO partnership, and tackle the issue of national 'caveats'; both declared and undeclared.

The European Parliament has an important role to play in this regard. It oversees the ESDP budget for civilian operations; has its own expertise on security and defence issues; and facilitates dialogue with national assemblies. It is a meticulous reviewer of ESDP

operations and the guarantor of a common European approach to security and defence issues. It is hence a venue for a wide European debate on security issues. Strengthening Parliament's power in ESDP would therefore contribute to the stronger legitimacy of Petersberg missions both at the European and national levels.

Capabilities

The fact that European security and defence depends on trends and events we rarely have control over constitutes a challenge for ESDP capabilities. It is easier to have a holistic approach to European security and missions, than to have necessary, robust civilian and military capabilities that match EU strategic objectives. The Helsinki European Headline Goal and the subsequent European Headline Goal (EHG) 2010 were adopted as vehicles for enhancing member states' military capabilities. Essentially, the European armed forces were to become professional in every respect; i.e. more mobile, self-sustainable in actions, equipped with high-tech system (C4SIR), and integrated on both the national and the European level. However, the progress thus far has been rather disappointing. As the former chief executive of the European Defence Agency argued, EU members have done too little to modernise their militaries for the purposes of ESDP. 'Nearly two decades after the end of the Cold War, most European armies are still geared towards all-out warfare on the inner-German border rather than keeping the peace in Chad, or supporting security and development in Afghanistan.'³

EU members together spend more than 200 billion euro per year on defence, which is more than half the defence expenditure of the United States. Yet, the lack of efficiency and coordination in the utilisation of those funds leads to unnecessary duplication between Europeans. Specialisation, pooling and sharing of existing capabilities, and joint development of new ones is the only rational way for addressing the capabilities deficit. The European Defence Agency (EDA) plays a leading role in that respect. But without the serious and long-term financial and political commitment of national governments the EDA will not be able to fulfil its mission. We need therefore a stronger and more visible role of defence ministers in the EU.

It is the gap between declared ambitions and the dire state of capabilities for Petersberg operations that undermines any future prospect for ESDP. It leads to operational inaction and also increases tensions between members seriously approaching the capabilities gap and those who tend to free-ride. Even in the time of the financial and economic crisis implementation of European Headline Goals – both military and civilian – has to be continued.

3. Nick Witney, *Re-energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy*, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), February 2008, p. 1.

ESDP also needs further development of cooperation between national armed forces so that they become increasingly synchronised. The Parliament proposed therefore that this process and the armed forces be given the name 'SAFE' – Synchronised Armed Forces Europe. This term offers a less confusing description of what ESDP really needs. The EU is not on the road to building a European army. The EU does not expect Member States to abandon sovereignty over their armed forces and the lives of soldier-citizens. SAFE is an opt-in model for military cooperation based on more intensive voluntary synchronisation. The Parliament also approved the idea of a European statute for soldiers within the framework of SAFE governing training standards, operational doctrine and freedom of operational action, issues relating to duties and rights, as well as the level of equipment quality, medical care and social security arrangements in the event of death, injury or incapacity.

The civilian leg of ESDP – Civilian Crisis Management (CCM) capabilities – limps as well. The trouble is not the lack of sophisticated and expensive hardware, but of a sufficient number of experienced, educated and committed staff prepared to take the personal risk to go on missions abroad. The fact that CCM requires the kind of personnel that is highly regarded and sought after by national institutions – e.g. the police, courts – causes additional problems. It takes therefore long and concerted efforts of the Council and the Commission to create a framework for recruiting civilian personnel for ESDP operations. But as with the military capabilities the main responsibility lays with the national governments. If Member States do not provide sufficient incentives for national civilian experts and do not overwhelm domestic institutional bottle-necks the EU role in bringing post-conflict stability and reconstruction will be seriously limited, and ESDP credibility severely damaged. This problem will also impinge upon Europe's relation with the United States. A Europe that appears unable to deliver civilian assets for reconstruction on e.g. Afghanistan, cannot expect to be viewed in Washington as a reliable partner.

Defence clause

The issue of whether EU members should be bound by a defence clause in case of an external military aggression had been on the European agenda since the rejection by the French National Assembly of the European Defence Community plan in the 1950s. Article V of the modified Brussels treaty reads that in case of an armed attack in Europe against one of the Treaty's signatories, the other contracting parties 'will afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.' The wording of the clause predates defence commitment as set out in NATO Article V and in theory offers a more solid security guarantee than the Washington treaty. However, during the Cold War the Brussels treaty remained in the shadows. It was NATO and the US nuclear

umbrella that provided security in and for Europe. After the Cold War, in turn, the European defence clause was interpreted by some as a perilous idea that would undermine NATO security guarantees, and as such was rejected by subsequent intergovernmental conferences (IGCs). From Maastricht to Lisbon all EU treaties envisage hence that the common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy that ‘will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.’⁴ It was the Constitutional treaty that went a step further adding an obligation that ‘Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power (...)’.⁵ The Lisbon Treaty upholds this commitment. Is European defence today therefore an issue of treaty implementation? Or will the above commitment remain inactive like the Brussels article V? But does the EU truly need a mutual defence clause?

The answer to the last question is an unequivocal ‘yes’. Although Europe currently enjoys an unprecedented era of peace and stability, European defence should be more than the Petersberg tasks. We must not run the risk of an overoptimistic assessment of security dynamics in Europe’s neighbourhood. Two waves of enlargement have stretched the Union’s territorial range to the Baltic States, Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The EU now borders regions and areas where European interests and values are not widely shared, and often has to compete with other actors’ security perspectives. If the post-Cold War NATO decided to maintain its commitment to defence of its members, and now even seeks ways to strengthen it in a new security context, there is therefore no reason why the European Union should not follow suit. As long as we keep NATO and future EU defence planning under one roof there is no need for concern. When NATO goes global Europe must develop a regional approach to defence. Perhaps we should consider in the future a kind of an ‘Article V Berlin plus’ that would enable the EU to act in its defence when the US cannot be with us. We should view this process as supplementing, not supplanting, the transatlantic security bonds.

A fully-fledged European defence necessitates not only relevant legal and institutional adaptation, but first and foremost a political one. European defence will never be worthy of the name as long as the Union will not become an alliance. And to be an alliance, the EU needs far more than ESDP – its institutions and capabilities. It needs political solidarity and a Common Foreign Policy that speaks with one voice with regard to problems of strategic importance. As long as the EU is divided and/or lets others drive a wedge between its members on issues like energy security, Missile Defence or questions of war and

4. Section 2, Article 42, par. 2, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, Brussels, 30 April 2008.

5. *Ibid.*, par. 7.

peace, ESDP will not stand for a genuine European defence. From the above it follows that ESDP is only the first step towards making the EU a genuine alliance. The second would be to view ESDP as a nucleus of a security system in Europe that links internal politico-economic integration with a strategic approach to the external world.

At the Munich Security Conference this year President Sarkozy argued that Europe has to decide whether it wants to live in peace, or be left in peace. This phrase aptly corresponds with the main problem of European security and defence which is the deeply-rooted conviction of some that history has ended in Europe with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism. There is hence no need to increase defence expenditures or deploy troops to engage in real fighting. The 2008 August war and ongoing instability on Europe's southern and eastern strategic flank leaves no doubts, however, that history definitely has a future. And so does European defence, if the EU is determined to give it a chance.

Conclusions – Ten priorities for the next ten years

Álvaro de Vasconcelos

A number of conclusions are quite obviously shared by all practitioners and analysts who contributed to this volume. This last chapter is an attempt to summarise the main points raised, and to lay out a roadmap for the EU's common security and defence policy. Behind the ten-point roadmap to 2020 lies the equally shared assumption that the European Union needs to build a twin robust civilian and military capacity over the next ten years for its foreign, security and defence policy; this should build on what has already been achieved while decisively addressing a recognised deficit in policy coherence and consistency, and equally decisively filling the capability gap. This derives less from a shortage of capacities than from an inability to pool, join and coordinate existing resources and capabilities. It is virtually impossible to predict with any degree of certainty what the specific needs of the EU in the security field will be in ten years' time. But here the EU finds itself in the same predicament, indeed, as any other world power. In outlining the European ambition for 2020 we need first to ensure that present goals and commitments are met. As Claude-France Arnould rightly points out, the EU must be mindful of the gap '*between what is expected of ESDP and the means at its disposal*', and prevent that gap from widening '*as a result of the combined effect of the financial crisis and Europe's increasing engagement within the Atlantic Alliance in Afghanistan*.' The second unanimously shared assumption is that the European Union needs to be prepared to act both autonomously and jointly in most situations, as more and more defence- and security-related decisions are likely to be taken in an EU framework. This is why the focus needs to be on strategic ambition; there is no reason to believe that the coming years will be any less productive of surprising developments and strategic revolutions. ESDP needs will thus be determined by the ambition the European Union defines for itself as we move into the next decade and beyond. As a result, the third assumption made here is that EU Member States will remain aware that the EU's unique and distinctive civil-military profile is ideally suited to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, and will therefore adopt the 'no normative power without "real" power' scenario outlined in the introductory chapter. This will then require developing both military and civilian crisis-management resources that match the EU's independently-framed foreign policy

goals. Consequently, improved technical cooperation between ESDP and NATO notwithstanding, it must be firmly borne in mind that the primary political and strategic Euro-Atlantic partnership is between the United States and the European Union. Also, if shaping a multilateral system in a multipolar world is to remain at the heart of the conduct of EU foreign policy, if the EU wishes to be an ‘enabler’ for the solution of regional crises and the pursuit of peace and human dignity, then security must not be left out of EU strategic partnerships with current and aspiring global and regional players.

The following ten points are based on the additional assumption that the main provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP can and should be applied, irrespective of whether the treaty comes into force or not any time soon. Contributors will recognise their views, occasionally expressed in their own words, in the ESDP roadmap to 2020 outlined below.

1. Crisis-management today – common defence beyond 2020

ESDP is predicated on the assumption that the collective defence of EU Member States falls outside its remit. ‘Expanded Petersberg tasks’ can thus simply be defined as ‘anything but collective defence’.

That European solidarity – predicated on a common European destiny – will evolve over time so as to include assisting any EU Member State that is a ‘victim of armed aggression on its territory’ cannot be ruled out. Establishing a collective defence mechanism is unnecessary today. NATO is the military expression of transatlantic solidarity, and as such the guarantor of European security. The prospect of a common ‘solidarity force’, with a standard doctrine and common rules of engagement, would constitute a step towards a fully-fledged European defence which is not on the cards today, and seems a very unlikely prospect in 2020.

This does not mean, however, that ESDP can afford to do without an active military component which is sufficiently well trained and equipped to carry out combat missions. The range of ESDP *military* missions is quite broad, ranging from disarmament to humanitarian operations, military advice and assistance to conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions. The Treaty of Nice already envisages (as does the Treaty of Lisbon) using combat forces in a broader range of missions, where peace-making features prominently.

The EU should continue to do what it already does and should concentrate on doing it better: managing conflicts of a variety of types, in most cases internal wars in non-European states, as well as combating banditry, piracy, trans-national criminality including

terrorism, and cyber-terrorism. Broad as it already is, it is unlikely that the geographic scope for ESDP missions will become much wider: the EU acts independently of NATO in the framework of the UN and has deployed missions not only in Europe, but also in the Mediterranean, Africa and other regions of the world. Afghanistan must be seen as an exceptional case of EU states' involvement in a NATO expeditionary mission rather than the rule. Conversely, 'Europeanising' EU Member States' contributions to UN missions – Lebanon being a case in point – would not necessarily mean any significant degree of perimeter expansion.

2. A human security doctrine may require the use of force

The founding principles of the Union are enshrined in the Treaty on European Union: liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. These core values will remain as fundamental in 2020 as they are today. The widespread promotion of these values will continue to be pursued as the main goal of EU foreign policy, and security and defence should not allow for any infringement. Respect for human rights and international justice at all levels of military operations is an essential component of its legitimacy and effectiveness. Furthermore, the notion of so-called 'collateral damage' is against the EU's security doctrine and is therefore unacceptable.

There is no contradiction between adherence to the notion of human security and undertaking the full range of military operations including peace enforcement – on the contrary. This implies that if prevention fails, the need to use military force to stop crimes against humanity being perpetrated must be explicitly acknowledged.

3. Civilian and military 'force-generation' goals must be met

Given its unlikelihood, moving towards common forces and collective defence is not a scenario on which we should focus in the years to come: rather, we should concentrate our resources on developing a robust and effective military and civilian EU Peace Corps for crisis management. This requires that commitments made under both the military and the civilian 'headline goals' are kept.

- National military and civilian commitments should be adequately publicised in order to increase transparency, and an improved monitoring system of fixed benchmarks set in place to facilitate scrutiny. Special meetings of the Council of Ministers (in Defence, Foreign and Home Affairs formation, adding the latter to what is currently done already) should be regularly convened to oversee implementation (and possibly to adapt commitments in accordance with commonly agreed goals). A future civil/

military command should assist the Council in this task. On the military side, three areas are recognised as critical: force protection in war-like scenarios, deployment (strategic transport being a priority), and intelligence gathering. The EDA's *Long-Term Vision 2020-2025* can usefully be invoked to pinpoint shortcomings and propose adequate pooling and sharing solutions to fill in the gaps. It should be borne in mind that in building ESDP's military component, Member States should concomitantly be contributing to deep EU-wide national military reform. On the civilian side, readiness and adaptation to both civilian and civilian-military missions, as detailed below, is of the essence.

- The EU is seeking to develop adequate capabilities to set up a number of civilian-military missions simultaneously, part of which will need a strong military component: two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations, two rapid-response operations of limited duration, an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals, a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission, a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to ninety days, and about a dozen ESDP civilian missions of varying formats including a major mission that could last several years. The EU should therefore set itself a strategic target for 2020 of having at the ready a very sizeable force with the adequate equipment, particularly in transport and logistics. The target of 60,000 troops (i.e. 180,000 allowing for rotation) should be met as soon as possible, but the EU's ambition should be to double it by 2020.

The development of EU capabilities should build on 'Europeanising' existing national capabilities. The ability to pool such capabilities will depend on some form and manner of harmonising modernisation requirements, so that Europeanisation can proceed at a faster pace. Given the residual place of territorial defence in national doctrines – and even NATO – the natural trend of modernisation of national armed forces is for their being increasingly well-suited to both national and ESDP operations and missions.

- A common budget should be established, to pay for the common structures and to finance a significant part of ESDP military missions, namely providing logistic support, in particular transport. This would notably require suitable funding arrangements for Battlegroups to be devised, so as to share the burden of battle-group readiness and operations fairly and squarely.
- At-the-ready capabilities for civilian crisis management must be improved. Standing civilian teams, at the national level, could be developed into a kind of EU crisis-management package suited to different types and different stages of civilian and civilian-

military missions.

Military training support, as well as police-training support and assistance, are important target areas for civilian crisis management. Small advisory teams and mobile training teams to support security sector reform should form part of the civilian crisis-management package.

- The possibility of being able to launch missions before all final political decisions have been taken needs to be considered so as to minimise critical procedural delays. Mechanisms will need to be set up to ensure ‘mission preparedness’, in which the Commission should play an important role.

4. The case for a single European defence market and joint procurement

The success of the EU single market has yet to be extended to defence. In Europe, the defence market is still characterised by fragmentation, a lack of transparency and lack of competition. Member States continue to resort to the ‘national security’ clause enshrined in Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and thus make the bulk of their defence purchases on a national basis.

Over time, the recent ‘defence package’ of EU legislation – initiated by the European Commission and agreed to by the governments and the European Parliament – should greatly reduce the need for governments to invoke Article 296, thereby creating a more open defence market across Europe, which is gradually being subjected to single market rules.

The creation of a competitive and efficient European defence market is a precondition to achieving better military capabilities across the EU through pooling and sharing, which requires joint programming to assure gaps are adequately addressed. The EDA was set up to achieve this goal, one that all profess to share. ‘Europeanising’ procurement is the first crucial step in this direction. A critical factor to bear in mind will be the centrality of security-related research, and the increasing importance of a ‘knowledge-base’ for operations in widely varied and often complex environments.

The weapons of the future require major investment in new technologies by virtue of which the tools of military force will be transformed, becoming smaller, more autonomous, more intelligent and very closely integrated. The combined defence budgets of the 27 EU governments amount to the second largest in the world after the United States. That collective amount of defence spending (over 200 billion euro) should be sufficient

to carry out all the necessary modernisation, provided that it is spent in a more rational and coordinated way.

Growing financial difficulties can partly be overcome by seeking civil-military synergies; combining EDA with security-related research investment in the Commission is a case in point. The Lisbon Strategy for development and innovation provides the framework for synergising including with non-EU countries, in particular the US. A knowledge-based global society can ill-afford to ignore the findings of advanced research wherever it is being developed.

5. Prioritising the European military and civilian command

There is a broad consensus among the authors that EU autonomy is implicit in the entire thrust of European security and defence policy since St. Malo. This should imply in the years to come a number of permanent structures: a formal Council of Defence Ministers, chaired by the EU 'Foreign Minister'; a European Security and Defence College, with its own premises and budget, to train all personnel in a common strategic culture of the Union; a European Command to plan and conduct the Union's military operations, alongside a civilian command and an integrated civil/military command capability; joint manoeuvres on the ground for European forces. The EDA and other relevant EU agencies should also be equipped with means commensurate with the EU's international ambitions. Setting up the civil-military autonomous command for EU missions is the most urgent task.

This should be followed by intelligence, to be gathered directly through a European agency. However one should bear in mind that intelligence of the kind needed for crisis-management operations is different from traditional military intelligence; open sources are normally more effective and quicker to access.

6. Developing a European perspective on the role of NATO

The distinctive identities of NATO, a military alliance, and European defence, a security and crisis management component of the Union, should make the question of the role of each in international security quite easy. Moreover, this should be the point of departure for the definition of an EU perspective on NATO.

The idea of a 'division of labour' (reflecting a wider separation of roles between a soft-powered EU and a hard-powered US) whereby ESDP gradually cedes its military component to NATO, which would become the sole military intervention body, possibly integrating a European defence pillar, is strongly rejected. There are three basic priorities

for the Europeans to guarantee that NATO continues to play an essential role in the collective defence of its members and is a guarantor of peace and security in the entire continent.

- The European Member States need to define a common position on the future of NATO, namely on its Strategic Concept, and the necessary decision-making autonomy of the two organisations needs to be understood and respected by all. This critical debate on NATO's Strategic Concept leading to its adoption in 2010 can shape the strategic outlook of the whole decade ahead.
- A stronger EU-US strategic relationship must be built, and for this the United States needs to clearly recognise, as there is every indication it is already doing, that European defence policy-decisions including those affecting the Atlantic Alliance will be increasingly made within a European framework. In this stronger security relationship with the EU, NATO is just one of the elements, and may not be the dominant element.
- The ESDP-NATO relationship must not be allowed to be a pretext for collective paralysis, both inside the EU and in NATO. On the contrary, increasing overlap between the European memberships in both structures should allow for more effective and dynamic cooperation. There is a need to rethink the modalities of this cooperation, which implies a swift resolution of the Cyprus question, putting more emphasis on successfully executing the tasks both organisations are called upon to perform today, especially when engaged in the same theatre.

7. Creating a European Parliamentary Council for Security and Defence

Democratic control of ESDP is becoming an issue, as European public opinion is demanding greater accountability and transparency with regard to the full spectrum of EU decisions. This requires the engagement of national parliaments and of the European Parliament. More extensive parliamentary debate on ESDP will lead to increased public scrutiny and awareness of ESDP missions, thus enhancing their legitimacy, both at the European and national levels.

The 'Europeanisation' of the national parliamentary defence committees is thus a condition for the success of ESDP. This should be achieved by a greater interaction between the European Parliament subcommittee on security and defence and equivalent committees from the EU's national parliaments. A European Parliamentary Council for Security

and Defence should speedily replace the existing WEU Assembly.

8. Building an 'open' ESDP

The European Union needs to take into account all the relevant implications for ESDP of four concomitant strategic conclusions:

- The international system has changed fundamentally, and in future the success of most EU security and defence objectives will depend not only on cooperation with the United States, within or in most cases outside NATO, but on its ability to engage with other states and also regional organisations.
- The Union shares with many countries of the world a common interest in keeping the flux of globalisation open in a way that allows for the development of effective multilateral cooperation. The current involvement of a large number of states from several continents in anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa is a good example of shared global security interests.
- EU missions will normally be developed in the framework of the UN, which implies substantial legitimacy and a convergence with other UN Member States.
- EU involvement in crisis management operations is welcomed by many.

There is no reason for the European Union not to open ESDP to strategic partners and develop with them common training and interoperability necessary to the effectiveness of the missions. This is already happening in a number of *ad hoc* cases, but should become the rule. A number of other states, from Africa and Latin America, have already shown an interest in developing far-reaching cooperation with the EU.

Deeper cooperation should be sought first and foremost with candidate countries and neighbouring countries. Turkey in particular should be fully associated with the ESDP and all EU agencies.

The EU should have ESDP representatives in the EU missions to the UN, the United States, Brazil, China, India and Russia in order to promote security cooperation.

Coherence and cohesiveness is a precondition to assure that the European Union, acting as a hub for a broad multilateral coalition, will simultaneously reinforce its effectiveness and its distinctive international identity.

9. Overcoming the political deficit: putting coherence first

Without a clear-cut strategy for international action, the ability of the European Union to make full use of its multiple strengths, i.e. consistently bringing all EU foreign policy instruments into play, is severely curtailed. A civilian power that has delegitimised power politics, the EU has a unique ability to develop a comprehensive concept of international action, including in the field of security and defence. ESDP is just a part of what the EU does as a global security player. The EU's global political role on the international stage must remain the overriding concern.

Politically, ESDP has been restored to its proper place as tool of the Union's foreign policy – it is not a separate fourth pillar. But both foreign policy and security and defence policy must converge with all the policies of the Union. ESDP is one among an array of other tools possessed by the European Union, whose success depends on its ability to integrate the military component in a common political strategy. This is not a weakness of the Union, since developments in international security make non-military crisis management resources increasingly important, and the Union is the only organisation to possess the entire range of resources required – economic, legal, humanitarian, financial, civil and military. This throws its strategic modernity, and hence its added value as a global security institution, into sharp relief.

A clear priority that cannot wait for 2020 is to make the necessary reforms to ensure the coherence and the consistency of the EU's international action. In the event that the Lisbon Treaty is not ratified, the European Council should nominate the High Representative for External Action as Vice-President of the Commission, thus extending the practice of double-hatting to the external representation of the Union, by introducing the necessary legal reform. The role of the European Commission in CFSP and ESDP should be acknowledged: it manages the CFSP budget, which finances all civilian ESDP operations and plays an important role in prevention and reconstruction.

10. Inclusiveness is a prerequisite for legitimacy

The need to move forward with the military dimension of ESDP has been articulated around the proposal of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC), to be established among a few able and willing EU Member States, along the same lines as what has been achieved with the eurozone states in the monetary field. This can increase efficiency without compromising European legitimacy if, and only if, as with Monetary Union, participation is open to all Member States on the basis of well-defined and well-publicised 'convergence criteria' set forth by the Council. It is for the Council to decide at what point

in time PSC convergence criteria are met by Member States wishing to join. Moreover, in formulating the criteria the Council needs to ensure a higher degree of legitimacy for PSC. It is necessary to bear in mind that in the case of the European Union there is a clear link between its effectiveness and its European legitimacy, the European dimension of a given operation being an important condition for its welcome deployment.

One basic criterion should be willingness to participate in and to contribute to the common effort according to an individual state's capacities and possibilities. Furthermore, if an operation is launched on behalf of the European Union by a limited number of states, no Member State wishing to usefully contribute to such an operation should be prevented from doing so.

The ambition of the Union for 2020 should not be a European mini-defence project, spearheaded by the most militarily capable Member States, but a powerful foreign, security and defence policy, able to pull together, in a coherent and consistent way, the weight of all Member States and of all the European institutions.

Annexes

ANNEX 1: The authors

Claude-France Arnould is a Minister Plenipotentiary and has been Director of Defence Issues, Directorate VIII, at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union since 2001. She was Director of International and Strategic Affairs at the French National Defence General Secretariat from 1998 to 2001, and First Counsellor at the French embassy in Germany from 1994 to 1998. Secretary General of the French National School for Public Administration (ENA) from 1987 to 1989, Claude-France Arnould was also Special Adviser in the Office of the Minister for European Affairs in 1986.

Juha Auvinen is Head of Unit for CFSP Operations at the External Relations Directorate General of the European Commission. His unit manages the CFSP budget and represents the Commission in the Committee for Civilian aspects of Crisis Management and the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Group of the Council. Prior to joining the Commission in 1997, he was Professor of International Relations at the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi, Finland. He holds a D.Phil in Development Studies from the University of Sussex and is Docent of International Politics at the University of Helsinki. He has published a number of articles on security and development, e.g. in the *Third World Quarterly*, *Journal of Peace Research*, and in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution and World Development*.

General Henri Bentégeat graduated from the Military Academy of Saint Cyr in 1967, and subsequently served in both France and Africa. In 1990, he was sent to Washington, D.C. as the Assistant Defence Attaché and came back to Paris in 1992 to attend the Advanced Military Studies Course. He then became Assistant to the Chief of the Military Staff of the President of the Republic in 1993. Having been promoted to Brigadier General in 1996, he took command of the French forces in the West Indies. In 1998, he was promoted to Major General and became assistant to the Director for Strategic Affairs of the Ministry of Defence. In April 1999, he was assigned to the Elysée Palace as the Chief of the Military Staff of the President of the Republic. He was promoted to Lieutenant General on 1 September 1999 and General on 4 January 2001. He became Chief of the Defence Staff in October 2002. On 6 November 2006, he was appointed Chairman of the European Union Military Committee by decision of the European Council.

Nicole Gnesotto is currently Professor of International Relations, responsible for the chair of European Union studies at the Conservatoire national des Arts et Métiers in Paris. For the past three years, she has also been vice-president of the think tank 'Notre Europe', created by Jacques Delors. She was the first Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies, from 2002 until May 2007, after having been Director of the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union (WEU) from 1 October 1999 until 31 December 2001. She was formerly (1994-99) a professor at the Institut d'Etudes politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) and *chargée de mission* to the Director of the Institut français des Relations internationales (IFRI). A specialist in security issues, she was deputy head of the French Foreign Ministry's Centre d'Analyse et de Prévision (policy planning staff) from 1986 to 1990. She is the author of many publications and articles. Her most recent book, *Notre Europe*, co-edited with Michel Rocard, was published by Robert Laffont in October 2008.

Jolyon Howorth is Jean Monnet Professor *ad personam* of European Politics at the University of Bath (UK) and, since 2002, has been permanent Visiting Professor of Political Science at Yale University. He has published extensively in the field of European security and defence policy and transatlantic relations – fourteen books and over two hundred journal articles and chapters in books. Recent books include: *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (2007); *Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy* (2003, co-edited); *European Integration and Defence: the Ultimate Challenge?* (2000)

F. Stephen Larrabee holds the Corporate Chair in European Security at the Rand Corporation. He has a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University and has taught at Columbia University, Cornell University, New York University, the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Georgetown University, George Washington University and the University of Southern California. Before joining RAND he served as Vice President and Director of Studies of the Institute of East-West Security Studies in New York from 1983-1989 and was a distinguished Scholar in Residence at the Institute from 1989-1990. From 1978-1981 Dr. Larrabee served on the U.S. National Security Council staff in the White House as a specialist on Soviet-East European affairs and East-West political-military relations. He is the author of numerous books and articles.

Tomas Ries is Director of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. He has worked with security studies since 1979. During the Cold War he focussed on Soviet military interests in the north, Nordic security and Finland's security policy. Since 1992 his main interest is the globalising security environment and future trends. Previous positions include Senior Researcher at the National Defence College in Finland (1997-2004), Deputy Director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (1996-1997), Director of the International Training Course in Geneva, Switzerland (1992-1996), Senior Researcher at

the Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo (1988-1992) and Researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo (1986-1988). Dr. Ries holds a B.Sc. (Econ) from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a Ph.D. from the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Geneva University.

Jacek Saryusz-Wolski graduated with a Ph.D in economics from the University of Lodz in 1980. He studied at the Centre Européenne Universitaire in Nancy, France and was Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence (1989-90). At various stages in his academic career he was Guest Professor and Researcher at the Universities of Lyon, Grenoble, Oxford, Edinburgh and Paris (1972-90). Active in the Solidarno c movement, he went on to become the first Polish Minister for European Affairs (1991-96 and 2000-2001) and was the architect of Poland's entry into the European Union. He was President of the Natolin European Centre and Foundation College of Europe and Vice-Rector of the College of Europe, Bruges and Natolin (1997-99). He was Vice-President of the European Parliament from 2004 to 2006, and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the European Parliament from 2007 to 2009. He was re-elected MEP in 2009.

Stefano Silvestri is President of the Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI), and has been variously connected with the IAI since 1966. As a professional journalist he has worked for the major Italian newspapers (*La Stampa*, *Corriere della Sera*, *Repubblica* and lastly *Il Sole 24 Ore*). He has been a consultant to a number of Italian Prime Ministers as well as to the Italian Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Industry and to the European Commission, as well as being a member of the French Economic Defence Council. He was UnderSecretary of State for Defence in 1995-96. He written extensively on strategic and military questions.

Alexander Stubb is the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Prior to his appointment in April 2008, he served as a member of the European Parliament in 2004-2008. He has wide experience of EU affairs – he was a member of the Finnish Delegation to the Inter-Governmental Conference in 1999-2001 and 2003-2004 and worked as an adviser to the President of the European Commission in 2001-2003. He graduated from the College of Europe, and later held the post of a Visiting Professor (2000-2007). He has a Ph.D from the London School of Economics and has published numerous books on the European Union.

Nuno Severiano Teixeira is Minister of National Defence of the Portuguese Government, since July 2006. Until that time, he was Professor of International Relations at the New University of Lisbon. He has been Visiting Professor at Georgetown University (2000) and Visiting Scholar at the Institute for European Studies, Berkeley University of California. From 2000 to 2002 he was Minister of Home Affairs and from 1996 to 2000 director of the National Defence Institute in Lisbon. He has published extensively on Portuguese foreign policy and military history.

Álvaro de Vasconcelos has been Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies since May 2007. Prior to this, he headed the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (IEEI) in Lisbon, of which he is a co-founder, from 1981 to 2007, from where he launched several networks including the Euro-Latin American Forum and EuroMeSCo. As well as being a regular columnist in the Portuguese and international press, he is author and co-editor of many books, articles and reports, notably in the areas of the EU common foreign and security policy and on the world order, such as *Portugal: A European Story*, *La PESC: Ouvrir l'Europe au Monde*, *The European Union, Mercosur and the New World Order*, and *A European Strategy for the Mediterranean*. He was co-editor (with Giovanni Grevi) of EUISS *Chaillot Paper* no. 109 'Partnerships for effective multilateralism – EU relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia' (May 2008) and edited EUISS Report no. 4, *The EU and the world in 2009 – European perspectives on the new American foreign policy agenda*; he also edited and contributed to EUISS Report no. 5, *The European Security Strategy 2003-2008 – Building on common interests* (January 2009) and was a contributor to EUISS Report no. 1, *Union for the Mediterranean – Building on the Barcelona acquis* (May 2008).

Alexander Weis graduated in law studies from the universities of Saarbrücken and Treves. During his early career he worked at the Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement, was Deputy Armaments Attaché at the German Embassy in Paris and German exchange official at the French Ministry of Defence in Paris. He then worked in several State Secretaries' offices in Berlin until his appointment as Chief of Staff in the Directorate General of Armaments and subsequently Director of Armaments in Bonn. He was appointed Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency in Brussels on 1 October 2007.

Richard Wright is the European Commission representative to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) at the Directorate General for External Relations and was formerly Director for relations with North America, East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, EEA, EFTA, San Marino, Andorra and Monaco. He is also Head of Crisis Platform and Policy Coordination in CFSP. He is the former Ambassador, Head of Delegation of the European Commission to the Russian Federation, Moscow, and has had considerable experience of a variety of posts within the European Commission.

Annexes

ANNEX 2: Survey: what ambitions for European defence in 2020?

Ten questions about ESDP that were put to the authors in this volume

(1) What kind of missions should be undertaken under ESDP? (Should the Union agree to integrate in the objectives of ESDP an article similar to Article 5 of the WEU or NATO treaties)?

- Can the security commitments (explicit and implicit) already present in the Lisbon Treaty be met without a sound ESDP?
- What other types of operations (civil or military) might the EU undertake in the future?

(2) What principles and values will drive ESDP? Will human security be the general orientation of ESDP? How important will the Responsibility to Protect (RtP) be to EU security priorities?

(3) What should be the exact capacities of ESDP? Are we going to move towards a European army? If not, what should be the model for the European Armed Forces?

- How to integrate military and non-military capacities? What kind of non-military capacities are needed (this is one of the major problems confronting the EU in crisis management)?

(4) Will we have a European Defence Market? What kind of market will it be?

(5) What kind of organisation should be put in place for ESDP? Will there be an EU permanent operational headquarters, alongside SHAPE?

(6) How will relations with the US and NATO be organised in 2020?

(7) Where does the legitimacy of ESDP come from? What should be the role of the European Parliament? Is there a role for the WEU Assembly? Should a third kind of inter-parliamentary organisation for ESDP be created?

(8) What should be the geographic outreach for ESDP? Should it have a purely regional role? Should it have a regional plus Africa or a global role?

- What is the potential for European-sponsored multilateral missions, with or without an EU flag, stemming from permanent structured cooperation? How should they relate to the EU chain of command?

(9) What will be the place and importance of the ESDP in CFSP? How can we pool the divided competencies of our national foreign and defence ministers at the European level?

(10) Will the ESDP be a common policy conducted for and by all Member States or a policy conducted by a few with a core group of Member States? In other words, what will be its flexibility?

Annexes

ANNEX 3: Abbreviations

AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
AMS	Alienated Modern States
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BOG	Boots on the Ground
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India and China
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCM	Civilian Crisis Management
CDP	Capability Development Plan
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
C-IED	Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CNO	Computer Network Operations
CoBPSC	Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CRT	Civilian Response Team
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	European Armaments Cooperation
EATF	European Air Transport Fleet
EBB	Electronic Bulletin Board
EC	European Commission
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDEM	European Defence Equipment Market
EDRT	European Defence Research and Technology
EDTIB	European Defence Technological and Industrial Base
EEAS	European External Action Service
EMS	European Military Staff
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU BG	EU Battle Group
EUMC	EU Military Committee

EUMM	EU Monitoring Mission
EUSR	EU Special Representative
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GMES	Global Monitoring for Environment and Security
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IGC	Intergovernmental conference
IT	Information Technology
JIP	Joint Investment Programme
JIP-FP	Joint Investment Programme on Force Protection
JIP-ICET	Joint Investment Programme on Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air Defence Systems
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NRF	NATO Response Force
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
OSCE	Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe
PMC	Postmodern Community
PMS	Premodern Societies
PSC	(i) Permanent Structured Cooperation (ii) Political and Security Committee
R&T	Research and Technology
RTS	Rapid Transition Societies
SAFE	Synchronised Armed Forces Europe
SMS	Struggling Modern States
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TNC	Transnational Corporations
UAV	Unmanned Air Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union

CHAILLOT PAPERS

- 116 JUN 09** War crimes, conditionality and EU integration in the Western Balkans
Judy Batt, Vojin Dimitrijevic, Florence Hartmann, Dejan Jovic, Tija Memisevic and Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik; edited by Judy Batt and Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik
- 115 AVR 09** Maghreb : vaincre la peur de la démocratie
Luis Martinez
- 114 DEC 08** Negotiating the final status of Kosovo
Marc Weller
- 113 NOV 08** Towards a European Defence Market
Erkki Aalto, Daniel Keohane, Christian Mölling and Sophie de Vaucorbeil; edited by Daniel Keohane
- 112 OCT 08** EU security and defence. Core documents 2007
Volume VIII, compiled by Catherine Glière (also published in French)
- 111 SEP 08** Bush's legacy and America's next foreign policy
Marcin Zaborowski
- 110 AUG 08** Rethinking Iran: From confrontation to cooperation
Christoph Bertram
- 109 MAY 08** Partnerships for effective multilateralism: EU relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia
Ummu Salma Bava, Feng Zhongping, Sabine Fischer, Marco Aurélio Garcia, François Godement, Giovanni Grevi, Dimtri Trenin, Alfredo Valladão, Álvaro de Vasconcelos and Christian Wagner; edited by Giovanni Grevi and Álvaro de Vasconcelos
- 108 FEB 08** Ukraine: Quo Vadis?
Sabine Fischer, Rosaria Puglisi, Kataryna Wolczuk and Pawel Wolowski; edited by Sabine Fischer
- 107 JAN 08** Is there an Albanian question?
Judy Batt, Misha Glenny, Denisa Kostovicova, Nicola Mai, Nadège Ragaru, Fabian Schmidt and Miranda Vickers; edited by Judy Batt
-

BOOKS

- 2006** The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025?
directed by Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi
- 2006** Friends again? EU-US relations after the crisis
Nicole Gnesotto, James Dobbins, Federico Romero, David Frum, William Wallace, Ronald D. Asmus, István Gyarmati, Walter B. Slocombe, Gilles Andréani, Philip H. Gordon, Werner Weidenfeld, Felix Neugart, Geoffrey Kemp, Dov Lynch, Fiona Hill, Baudoin Bollaert, Joseph Quinlan, Marcin Zaborowski; edited by Marcin Zaborowski
- 2005** Defence procurement in the European Union – The current debate
Report of an EUISS Task Force
Chairman and Rapporteur: Burkard Schmitt

Looking ahead to the horizon of 2020, this book seeks to define Europe's long-term security and defence ambitions, and to examine how these ambitions might translate into politics and policies.

The tenth anniversary of ESDP seems a fitting moment to outline perspectives for its evolution over the next ten years. In attempting to set out what should be the ambition of Europeans in the field of security and defence, we have asked the contributors to this volume to address a set of ten specific questions. The topics include the nature of ESDP missions and their geographical scope; intra-European solidarity and relations with NATO; ESDP goals and capacities; the creation of a European defence market; the legitimacy of ESDP in relation to the European Parliament and inter-parliamentary organisations; the principles and values that drive ESDP, including the concept of human security; and the issues of coherence and flexibility.

'This book makes a significant contribution to the debate on the future of ESDP and the implications of what the Lisbon Treaty could and should bring to it, identifying the obstacles to progress and solutions for addressing them. I am grateful to the EUISS for this important initiative and to the contributors for their valuable input.'

Javier Solana
(Preface)

Contributors:

Claude-France Arnould
Juha Auvinen
Henri Bentégeat
Nicole Gnesotto
Jolyon Howorth
F. Stephen Larrabee
Tomas Ries

Jacek Saryusz-Wolski
Stefano Silvestri
Alexander Stubb
Nuno Severiano Teixeira
Álvaro de Vasconcelos
Alexander Weis
Richard Wright

ISBN 978-92-9198-145-8
QN-80-09-755-EN-C

published by the EU Institute for Security Studies
43 avenue du Président Wilson
F-75775 Paris cedex 16
phone: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 30
fax: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 31
e-mail: info@iss.europa.eu
www.iss.europa.eu